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Abstract 
In this work 1 develop an argument which shows that rule-following is impossible, and 
investigate its impact on the philosophy of language. By way of orientation, 1 start with a 
critical evaluation of existing ‘rule-following considerations’, arguments derived fi-om 
Wittgenstein which purportedly put rule-following under pressure. Having shown that its 
predecessors are unsound, and with the explicit aim of avoiding their flaws, I then formulate 
the new ‘indexical’ argument. 
The conclusion that rule-following is impossible is difficult to accept because we think that 
the ability to folldiw rules is constitutive of language-mastery. If this is correct, then to show 
that rule-following is impossible is to show that language is impossible. Such ‘meaning 
nihilism’ is not a tenable position, and some way of avoiding this conclusion has to be 
found. Various proposals in the literature have the potential to do this: principally (a) the 
irrealism suggested by Kripke; and (b) subjective on-gong determination advocated by 
Wright. 1 argue that neither strategy is successful. 
The correct response to the indexical argument is to accept that rule-following is not 
constitutive of language-mastery. In this case, clearly, the impossibility of rule-following 
does not entail the impossibility meaning, and the conclusion that rule-following is 
impossible becomes unproblematic. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how language could 
survive without rules. The remainder of this work shows that rule-elimination does permit a 
respectable notion of linguistic content. The result is distinctively Wittgensteinian: a 
communitarian, ‘use’-based account of language. 
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This is an investigation into the nature of rule-following. It is motivated by the readily 
acknowledged connection between rules and meaning, namely that rules bestow words with 
content. To have meaning, a word must have an extension; to use the word meaningfully, I 
must know what that extension is. To take an example, the meaning of the English word 
‘red’ determines that it applies to all, and only, red objects, and if I am to know tlie meaning 
of that word, I have to know that the word applies to all and only red objects. Since the word 
‘red’ applies to countless objects - objects which I have never come across, nor even 
envisaged - it cannot be that I know explicitly which objects ‘red’ applies to. Rather, I must 
have aprinciple for using the word - that is, a rule governing its application to the world. It 
is the fact that we follow a certain rule when using a word that gives the word its meaning. 
As a result, the illumination of rule-following ought to allow for the illumination of meaning. 
In focusing on tlie rule which governs the application of the word ‘red’ (which we may call a 
‘truth-rule’, for it is the rule governing what the word is true of), we simplify things 
enormously. Complete mastery of a complex language such as English would normally be 
considered to involve mastery of several layers of rules. I n  addition to the application rules 
mentioned above, there are also, for example, graininatical and syntactical rules governing 
the way that words may be combined to form sentences and simple sentences combined to 
form complex ones. In addition, we follow various discourse rules which govern the way 
different constructions can have different senses - literal meaning as opposed to 
metaphorical, say. Yet it is the truth-rule that bestows a word with content, and it is the 




Rules seem to permeate human existence at every level. Not only do we think of ourselves as following rules 
when we speak, but also when acting morally, lawfully, or politely. In addition, there are many wholly practical 
endeavours in which the avoidance of disaster appears to depend upon our satisfaction of various rules. (For 
example, when driving, stay on the stipulated side of the road: when constructing a building, use your materials to 
within their load-bearing capacity, and so on.) The ramifications of any examination of rule-following, therefore, 
extend far beyond the philosophy of language. having bearing on ethics, the philosophy of law, and indeed on the 
framework used to explain human behaviour in general. Whilst I acknowledge the wider significance that rule- 
following has, it is not possible to consider such matters within this work. 
1 
Wittgenstein’s Attack 
Whilst the content-bestowing power of rules is sufficient to make the formulation of a theory 
of rule-following worthwhile, the endeavour is made wholly compelling by the fertility of 
Wittgenstein’s own investigations in this area. It is now broadly recognised that 
Wittgenstein’s “rule-following considerations” (principally Philosophical Investigations $5  
139-242, and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Part VI) lie at the heart of his 
later philosophy. From the examination of rules, he formulates an original philosophy of 
language, which in turn supports theses in the philosophies of logic, mathematics, mind, and 
of the nature of philosophy itself. In this way, the alteration to our views about language 
arising from the investigation of rules gives unprecedented potential for shedding new light 
on old problems. 
The foundation of Wittgenstein’s argument is the contention that our commonplace 
(philosophical) thoughts about rules and rule-following are fundamentally wrong. As a result 
of the negative argument we are forced to revise of our notion of rule-following, and, given 
the noted connection between rules and meaning, a corresponding alteration to our views 
about language ensues. Without giving any further detail, the overall structure of 
Wittgenstein’s argument can thus be given in three parts: 
Negative Argument: A demonstration that our ordinary conception of rule-following is 
somehow flawed. 
A revision of the notion of rule-following to accommodate the 
conclusion of the negative argument. 
The incorporation of the revised theory of rule-following within a 
(revised) theory of meaning. 
Positive Thesis: 
App 1 icat ion : 
Should we try to pin down the detail of Wittgenstein’s argument in more detail, we would 
face controversy at every stage. There is no consensus as to the identity of the ‘ordinary 
conception’ of rule-following that Wittgenstein intended to overturn; the nature of the 
negative argument; the positive steps he suggested should be taken to remedy the situation; 
the impact of these concerns on the rest of his philosophy. 
It is not my aim to settle any exegetical disputes here, for it is the overall strategy which is of 
interest. Certainly, without needing to settle on the exact interpretation of his work, it is clear 
that Wittgenstein’s own investigation into rule-following was original and penetrating, and 
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of such significance to him that it became the foundation for much of his (later) philosophy. 
At the outset it would be rash to suggest that Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the subject can be 
bettered, or that his work leaves room for any substantial development of the topic. In no 
way do I wish to play down the magnitude of Wittgenstein’s contribution, or the degree in 
which every discussion of rule-following, including this one, is indebted to him. However, 
the automatic limitation of our discussion to Wittgenstein ’s rule-following considerations is a 
needless restriction. Philosophy is better served, I think, if, rather than asking what 
Wittgenstein intended to show, we instead take this overall structure and see how far it can 
ng, is the problem with 
does this have on the 
take us. With this aim, the questions before us are: What, if anyth 
rule-following? What is the appropriate response? What impact 
philosophy of language? 
The Paradox of Rule-Following 
My formulation of the tripartite structure given above is inspired by Saul Kripke’s influential 
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, where the separation of negative argument 
from corresponding positive thesis is given particular prominence. (Although Wittgenstein 
did not lay out the tripartite structure given above explicitly, it is beyond question that 
Wittgenstein’s intentions in discussing rules were polemical - not merely to elaborate on our 
ordinary characterisation of rules, but to alter our views - in which case his first step must 
have been to show that there is something wrong with the (then) received position. In 
making the division so prominent, we do not thereby misrepresent the substance of the 
argument, but merely make the somewhat obscure structure more visible.) Given that it is 
possible to run these first two steps of the argument together, to present a single unified case 
in support of the posited revisionary thesis, it might be thought that this division is somewhat 
superficial. However, in Kripke’s hands the division is far from idle, for it is used to good 
motivational effect. (My reason for retaining this aspect of Kripke‘s presentation is precisely 
to exploit that effect here.) 
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The motivation in question comes from the generation of a ‘paradox of rule-following’. The 
paradox arises when we note that the reason for rejecting the ordinary conception of rule- 
following is that rule-following so characterised cannot occur. In short, the argument must 
show that rule-following, as ordinarily Characterised, is impossible. On the basis of the above 
noted constitutive connection between rules and meaning, if rule-following is impossible, 
2 
Kripke (1  982). 
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then so too is meaning. If this is right, language is illusory. Such a conclusion is certainly 
difficult (if not impossible) to accept,3 for if meaning is impossible, we could not state the 
conclusion of the argument; nor, for that matter, could we formulate the argument in the first 
place. In short, the ‘sceptical’ argument undermines itself, which is why Kripke calls it the 
‘ paradox’ of the ru 1 e- fo 1 low ing cons iderat i ons. 
(For my part I cannot accept that this ‘paradox’ is a genuine antimony. Clearly meaning 
nihilism is a position which cannot be established by argument - indeed by its own lights it 
cannot even be stated - but that alone does not ensure that meaning is, after all, possible. This 
is because a stable response to the self-defeating nature of any such argument would be to 
accept that it is not an argument at all precisely because language is not possible. This, 
though, is a ininor point, for a paradox can also be a demonstration that what manifestly is 
the case cannot actually occur. The existence of a paradox of rule-following in this more 
informal sense is quite sufficient to galvanise a search for a disarming response to a negative 
argument. Meaningful communication is possible; we do it all the time. The challenge is to 
see how this can be so.) 
To avoid the paradox, Kripke suggests that a more sophisticated response has to be found, 
one which avoids the self-defeating result. To this end, Kripke portrays his negative 
argument - what he calls the “sceptical argument” - as a step in a larger argument which ends 
with a retreat from realism about meanings. I shall examine Kripke’s alternative conclusion 
in Part 2, but for now our interest lies with the effect of the paradox, which is toforce us to 
reconsider rule-following at a fundamental level, to formulate some new position not 
previously on the map. It is precisely because any negative argument (not just Kripke’s) will 
give rise to the same paradox, and so will similarly compel us to expand our horizons, that 
the search for any such argument gains its true significance. 
Strategy 
When I started this work I was not convinced that anyone had found a substantial problem 
with rule-following, which is to say that I was not convinced that the rule-following 
considerations had any substantial message to convey. What I was certain about was that the 
rule-following considerations reflect on the notion of meaning at such a fundamental level, 
that there is no more important question in the philosophy of language than whether any of 
3 
Though this view - that meaningful communication is impossible - was apparently held by Cratylus. 
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the positions claimed as the result of this type of enquiry could in fact be established. 
Whether actually ascribed to Wittgenstein, or simply inspired by Wittgenstein, there is a 
wide range of theories offered as “the message of the rule-following considerations”. Those 
already on the table include: that meaning is communal; that meaning is public; that 
meanings are not real; that meanings are non-naturalistic; that they are subjective; 
dispositional; unanalysable. Theories such as these promise stout ramifications in other 
philosophical areas, in particular for theories of the mind, of truth, and for the distinctions 
between the real and the non-real, the objective and the subjective. Although I cannot 
address this second tier of issues within this work, clearly there is at least the prospect that 
the rule-following considerations have radical and far reaching consequences, and we cannot 
start to identify these until we know precisely what position we should take with respect to 
meaning. 
As we shall see, I do think that there is a serious problem with our notion of following a rule, 
indeed one not hitherto identified. The argument is presented in the way it was developed, 
that is subsequent to a detailed evaluation of existing negative arguments. Of these, there are 
basically two types - ontological and epistemological - and they are considered in turn in the 
first two chapters. Neither approach is successful, but it is only in  light of their failure - by 
identifying gaps to be filled, and inspirations to be borrowed - that the new argument could 
come into being. 
As mentioned, any argument which threatens the idea that we are rule-followers generates 
the Kripkean ‘paradox’ of rule-following. Having presented a negative argument, the 
discussion opens up: given that there is a difficulty with rule-following, and given that in 
order to salvage language we have to do something, what should we do? In the spirit of 
investigation I shall not here pre-empt my conclusions any further. I did not set out to defend 
any one position, and correspondingly I shall allow the argument to take its own course. 
I have already indicated one way in which my approach has been influenced by Kripke’s 
enquiry, and there are two further features of his work which I have incorporated here. One 
is that the rule-following considerations be taken as foundational. Not all interpretations of 
Wittgenstein accept this view - in particular Wright (1980) sees the discussion of rules as 
issuing from a strong premise in the philosophy of language, namely the manifestablity of 
meaning. Again, without deciding which is really Wittgenstein’s strategy (my own view is 
that Wright is here wrong), I shall take the examination of rules as the starting point for our 
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enquiry, a point from which all other results follow. Our question is what can the 
examination of rule-following tell us, not what can such an examination tell us in the light of 
certain other strong philosophical theses. 
Secondly, Kripke describes his work, not as a straightforward account of Wittgenstein, but as 
“Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke” (1  982, p. 5). With reference to his own work, 
Wright, who has probably written more on this issue than anyone else, and whose work has 
also been a great influence here, could have said something similar. It is this kind of 
approach which is most exciting: a discussion of rule-following sparked-off, certainly, by 
Wittgenstein‘s incredible insights, but one in which exegesis is not allowed to suffocate 
innovation. It is in the hope of contributing to the discussion in this spirit that I present the 





1 Kripke’s ‘Sceptical’ Argument 
Kripke’s (1982) has become the undisputed benchmark for any discussion of the rule- 
following considerations, and given that it emphasises the negative aims of the initial stages 
of the argument, it is the obvious place to start our search for a case against the possibility of 
rule-following. I shall start by giving an account of the core argument - the so-called 
‘sceptical’ challenge - as I understand it. Somewhat surprisingly for an exposition as clear as 
Kripke’s, this argument has been subject to various differing interpretations, and so I go on 
to say something in defence of the version given here. Finally, I shall consider some of the 
criticisms which have been directed against the ‘sceptical’ argument. Although the argument 
is eventually unsuccessful, our aim here is to assess its strengths and weaknesses, and so to 
learn what lessons it has to teach, and what improvements have to be made if we are to 
deliver a more successful argument in its place. 
1 
Kripke’s argument that rule-following is impossible - that meaning is impossible - proceeds 
on the basis of exhaustive elimination. He first identifies an adequacy condition which must 
be satisfied if someone is to be a rule-follower. He then lists all the properties of a person - 
physical and psychological - which could potentially satisfy this condition. In turn, each type 
of property on the list is shown to be inadequate in one respect or other. If no property of a 
person determines that she i s  following a rule, then she is not a rule-follower. Likewise, 
since to grasp the meaning of a word is (at least) to grasp a rule governing its correct 
application, on the basis of the conclusion that nothing determines which rule our speaker is 




Kripke indicates that he personally does not accept the argument which he presents in the name of Wittgenstein 
(see for example 1982, pp. 93-94, fn. 76). For the sake of brevity I shall take Kripke’s misgivings as read, and 
speak of the argument as ifKripke fully endorsed it. 
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Of course one cannot often use a single word to utter a sentence, and so the meaning of a word does not usually 
dictate any correct use outside the context of a sentence. Clearly what is meant is that given the meanings of the 
other words in a sentence, the word ‘green’ determines a rule for correct use. 
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The adequacy condition in question is quite uncontentious, and can be illustrated with an 
example. Take someone who is following the rule add 2. Having proceeded 2, 4, 6, etc., the 
next number is clearly 8. That is, the rule determines that the correct thing for the agent to do 
at this stage is to say ‘ 8 ’ :  any other answer would be wrong. Clearly there are an infinite 
number of steps in the series, and at each one of them the rule must determine what action 
accords with the rule. Thus the rule determines an infinite correctness condition, an infinite 
norm. If I am to follow a rule, something must determine which rule I am following, that is, 
which action is correct in any given situation. This, then, is Kripke’s adequacy condition: 
To follow a rule, an infinite correctness condition must be in force. 
Kripke’s ‘sceptical’ problem concerns grasp of a rule (and grasp of meaning), not rule- 
following as such (i.e. with the problem of having an infinite correctness condition somehow 
in mind, rather than the question of how one uses the rule to inform one’s behaviour) - 
though of course one cannot follow a rule unless one grasps it first. 
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We should normally think that someone who continues the sequence 2, 4, 6 is following the 
rule add 2, that the next answer they ought to give is 8, and that there is no substantial 
question as to which rule is being followed. However, in this case the rule add 2 is not the 
only option. Kripke makes this plain with his example of the ‘quus’ function (symbolised by 
‘O’), defined as follows: 
v X, y: x 0 y = x + y, ifx, y < 57 
= 5 otherwise. 
Suppose that we are faced with someone continuing: 2, 4, 6, etc., who has now reached a 
stage further in the series than she has ever reached before. For convenience we suppose that 
the speaker has led a rather sheltered life (arithmetically speaking), and so far has had no 
dealings with any numbers greater than 57. Of course, we should expect her to say that after 
56 comes 58, for she appears to be following the rule add 2. Yet for numbers less than 57, 
the series generated by the quus function is (by definition) the same as that generated by 
addition. So the answers that our subject has given so far are consistent with her following 
3 
Wittgenstein’s attack on the possibility of rule-following (i.e. getting into epistemic contact with the 
requirements of a rule), an attack which assumes that grasp of a rule is unproblematic, is considered in Chapter 2. 
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either the rule add 2, or the rule quadd 2 (where quadding is to quus as adding is to plus). On 
reaching 56, the two rules diverge: if our subject is adding she ought to say ‘58’ next, if 
quadding he should say ‘5’. If she really is following one rule rather than the other, then 
something about her situation must determine which answer at that stage is correct. 
The difference between plus and quus can be treated as a test case. In fact, no matter how 
many elements in the series have been developed, there are countless such ‘quus’-like 
functions which are consistent with the answers given so far. (We can always define a 
function which deviates from addition at the very next step not yet considered; and there are 
endless different such deviations we can consider - add to a certain point, then continue 6, 6, 
6, etc., or at first add 2, then add 4, and so on.) Indeed, for any response the agent now gives, 
no matter how the rule has been applied in the past, we are able to construct a rule under 
which the present answer turns out to be correct. Unless some property of the speaker 
distinguishes between her following the rule for plus and not quus, then the floodgate is 
opened; any answer is correct according to some rule. So unless something determines that 
the rule in force is plus, not quus, we should lose sight of the idea that a rule is in force at all. 
The situation is not peculiar to mathematics. In a similar vein, we can consider someone who 
has been using the term ‘green’ in accordance with normal English usage, namely to refer to 
green objects. Again, we should usually say that this person means green by ‘green’, but as 
before this is not the only option. For example, we can define the predicate ‘grue’ as 
fol 1 ow s : 
4 
Vx, t: x is grue at time t Q x is green at t and t < ls t  January 2000 
x is blue otherwise. 
In the (pre-2000) present, those who mean green by ‘green’, and those who means q u e ,  
ought to apply the term to the same objects, namely the green ones. After this turn of the 
century we should expect their behaviour to diverge: those who mean green ought to 
continue to call green things ‘green’, those who mean grue ought to apply the term to blue 
things. For our subject to mean green, not grue, something must determine that at that time 
‘green’ correctly applies to green objects, and not to blue ones. 
4 
The predicate ’grue’ comes from Goodman ( 1973). The above definition is significantly different from 
Goodman’s original, but the alteration has become reasonably standard. 
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The key point to be drawn from these examples is that no matter what actions have been 
performed in the past, any new action could count as following the same rule, given an 
appropriate rule. If rule-following is possible, then something about the individual must 
determine which action is correct in each situation. What we want to know is, what is it 
about an individual which makes the difference: what determines that one rule is in force and 
not some other (or no rule at all). 
As mentioned, Kripke holds that nothing can determine that some specific rule is in force, 
rather than some quus-like alternative. To demonstrate this, his strategy is to identify all the 
properties of an individual which might plausibly play the determining role, and to discount 
each in turn. The list of putative meaning determining facts he arrives at is as follows: 
( 0  Self-directed thoughts or instructions 
(ii) Dispositions or functional states 
(iii) 
(iv) Platonic objects 
(v) Irreducible meaning properties 
Mental pictures, or other qualitative mental states or experiences 
Kripke argues, in a piecemeal fashion, that none of these things can determine an infinite 
norm. The intention is that this list covers all reasonable options, that there is nothing else we 
could suggest as a meaning determinant. On that basis, if none of the above determines 
meaning, then nothing does. 
Self-Directed Instructions 
Turning to the first item on the list, we might suppose that the speaker gives herself explicit 
instructions which would rule out the possibility that she means p u s .  Clearly when we grasp 
the meaning of addition, we do not (and cannot) think of all possible additions, and so the 
meaning of the word cannot be determined by our explicit entertainment of all correct 
applications. However, there are more general principles we might think that our use of the 
word must obey. For example, our speaker might say to herself “The sum of two (positive) 
numbers is always greater than either of those numbers.” If so, then her instructions rule out 
the possibility that she means p u s ,  for the ‘quum’ (quus-like sum) is sometimes less than 
one of the input numbers. 
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However, this type of instruction is only effective if we can assume that the sentence used to 
formulate it has itself a definite meaning. In particular, the sceptic will now demand that 
some fact be produced in virtue of which the speaker means greater by ‘greater’ and not 
some quus-like equivalent. We can easily give ‘greater’ a meaning which is both consistent 
with the speaker’s previous use, and under which the quum of two numbers is indeed 
‘greater’ than either original number. For example, by ‘<’ the speaker might mean ‘qreater’ 
(symbolised ‘q’), which is defined as follows: 
X, y: x 4 y e x  < y  if x, y < 5 7  
x 2 y otherwise. 
Indeed, whatever instructions the speaker gives herself, the use she has previously made of 
that expression is finite, and hence consistent with countless different meanings. When the 
meanings of one’s words are in question, it is no use in looking to other words to fix 
meaning - for this invites us to ask what fixes the meaning of the new expression. If this 
tactic is maintained, we are left with an infinite regress, forever looking for instructions to fix 
the meaning of our instructions. Therefore the instruction does not answer the ‘sceptic’; it 
only forces him to shift his attention to a new target. 
Dispositions and Functional States 
The dispositional thesis which Kripke considers is that meaning plus, rather than quus, is 
determined by the responses the speaker is disposed to give. Typically, the suggestion would 
be that if asked to perform a calculation - for example “What is 67+58?” - she would reply 
with the sum, not the quum. Similarly, to mean green rather than f l u e  is to be disposed to 
apply the word ‘green’ to green objects. More generally, the thesis is that an object falls 
within the extension of a term just in case the speaker would apply the term to that object. 
Kripke finds this analysis wanting in terms of the infiniteness condition: 
The dispositional theory attempts to avoid the problem of the finiteness of my actual past 
performance by appealing to a disposition. But in doing so, it ignores an obvious fact: not only my 
actual performance, but also the totality of my dispositions, is finite. (Kripke 1982, p. 26) 
In support of this claim, Kripke notes that addition may involve numbers so large that no 
human has the intellectual, or for that matter the physical, capacity to deal with them. For 
example, as numbers get larger, their symbolisations (in standard notation) get longer; 
eventually numbers get so large that no speaker has the required mental stamina, or a 
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sufficiently long life span, to deal with them. Clearly the speaker is not disposed to give any 
answer to an addition problem involving such a number, let alone give the addition. As a 
result, the speaker’s dispositions determine a rule only up to a certain point. But unless a 
unique function is fixed for all numbers, no matter how large, there will be countless quus- 
like functions consistent with the finite answers the subject is disposed to give, and so what 
she means is left underdetermined. 
In mentioning our inability to perform huge calculations, Kripke identifies but one type of 
situation in which a speaker fails to accord with the rule being followed, that is in which she 
makes a mistake. Mistakes can occur for a variety of other reasons - we may misread a 
figure, forget to carry, and so on. Hence, although someone may meansplus, she may not be 
disposed to give the sum of two numbers; in certain situations she may be disposed to give 
the wrong answer. More generally (i.e. in non-mathematical cases), all sorts of perceptual 
errors could affect our ability to correctly classify the world around us. For example, under 
certain lighting conditions, a white plate may look green, in which case we should not be 
surprised if our speaker calls such a plate ‘green’. In this case the speaker is disposed to 
apply the term ‘green’ to a white object, but it does not follow that the plate falls within the 
extension of the term ‘green’. Because mistakes are possible, the extension of the term 
cannot be identified with those objects which the speaker would call ‘green’. The simple 
identification of meaning with one’s overall dispositions does not give our words the 
extensions they actually have, and so does not give a correct account of meaning. 
If the extension of a term is to be determined by one’s dispositions, then dispositions which 
produce mistakes must somehow be removed from consideration. In other words, we should 
focus on how the speaker would act in the absence of any interfering factors which may 
result in error. To do this, we need specify ideal conditions, conditions under which the 
speaker is disposed to perform correctly. The meaning of one’s words is not then determined 
by one’s overall dispositions, but only by one’s idealised dispositions. These idealisations 
must cover three areas: idealised external conditions, to ensure that the speaker perceives her 
environment correctly; ideaEised internal conditions, to ensure that, even though the context 
5 
5 
This condition is more plausible with predicates and terms which apply to material ob-jects, in which case the 
dispositionalist would require that the lighting, angle of view etc. be in some sense ’normal’. However the point 
holds even for statements about abstract objects, for, if the speaker is asked a question. she must hear it correctly, 
she might need pen and paper to carry out a calculation, and she must be able to give her response and perceive it 
correctly (for example, if she thinks. due to an aural illusion. that she said ‘ 5 ’  when she meant ‘125’, she may 
withdraw her answer). 
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of the utterance is perceived correctly, the speaker does not give a wrong answer (e.g. is not 
drugged, mentally ill or sheer bloody-minded); and enhanced mental capacities, so that she 
can deal with any calculation, however large. Thus the idealisation takes care of both the 
need for infiniteness, and for the need to allow for our disposition in certain circumstances to 
make mistakes. 
This third category - idealised mental capacities - faces an immediate difficulty. We suppose 
that before idealisation our agent was not disposed to give any answer to a particularly large 
calculation; hence we suggest that the correct answer is the one she would give were she to 
have extended mental powers, bestowing her the ability to grasp large numbers, and to add 
them. Any alteration of the speaker’s capacity to deal with large numbers will thus change 
her dispositions (this, after all, is the point of the idealisation). However, we could just as 
well ‘idealise’ her faculties in such a way that she can grasp large numbers and gives their 
quum. Either one of these additions is consistent with the meaning determined by her actual 
(i.e. non-extended) dispositions, since her actual dispositions do not determine any answer in 
the relevant cases. Given that more than one alteration is possible, how should we decide 
which alteration counts as ‘ideal’? Clearly, her actual dispositions do not determine which 
idealisation preserves what she means, just because her original dispositions do not 
determine what she means. If we are to have a unique, correct idealisation, we have to 
presuppose that something determines what she means: and therefore we cannot appeal, 
without circularity, to idealised dispositions to determine what she means. 
The same problem arises if idealised dispositions are suggested as a means of 
accommodating the speaker’s disposition to make mistakes in other cases. To return to our 
earlier example, our speaker applies the word ‘green’ to green objects when operating under 
normal (daylight) conditions, but to a white object in abnormal lighting conditions. We 
might suggest that daylight is ideal, and that the different lighting condition is responsible for 
the misapplication of the term. Yet, an alternative view would be that the subject actually 
means white by ‘green’, that it is daylight which produces mistaken applications, and that the 
supposedly ‘abnormal’ conditions are really ideal. Although we think that humans can 
identitjr colours most successfully in daylight, there is no reason why the reverse should not 
be true: a being could be more effective is this respect in green lighting than in daylight. So 
there is no apriori reason to say that one type of lighting is ideal, and the other not. Yet this 
distinction has to be made if the dispositional thesis is to be successful. 
14 
The only obvious court of appeal we have is in terms of what the speaker means: if she 
means green, then daylight is ideal; if she means white, then daylight is not ideal. But this 
makes the account circular, for we can only say which dispositions are correct given a 
meaning, and so one’s dispositions cannot determine what one means. 
The result that ideal conditions can only be specified given a meaning itself points to the 
fundamental problem which Kripke identifies with the dispositional thesis. For even if we 
could specify, without circularity, those ideal conditions under which no mistakes are made, 
the dispositional thesis only tells us what the speaker would do, not what she should do. In 
short, dispositions fail to account for the essential normativity of meaning. 
6 
The points raised against the dispositional thesis can also be used to discount other 
naturalistic theories of meaning. The main alternative which Kripke considers is a functional 
(causal role) theory. As with the dispositional theory, functionalism analyses meaning in 
terms of input-output, but rather than identifying meaning with the disposition itself, the 
functionalist states that to mean such-and-such is to be in a state which causes the behaviour 
in question. For example, to mean plus by ‘+’ is to be in a state which causes one to answer 
addition problems with additions, rather than the disposition itself. 
This type of theory offers one immediate benefit, in that it places meaning in an orthodox 
relationship with behaviour. Normally, we consider grasp of meaning to be a mental state, 
and that mental states are causally connected to our behaviour. If, for example, we are to 
explain why the speaker says ‘125’ in terms of the mental states which caused her to utter 
these words, then one of the states we have to mention is that she means (or understands) 
plus by ‘plus’. 
Despite this slight advancement, the shift from dispositions to causal roles affords little 
advantage when it comes to answering Kripke’s sceptic. For even though I meanplus by ‘+’, 
I am not always caused to give the sum of two numbers - as we know, mistakes are possible. 
Therefore, as with dispositions, in order to analyse meaning in terms of functional role, we 
again have to identify ideal conditions - conditions under which I am caused to give the 
correct answers. Just as before, the only apparent method for doing this is to identify those 
6 
Cf. Kripke 1982, p. 37 
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conditions under which I would accord with my meaning, but in appealing to what I mean, 
the account becomes circular. 
It is not surprising that the move from dispositions to functional states achieves so little. For, 
whether we say that the speaker is disposed to say ‘125’ or is in a state which causes her to 
say ‘125’, these are descriptions of naturalistic states. As such, even if we can specify ideal 
conditions, we still only have a description of how the speaker would behave, not how she 
should behave. Naturalistic states - either dispositions or functional roles - do not give rise to 
semantic normativity. 
Mental Pictures and Felt Qualities 
The problem of normativity also arises for the next items on Kripke’s list - mental pictures, 
and other qualitative mental states. Taking mental pictures first, the suggestion is that to 
mean square by ‘square’ is to have an image of a square before the mind whenever uttering 
the word. The thought behind the idea is that a picture of a square in some sense refers to an 
infinite number of squares, in that a picture of a square is (potentially) a picture of each one 
of an infinite number of different squares in an infinite number of different situations. 
The problem with this suggestion is that an image does not determine a norm - there is, for 
example, no such thing as acting in accordance with an image of a square. Therefore if the 
image is to play any part in the determination of meaning, it must be suitably interpreted. 
The occurrence of the image must be interpreted to mean that the word associated with the 
image of a square is to be applied to those objects which resemble the image. 
7 
Unfortunately, whenever an object stands in need of interpretation, more than one 
interpretation is available. The resemblance relation mentioned in the above example is only 
one possibility. Other interpretations we in ight suggest, which could equally give a meaning 
to the image of the square, are: apply the word to anything which is the same colour as the 
mental image; apply the image to anything which is a conic projection of the image; or apply 
the word to anything which would fit inside the image. It seems we could pick almost any 
relationship which holds between the image and an external object and use it to construct 
some interpretation, an interpretation under which the image (or the word associated with the 
7 
In addition, it i s  unclear how such an account could deal with the meanings of terms referring 
concepts (such as addition, or possibility), which is one of the reasons why Wittgenstein abandoned 




image) applies to the object in question. Yet, if a picture in the mind is to determine an 
extension for the predicate ‘is square’, then there must be a unique correct interpretation, and 
something in the speaker’s mind must determine which interpretation that is. 
What are the characteristics of an interpretation? It is, obviously, just as infinite as a 
meaning, for it must determine a relation between the (finite) picture and the countless 
objects the picture represents under the interpretation. The interpretation must also determine 
a norm - it must determine to what the word associated with the picture correctly applies. 
Therefore the requirements on an interpretation are precisely the same as the requirements 
we have identified for meanings - the interpretation must determine an infinite norm. If we 
have trouble accounting for the infinite norms of meaning, we will have the same trouble 
accounting for the infinite norms of interpretation. We cannot suggest that the interpretation 
is another mental image, for then we have another infinite regress. And if we suggest that the 
interpretation is determined by a sui generis mental state, one not to be identified with a 
mental picture, then we may as well stop the inquiry one stage earlier, and say that meaning 
is a sui generis state. As a result, the appeal to mental pictures adds nothing to the account of 
meaning, but just defers our difficulty. 
In terms of meaning determination, distinctive felt qualities are just as unsatisfactory as 
mental images. To take an example, a headache does not in itself determine that any action is 
correct; there is no such thing as acting in accordance with a headache. If a felt quality is to 
determine a norm, then the felt quality must be interpreted in an appropriate manner. Again, 
the question is: what determines that a certain interpretation is correct? If it is another 
qualitative state then the account is regressive - for that qualitative state will require 
interpretation in order to fix the correct interpretation of the initial qualitative state. If, on the 
other hand, the correct interpretation is determined by some property other than a felt 
quality, then that property must be capable of determining a norm without the contribution of 
the felt quality. Once again, the account is either regressive, or the object which requires 
interpretation is superfluous, which is why felt qualities can play no part in meaning 
determination. 
Platonic Entities and Irreducible Meaning Properties 
The remaining two suggestions may be treated together. The first is that the meaning- 
determining state is not reducible to dispositions, or qualitative mental states, but is rather a 
sui generis mental state. The other is that meaning is determined by the fact that one’s mind 
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grasps a Platonic object - an abstract object which determines an extension as a matter of 
essence. With respect to the sui generis hypothesis, Kripke complains that this manoeuvre is 
unexplanatory : 
Such a move may in a sense be irrefutable, and if it is taken in an appropriate way, Wittgenstein 
may even accept it. But it seems desperate: it leaves the nature of this postulated primitive 
state ... completely mysterious. (Kripke 1982, p. 5 1) 
Moreover, there is a distinct logical difficulty with this answer, for “Such a state would have 
to be a finite object, contained in our finite minds” (p. 52). How such a finite state can issue 
in an infinite norm is, Kripke suggests, beyond comprehension: 
Can we conceive of a finite state which could not be interpreted in a quus-like way? How could 
that be? (p. 52) 
it remains mysterious exactly how the existence of any finite past state of my mind could entail 
that ... I must give a determinate answer to an arbitrarily large addition problem. (p. 53) 
The argument is this. If a finite state is to yield an extension over an infinite domain, then the 
state must (surely?) be interpreted in some way - for how else can the answers to infinitely 
many question be determined by a finite object? And if the meaning-state has to be 
interpreted, something in the speaker’s mind must determine what the correct interpretation 
is. Which is to say that another finite object must determine an infinite norm, and so it in turn 
must be interpreted. (Once again the regress of interpretations.) This regress is clearly 
vicious, for the speaker’s finite mind cannot possibly contain an infinite number of 
interpretations. Hence a sui generis state cannot determine what the speaker means. 
The theory referring to Platonic objects succumbs (Kripke claims) to a similar objection. The 
supposed advantage of this position is that there is no difficulty with the idea that an abstract 
object can determine an infinite extension from its own resources, as it were - that is, without 
interpretation. Yet to govern my behaviour, such an object must be grasped by my mind (in 
Frege’s terminology, I have an idea in my mind which grasps the Platonic sense), and here 
again we have a difficulty in reconciling the ‘finiteness’ of mind with the infiniteness of 
extension. As Kripke says: 
The idea in my mind is a finite object: can it not be interpreted as determining a quus function, 
rather than a plus function? (Kripke 1982, p. 54) 
As before, a finite object can be interpreted in many different ways to yield different infinite 
extensions. This, Kripke claims, shows that no such finite state can fix a unique extension. 
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The importance of this part of the argument should not be underrated, for without an 
argument against irreducible meanings, the fact that Kripke fails to find a meaning- 
determinant is simply proof of the hopelessness of a reductionist programme. As with any 
other property, there is no automatic requirement that we should be able to provide an 
analysis of grasp of meaning, to say what meaning consists in any other terms. Should it turn 
out that we cannot give any account of a meaning determining fact, if we cannot analyse the 
notion in some other terms, we do not thereby have any right to say that no such property 
exists, or remains uninstantiated. Success in eliminating this type of response is therefore 
vital for the ‘sceptical’ argument to succeed. Unfortunately, as we shall see, Kripke’s 
argument is at its weakest here. In particular the basis for the claim that an infinite norm 
cannot be contained within a ‘finite’ mind is not particularly robust. To address this issue 
takes us away from exposition into criticism of Kripke’s argument, and so I shall for the 
moment defer further discussion. 
8 
Concluding the ‘Sceptical’ Argument 
This brings us to the end of the list of putative meaning determining facts. If Kripke has 
shown that every item on his list is inadequate for the determination of meaning, and if we 
accept that his process of exhaustive elimination has indeed been exhaustive, then he has 
shown that meaning is impossible. We think that if 1 start reciting the series 2, 4, 6..., and 
state that I am at every stage adding two, then every element of the series is determined in 
advance, that at each stage in the sequence there is one correct answer, and that this answer 
is determined by the meaning of the word ‘add’. According to the ‘sceptical’ argument this is 
false: nothing determines that any answer is correct or incorrect, and no answer is any better 
than any other. Quite clearly the thesis is quite general in its application: with any word, no 
matter how convinced we are in our own practice that there is a correct standard of use, the 
result of the ‘sceptical’ argument is that this is an illusion, putting language as a whole on the 
verge of collapse. 
9 
8 
Several authors have criticised Kripke for unwarrantedly adopting a reductionist position. For example, 
Goldfarb states that “Kripke’s concern is with physicalist reductions of meaning notions” ( 1985, p. 479). The fact 
that Kripke considers meanings as sui generis states shows that he does not take this dogmatic reductionist line. 
9 
I do not intend to give a detailed account of the differences between Kripke’s account of Wittgenstein’s negative 
argument and Wittgenstein’s actual argument. Certainly much of what Kripke says is a faithful reading (rather 
more faithful than many critics have suggested). For example the following elements of Kripke’s exposition are 
explicit in the Investigations: the concern with what constitutes meaning and understanding (e.g. PI 0 148, 6 153, 
and $186); the claim that no qualitative state could constitute meaning (most clearly stated in the discussion of 
reading PI $ 156- 178); also that pictures and self-directed instructions fall to the regress of interpretations (e.g. PI 
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Some Presentational Issues 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the above exposition of the ‘sceptical’ 
argument is intended to give the core thesis as straightforwardly as possible, and as such it 
has been stripped of some of the presentational devices which Kripke employs. The reason 
for this is that some of the superficial elements of Kripke’s original exposition are 
misleading - indeed, they have led various early commentators to misrepresent the nature of 
the ‘sceptical’ argument. Whilst the early discussion provoked by Kripke‘s book has, I think, 
diagnosed the sources of error - and settled that such misrepresentations are indeed 
misrepresentations - it is important that the relevant issues be identified, not least to establish 
that the elements I have omitted are indeed wholly dispensable. Once these are out of the 
way we will be in a position to assess some rather more substantial objections. 
The first observation is that although Kripke describes his argument as a “sceptical” 
argument (and his protagonist as “the sceptic”), this label is misleading. Kripke‘s argument 
has nothing to do with classical scepticism, nor indeed with any epistemological issue. This 
point is important because if we were misled into thinking that the ‘sceptical’ argument 
really were sceptical, then we would perhaps dismiss it rather too quickly. Sceptical doubts - 
real sceptical doubts, doubts about the possibility of a certain kind of knowledge - do not in 
general allow us to make conclusions about the way of the world. Usually the fact that we do 
not know that p does not entitle us to conclude that not p. Hence, if all Kripke shows us is the 
sceptical claim that we do not know what a speaker means (or perhaps that she does not 
know what she herself means), we cannot thereby infer that she does not mean anything at 
all. Thus, as a means of establishing the impossibility of meaning, a sceptical argument looks 
unpromising. 
10 
$ 139, $6  189-90); dispositional and functional reductions fail (e.g. PI $ 149 and $8 193-1 95 - though Kripke’s 
discussion is a considerable advancement on Wittgenstein’s. especially with respect to dispositions), and 
mysteriousness of how a rule can determine all the steps in advance (e.g. PI $188). As we shall see in Chapter 2, 
Wittgenstein had additional epistemological concerns (which Kripke, 1 think wrongly. interprets as yielding an 
ontological point when taken to their limit). In addition, there are doubts over whether the aim of the investigation 
is quite the same as Kripke makes out, or whether the end result Kripke offers has anything acceptable to 
Wittgenstein. My own view is that Kripke’s discussion is rather closer to Wittgenstein than many have made out 
in terms of both negative argument (not least because many such critics mistakenly identify the ‘sceptical’ 
argument as a genuine kind of scepticism, something Wittgenstein would certainly abhor). and also in terms of 
the positive proposal. 
10 
The mistake of ascribing an epistemological argument to Kripke is made by Baker and Hacker ( 1  984). McGinn 
makes a similar error (1984, p. 72). I shall continue to follow Kripke’s (now established) usage of the term 
‘sceptical’, but shall continue to signal the inappropriateness of the nomenclature with scare-quotes. 
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The problem is not limited to Kripke’s use of the term ‘sceptical’, for he does portray the 
argument as epistemological by talking in terms of justification. For example, he says: 
In the discussion below the challenge posed by the sceptic takes two forms. First, he questions 
whether there is any fact that I meant plus, not quus, that will answer his sceptical challenge. 
Second, he questions whether 1 have any reason [emphasis added] to be so confident that I should 
answer ‘125’ rather than ‘5’ .... An answer to the sceptic must satisfy two conditions. First, it must 
give an account of what fact it is ... that constitutes my meaning plus, not quus. But further, there is 
a condition that any putative candidate for such a fact must satisfy. It must, in some sense, show 
[emphasis added] how I am justified in giving the answer ‘125’ to ‘68+57’. (Kripke 1982, p. 11)  
The first condition mentioned is familiar - the meaning-determining fact (property) must 
determine a unique function over an infinite domain, and it must do so normatively. 
However, the second condition is new: Kripke here claims that the speaker himself must be 
able to tell that his action is in accordance with his previous meaning if he is to be fully 
justified in acting as he does. As a result, Kripke’s argument might be read as follows: if the 
speaker cannot verzh what she meant in the past (in order to decide how to act now), or 
cannot justzh the claim that her meaning requires her to say ‘125’ (rather than ‘5’), then 
there is no fact about what she means; none of the items on the list provide such 
justzjications, so there is no fact about what the speaker means. Of course the fact that a 
speaker cannot justify her claim to mean plus rather than quus, or that she ought to answer 
‘5’ does not mean that these claims cannot be true. Any argument which followed this course 
without additional material would clearly be verificationist, and Kripke for one gives us no 
reason, in this context, to accept such a move. 
I 1  
As it happens, though, Kripke does not reject any of tlie potentially meaning-determining 
properties from his list on the basis that it cannot provide the justification mentioned above. 
Therefore, in the actual execution of the ‘sceptical argument’, the condition that the meaning 
determining fact must provide such a justification is redundant. Indeed, Kripke explicitly 
states as much: 
it is clear that the sceptical challenge is not really an epistemological one. It purports to show that 
nothing in my mental history or past behaviour - not even what an omniscient God would know - 
could establish whether I meant plus or quus. (Kripke 1982, p. 21) 
As we shall see, the search for a justification for following a rule in the way one does is one 
of Wittgenstein’s central concerns, and it is therefore a flaw in Kripke’s interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s argument that he (Kripke) makes no use of it. 1 shall consider the 
1 1  
In fact Kripke introduces the sceptic as one who “questions my certainty about my answer” ( I  982, p. 8). 
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epistemology of rule-following in Chapter 2, but for now I merely record the stance to take 
with respect to Kripke: his presentation suggests epistemological concerns, but the substance 
of the argument does not bear this out. 
12 
The second clarification to make is that I have portrayed the relationship between meaning 
and action as a synchronic relationship - my present meaning determines how I should act in 
the present - whereas Kripke describes it as a diachronic relationship. For example, he says: 
[The sceptic] questions whether my present usage agrees with my past usage, whether I am 
presently conforming to  my previous linguistic intentions. (Kripke’s emphasis, Kripke 1982, p. 12) 
According to this passage, Kripke’s search is for some property of his past self which 
determined what lie meant in the past; his present intention is to act in accordance with that 
past meaning, and so his past meaning determines what lie ought to do now. Thus the 
normativity of meaning is something which apparently stretches from the past into the 
present. 
If Kripke’s argument rests on a diachronic notion of semantic normativity, then it rests on a 
mistake. Meanings are not normative over time. For example, it may well be that the speaker 
meant plus in the past, but from this fact alone it does not follow that slie should, in the 
present, use ‘+’ in accordance with that prior meaning; nor, for that matter, does it follow 
that she should continue to mean plus by ‘+’ in the present. What she means now is 
independent of what she meant in the past, and tlie present intention to conform to a previous 
meaning is not essential for present meaning. What the speaker meant in  tlie past determined 
what slie ought to have said in the past; what she means in the present determines what she 
ought to say in the present: meanings are normative only at a time, not over time. 
Despite appearances, Kripke does not make this blunder about the temporality of semantic 
normativity. This talk of the ability of a linguistic norm to stretch into the future arises 
because Kripke considers a speaker who intends to accord with his previous meaning. If 
you intend to accord with a previous meaning, then clearly that meaning does set a standard 
13 
12 
At times Kripke appears to conflate that which justifies the speaker saying ’ 125’ and that which makes 125’ 
the correct answer. For example, he says (1982, p. 37) that dispositions cannot account for normativity, and then 
says that dispositions provide no justification for any action. As I read it, the latter is intended to be a re-iteration 
of the former point, meaning that Kripke identifies that which makes the judgement true with that which justifies 
the judgement. 
13 
See for example Kripke (1 982, p. 8). 
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for present use. But, as stated, that intention is not essential to meaning, and so is not a 
semantic norm. Nevertheless, the possibility of intending to accord with previous meaning 
does highlight the fact that meaning is a normative notion. When Kripke concludes that 
nothing about his past self determines what would count as satisfaction of his present 
intention (to accord with that past meaning), he simply makes the claim that nothing in the 
past determined what he meant in the past. As he goes on to say (Kripke 1982, p. 13), if there 
is no fact about what he meant in the past, then there is no fact about present meaning either, 
just because there is no relevant difference between the past and the present which could 
render meaning impossible then, but possible now. It is this failure of meaning - at any one 
time - which is the proper result of the ‘sceptical’ argument, not the inability to accord with 
past meaning. 
14 
The ‘temporal spread’ idea is thus not germane to Kripke’s argument, but is a device which 
is supposed to make the argument clearer. The reason for stating the problem in these terms 
is that Kripke presents the ‘sceptical’ challenge from first-person perspective; and thus 
Kripke’s own words constitute both the meta-language and the object language. Since the 
distinction between the object-language and the meta-language is all-important for his 
argument, it would be highly damaging if they were conflated. Keeping them temporally 
separated (padpresent) is simply a means of keeping them conceptually separated. 




This mistake arises from a confusion between the normativity of meaning and the normativity of intention. Of 
course, if the speaker intends to mean the same thing as before, there is something she ought to do, namely mean 
the same as she meant before (glossing over the doubtful implicit claim that ‘meaning something‘ is something 
we do). Thus intentions are akin to norms, i n  that intentions determine satisfaction-conditions. However meaning 
does not rest on the notion of intention (or at least not in this sense) - the speaker does not have to intend to mean 
the same in order to mean the same. The norm of this intention is therefore not a semantic norm. 
IS 
Kripke presents the argument in terms of the first-person in order to show that no behaviouristic restrictions 
should be assumed to operate on the type of property we might cite as meaning-determining (see for example 
Kripke 1982, pp. 55-56). Indeed, Kripke differentiates sharply between his ‘sceptical’ problem and Quine’s 
argument for the indeterminacy of translation (which is certainly based on a behaviourist premise - see Quine 
1992, p.37). Kripke, unlike Quine, thinks that appeal to introspective mental states is perfectly legitimate in this 
context, and may be utilised in the hope of refuting the ‘sceptic’. His use of the first-person highlights this fact 
(Kripke 1982, p. 15). 
16 
Kripke explains that he talks about past meaning in order to make object language and meta-language easily 
distinguishable (1982, pp. 12-13). Nevertheless, his use of a temporal spread has led to genuine confusion. For 
example Colin McGinn (1984, p. 174) takes normativity over time to be essential to the argument. (McGinn’s 
error is pointed out by Boghossian (1989, pp. 90-91)) In addition. Coates (1986) and Sartorelli (1991) both place 
undue weight on the trans-temporal aspect of the argument. Kripke’s statement that “The relation of meaning and 
intention to future action [emphasis added] is normative, not descriptive.’‘ (1982, p. 37) only adds to the 
impression that trans-temporality i s  a vital factor, whereas in reality it is not. 
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present accord with present meaning, as I have done. In my view, the meta-language/object- 
language distinction is more clearly made by considering the situation of a third person. 
Objections 
With these presentational issues out of the way, we can turn to the more substantial 




Kripke’s dismissal one or other of the items on his list is unsuccessful. 
Kripke’s list is not exhaustive: some fact which could be meaning-determining is 
not considered. 
Little argument has to be given to establish the second point, that Kripke’s list is not fully 
exhaustive. For example, Kripke does not consider the possibility of a causal theory of 
reference (as pointed out by Goldfarb 1985; McGinn 1984a; and Maddy 1984); nor that 
meaning might consists in  a capacity (cf. McGinn 1984a, pp. 168-175); nor that meaning 
may be analysed along Gricean lines -that is in terms of the propositionai attitudes (beliefs, 
intentions, and so forth) which accompany the utterance of a word (cf. McGinn 1984a, pp. 
167 - 168). I do not mean to suggest that any one of these properties is a particularly strong 
candidate, but Kripke does indeed fail to discount them explicitly. 
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This type of objection, though, ought to take second place in our order of priorities. For, to 
pursue this line of criticism, we should have to discern whether any one of these freshly 
suggested properties can be meaning-determining; and to do that, we should have to show 
that the arguments Kripke uses to discount those items which are on his list cannot be 
applied with equal efficacy against those which he fails to consider. So, before suggesting 
that the ‘sceptical’ argument fails because Kripke’s list is not exhaustive, we ought first to 
assess how effective the objections raised against those items explicitly mentioned on the list 
actually are. Only once we have the exact measure of Kripke’s resources can we see if there 
is any property, on or off the list, which is capable of surviving all the objections raised. It is 
therefore prudent to postpone the examination of what Kripke fails to consider until the 
success (or otherwise) of what he does give us has been properly gauged. 
17 
The classic works advocating this type of theory are Grice (1  957; 1969), and Searle ( 1969; 1979). Although 
McGinn mentions that Kripke fails to discount such a theory as providing a meaning-determinant, he does not 
endorse this as an adequate response to the ‘sceptical’ argument (cf. 1984, p. 168). 
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Of those items on Kripke’s list, several do not require further examination. The arguments 
given that meaning cannot be determined by self-directed instructions, mental pictures, or 
felt qualities are incontrovertible. Any property which is meaning-determining must do so 
without the need for interpretation, and so these entities can be safely removed from 
consideration. The results of the other aspects of the argument remain less secure, and these 
are the focus for the rest of this chapter. The two contentious elements of the ‘sceptical’ 
argument are those which relate to Kripke’s discussion of a dispositional theory of meaning, 
and those which relate to Kripke’s objections to the sui generis meaning property and 
Platonic object theories. I shall consider each in turn. 
The Dispositional Thesis 
As we have seen, Kripke claims that meaning cannot be dispositional because meanings are 
both infinite and normative, whereas dispositions are neither. In order to reinvigorate the 
dispositional thesis, respondents to Kripke have taken these objections head on, arguing that 
dispositions are indeed infinite in the required sense, and can yield normativity. The 
present task is to assess whether Kripke’s critics are successful in establishing these 
counterclaims. 
I8 
Dispositions and Infinitude 
It will be recalled that the problem of infiniteness is, in the terms of our arithmetical 
example, that numbers eventually get so large, and their symbolisations so lengthy, that the 
human mind is incapable of dealing with them. No one could mentally grasp such numbers, 
nor live long enough to fully survey them, and so no one actually has the disposition to give 
the sum of such numbers (nor, indeed, the quum). Consequently, human dispositions cannot 
determine that ‘+’ means plus, for plus is defined over the infinite domain of natural 
numbers. 
18 
Some of the many criticisms that have been directed against Kripke’s rejection of a dispositional reduction are 
off-target. For example, Coates (1  986) and McGinn ( 1  984a) both succumb somewhat to the confusion arising 
over the notion of trans-temporal normativity mentioned in the previous chapter; consequently they do not take 
the notion of synchronic normativity seriously, and falsely conclude that dispositions do not have to account for 
this type of normativity. In turn, Philip Pettit (1990a) thinks that the job of the dispositionalist is not to give a 
constitutive account of rule-following, and hence of meaning, but to save the phenomenology of rule-following. 
At least, in giving a dispositionalist response to Kripke, Pettit describes his project as the “attempt to give an 
explanation of how a rule-follower may see herself as having made a mistake and an explanation therefore of how 
we may see her inclination as having misfired.” (Emphasis added, Pettit 1990a p. 16.) But this is certainly off the 
point, for in order to answer the ‘sceptic’, we do not need an explanation of how we appear to make mistakes, but 
of how anything could actually be a mistake. 
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Kripke suggests that the way to solve this problem is by suggesting certain idealisations to 
our subject - to augment the speaker’s cognitive capacities in such a way that she could grasp 
huge numbers, and also perhaps scan them at an accelerated rate. Then we could claim that 
the speaker’s extended dispositions determine the answers to calculations over the whole 
range of integers, for the speaker’s dispositions are infinite when suitably idealised. 
Kripke’s objection to this suggestion is that any such augmentation of the speaker’s 
dispositions gives rise to a vicious circularity. If we are to alter the speaker’s capacities then 
there is clearly more than one way in which this could be done. For instance we could 
change her brain in such a way that she is disposed to compute sums; alternatively, we could 
propose an alteration that would leave her disposed to compute a quus-like function. Both 
‘idealisations’ would preserve the dispositions the speaker has with respect to smaller 
calculations. Yet we want to know which idealisation accords with what the speaker means. 
Why should we choose one idealisation over any other? The only grounds we could possibly 
have for preferring one cognitive extension over the other is that only one endows the 
speaker with the correct dispositions - correct, that is, given what she means by ‘+’. The only 
standard we could possibly have for preferring one cognitive alteration over another is 
provided by the meaning of the word, and so the theory presupposes the very thing it is 
supposed to describe. It is this circularity which makes the specification of augmented 
capacities impossible. 
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This argument is rebutted by observations made by Blackburn (1  984b), which concern the 
nature of paradigmatic dispositions. To take an example of Blackburn’s, the fragility of glass 
is a perfectly ordinary disposition, and one which is readily seen to be, in one respect at least, 
infinite. That is, a glass will shatter in any number of different ways, when struck in any 
number of different places, in any number of different locations, by any number of different 
objects. The disposition thus yields an ‘output’ (the glass shattering) for an infinite number 
of different ‘inputs’ (the glass being stuck with a hammer on Earth, with a brick on the 
moon, and so on), and it is in this sense that the disposition is indeed infinite. 
On its own, this observation is not sufficient to overturn Kripke’s charge that dispositions are 
finite, for it is not obvious we are talking about the right kind of infiniteness. One important 
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Blackburn’s criticism of Kripke is echoed by Forbes (1 984. pp. 233-235) and Ginet ( 1992, pp. 67-7 1). 
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sense in which extensions are infinite is that words refer to objects throughout (infinite) time 
and space (‘green’ refers to green objects no matter how far away temporally or spatially). 
And the point made above, that dispositions account for an infinite number of different 
inputs in afinite portion of the universe, does not address this issue at all. 
The reason why it might be thought that dispositions fail of this kind of infiniteness - that 
they do not ‘extend’ throughout time and space - is that physical objects cannot reach 
faraway locations without undergoing certain changes, which means changes to their 
dispositions. To continue with Blackburn’s example, glass has a certain degree of structural 
instability; in the time it would take to travel an immense distance the glass would 
disintegrate. Hence it is not true that the glass would shatter if struck in a distant region of 
the universe. Correspondingly, a speaker would not call a faraway galaxy ‘green’ (at least 
not on the basis of empirical evidence) for she would die before she could ever be 
transported into a position from which she could see it. In  that case, on the simple 
dispositional analysis, this green galaxy would not fall under the extension of the speaker’s 
term ‘green’, making the dispositional theory inadequate. 
In fact this objection - that the glass is not disposed to break on Alpha Centauri, and the like 
- rests on a misunderstanding. When attributing the glass with the disposition to break we are 
not claiming that the glass would be disposed to break after undergoing a million-year 
journey. We are concerned with the dispositions the glass has now; in other words how the 
glass in its present state would behave under different circumstances. The fact that Alpha 
Centauri is so distant does not have any bearing on the question of what would happen to a 
given glass if it were in the same state as it is now if it were in this different location. The 
same can be said with respect to time. When asking how a glass would behave in the year 
5098, we are not interested in how a 4000 year-old glass would behave; but rather, how a 
glass as it is now would behave if it were to exist at this different temporal location. In both 
cases it is perfectly legitimate to ignore any processes we might actually have to put the 
glass through in order get it into the appropriate context, for such processes do not play any 
role in determining the truth or falsity of the (counterfactual or subjunctive) conditional in 
question. So when properly characterised, there is no problem in attributing dispositions to 
objects throughout space and time. 
These results, which concern the dispositions of objects, can readily be applied to people, 
and their linguistic dispositions. Just as glass is fragile throughout time and space, we may 
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conclude that we have the disposition to apply ‘green’ throughout time and space, even 
though we could not actually reach many distant locations. For predicates referring to 
empirical states of affairs, there is no problem arising from considerations of infiniteness. 
Blackburn suggests that the foregoing considerations can successfully be transferred to the 
mathematical case, even if it does require a slightly more sensitive treatment. As a first step 
he suggests that we consider, not the response the speaker is disposed to give to an 
arithmetical problem, but the answer he is disposed to accept. The answer he is disposed to 
accept is “the one that would be given by reiterating procedures I am disposed to use” 
(1  984b, p. 289). The procedures in question are the subroutines we use to add large numbers, 
such as adding columns of single digits, carrying tens, and so on. So whereas my disposition 
to carry tens will at some point give out, there is still some answer I would give if I were to 
continue carrying ten, which is why the answer I would accept offers an advantage over a 
mere disposition. 
At first blush, it may look as though Blackburn appeals to one rule (the rule for reiteration) 
in  order to establish another (the rule for addition), in which case his account would beg the 
question. More specifically, the speaker’s manifest behaviour in any finite surveyable 
sample, in which she carries tens, is consistent with both the claim that she is carrying ten, 
and with the claim that she is ‘quarrying’ ten (carry ten for the first thousand digits, then 
carry twenty). In order to say that there is a determinate answer she would accept, something 
must determine which process it is which is to be reiterated, which under the dispositional 
theory can only be the speaker’s dispositions. In claiming that there is a determinate process 
which can be reiterated, Blackburn claims that her dispositions determine what she ought to 
do in every situation, for every number. Thus the disposition to accept certain answers only 
determines an infinite extension by appeal to a disposition which determines an infinite 
extension, which is precisely the issue in question. 
At this point the observations made about dispositions to behaviour applying throughout 
time and space have some bearing. There is no doubt I would not be disposed to reiterate 
certain arithmetical procedures indefinitely, simply because I would get bored, or die, first. 
But in saying that I would die first, we make a comment not about what I would say were I 
in the position to assess the matter, but only what my disposition would be after undergoing 
the process necessary to get me into that position. The objection that I am not disposed to 
carry ten is, as Blackburn suggests, akin to the claim that the glass cannot get to Alpha 
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Centauri, which, as we have seen, is not the basis for a strong objection. If any disposition is 
to be meaning-determining it must be what I would say were I in the position to assess the 
matter, not the disposition I would have after undergoing a process which alters my 
dispositions. The fact that I would die in getting into the required position does nothing to 
indicate that there is not a determinate answer I would give were I in that position. 
Consequently there is no difficulty in saying that I am disposed to carry, no matter how great 
the numbers involved, and so no reason to suppose that I am not disposed to give additions 
for all pairs of natural numbers. 
The above points fully rebut Kripke’s argument concerning infiniteness, but it should also be 
noted that there is actually no need to respond to Kripke’s charges directly. It is entirely 
possible for the dispositionalist to fully accept Kripke’s charges, for the claim that the 
finiteness of dispositions renders them incapable of determining meaning is something of an 
overstatement of the situation. The dispositionalist need only concede to the sceptic that 
dispositions are not adequate for the determination of functions over certain infinite domains, 
and that, boldly, the function identified by our word ‘plus’ is not determined over all natural 
numbers. Whilst Kripke’s argument is that such a result would be wholly destructive of the 
notion of meaning, in reality the point is not so forceful. 
The claim that dispositions determine what the speaker means, together with the claim that 
her dispositions are finite, does not entail that the speaker’s words are meaningless. At best it 
shows that what she means is, to a certain extent, indeterminate: nothing determines the 
answer she ought to give for sums above a certain threshold. If the threshold is very low, 
then certainly the indeterminacy is too great to bear: there would be nothing present which 
we could possibly call ‘meaning’. If, however, it is only after a few billion or so that the 
correct use of ‘+’ is left undetermined, there is nothing to prevent the claim that ‘+’ has some 
kind of content. In other words, the notion of meaning could withstand this level of 
indeterminacy. If it transpired that this was the only reason the sceptic could find for 
rejecting a dispositional account of meaning then his position would be weak, to say the 
least. 
Normativity 
The more significant objection to the dispositional theory is that dispositions cannot account 
for the normativity of meaning. As mentioned above, Kripke’s argument comes in two parts. 
The first is that the dispositional theory cannot accommodate the possibility of error: I mean 
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red by ‘red’, but I am not disposed to call all and only red things ‘red’. A satisfactory 
dispositional theory must therefore be buttressed with the addition of ceteris paribus clauses, 
which would remove all sources of error. (What I mean is then identified by the answers I 
am disposed to give under these conditions.) Kripke objects, as we have seen, that such 
ceteris paribus clauses can only be supplied given what I mean, the theory thus being 
viciously circular. 
The second objection is that even if I am disposed to call all green things green, the 
dispositional theory would only state what I would say, not what I should say. The point is 
that there is a fundamental difference between meanings and dispositions: meanings are 
normative, dispositions are not. 
Before addressing these issues directly, it is important to be clear about what is involved in 
semantic normativity. So far I have presented the matter in the terminology used by Kripke, 
that is as a distinction between what one would do, and what one should do (for examples of 
Kripke’s use of such language see his 1982, p. 24, p. 29 p. 37 and p. 56). In stating that a 
meaning determines what one ought to say, Kripke appears to hold that a meaning 
determines an absolute (or categorical) norm: that one ought to speak the truth no matter 
what. But clearly this is not so - I ought call red things ‘red’ only given that I intend to speak 
the truth. If I intend to lie, then I ought to call red things anything but ‘red’. That is to say, 
the force of the ‘ought’ of meaning is provided by the generally prevalent intention to speak 
the truth, and likewise a rule prescribes what we ought to do only given the intention to 
follow it. The ‘ought’ of rules and meaning depends on one’s aims, and so is not categorical, 
but hypothetical. 
Importantly, though, this dependency of the ‘ought’ on one’s intentions does not mean that 
the normativity of meaning is provided solely by the intention to speak the truth. (If that 
were the case, then the problem of semantic normativity would reduce to that of accounting 
for intentional mental states.) On the contrary, the intention to speak the truth can only be 
satisfied on condition that something counts as speaking the truth; the intention to follow a 
rule can only be satisfied if some action counts as acting in accordance with it. So to speak 
the truth, or to follow a rule, there must be a correctness condition of the appropriate kind 
which is quite independent of one’s intentions. It is the notion of correctness which makes 
meaning a normative notion, and so the challenge for the dispositionalist is not to get an 
‘ought’ from a ‘would’, but rather to construct a notion of correctness. 
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Despite the slight lack of clarity Kripke brings to the characterisation of semantic 
normativity, this in no way invalidates his argument, and the points he raises remain wholly 
pertinent. The various aspects of Kripke’s argument at this point may be drawn together by 
putting the matter on a slightly more formal footing. As stated, the aim is to provide a set of 
ideal conditions under which any subject will give only correct answers. That is, we need 
some set of conditions 0 which satisfy the following conditional: 
VS, x: Under 0, S would apply ‘F’ to x a ‘F’ is true of x. 
If we could provide a condition 0 which satisfied comparable conditionals for all terms in 
English, then we should have shown that any utterance made under 0 conditions is true, and 
that an utterance is only true if it is what would be said under 0 conditions. If this could be 
generalised, we would have shown that: 
b’s: s is true e s would be uttered under conditions 0 
(where s ranges over sentences). In that case, since what is true is necessarily co-extensive 
with what one is ideally disposed to say, then there is no obvious reason not to reduce one to 
the other, so that ideal dispositions would yield a correctness condition. 
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To rebut Kripke’s objections to the dispositional thesis, two questions have to be addressed. 
The first is whether this is really all there is to semantic normativity. The second is whether 
there are any such 0 conditions. The first question is difficult to answer, for there are 
competing intuitions. On the one hand, the truth of the biconditional above would ordinarily 
be taken as excellent grounds for a reduction. On the other hand, attendant with any such 
analysis of truth is an implicit claim about the relevant order of determination. That is, the 
claim is not only that true utterances are co-extensive with idealised responses, but in 
addition that such utterances are true precisely because they are made under ideal conditions. 
Whilst not immediately objectionable, this result is uncomfortable, for as Wright notes 
(1 987, p. 393), this makes the correct application of a rule - and hence a concept - dependent 
on the responses of the subject. And if every subject matter is response-dependent, then we 
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Forbes (1984, p. 228-232), Goldfarb (1985, pp. 477- 478), Ginet (1992, p. 70), and Millikan (1990, p. 337) all 
advocate, in direct response to Kripke, the thesis that the specification of ideal conditions is sufficient for 
normativity, and that such can be given without circularity. 
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have reached some form of global subjectivism - not something the (presumably realist) 
dispositionalist will have bargained for. 
No doubt more has to be said if Wright‘s objection is to be made fully convincing (and for 
my part I am not sure that the argument can be secured), but I shall not pursue such matters, 
for the point is that although there are difficulties the dispositionalist has to overcome - and 
although the result might not be quite as intended - the burden of proof is not to establish the 
dispositional thesis, but to refute it; and so far no concrete refutation has been forthcoming. 
The remaining question is whether Kripke’s contention that there can 
conditions is any more convincing. As we have seen, in the first instance 
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be no such 0 
Kripke suggests 
that ideal conditions can only be specified if we are given what the subject means. Putting 
the example used earlier into the present terminology, suppose that there is a set of ideal 
conditions 0 (perhaps including the specification of daylight) under which I am disposed to 
call all and only green things “green”, so that we have: 
‘dx: Under 0, I would apply “green” to x U x is green. 
Suppose further that under conditions 0 (perhaps including the specification of green 
lighting) I am disposed to call all and only white things “green”, so that we have: 
‘dx: Under 0, I would apply “green” to x e x is white. 
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To counter the claim that ideal conditions cannot be specified, Forbes (1984) suggests that no such 
specification is required, for any dispositional property carries with it implicit ideal conditions. For example, glass 
will not break if the temperature is very high, salt will dissolve in water but not petrol, and just about anything 
will burn if powdered. Yet these facts do not entail that that glass is not fragile, that salt is not soluble, or that 
aluminium is inflammable. By analogy, if we identify the speaker meaning plus with her disposition to use the 
word ‘plus’, we already allow for the fact that in some circumstances she will behave in a non-ideal manner. It 
does not matter that we cannot spell out what the ideal conditions are without circularity, for we do not have to 
spell them out. 
Yet the ideal conditions which Forbes mentions merely record conditions which human beings feel entitled to 
take for granted. It is only because water is so abundant that we take soluble to mean soluble in water (chemists 
do not - they always specify the agents involved), and because many dispositions do not vary with the few 
degrees Celsius that air temperatures vary by the effect of temperature are usually ignored. Thus the ideal 
conditions Forbes talks of are not objective in any sense but merely record the background conditions which 
humans have come to expect. With respect to meaning there are no commonly accepted ideal conditions, for 
different perturbing factors will affect the application of some concepts, but not others. It is, therefore, not 
possible to appeal to the notion of implicit ideal conditions to solve the problem. 
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On the face of it, we can only say that conditions 0 are ideal, and that 0 are not, on the basis 
that I mean green by “green”, which begs the question. 
However, it ought not be surprising that, when presented with a set of putative ideal 
conditions in this arbitrary and piecemeal way, we have no means of making a decision. 
Whilst in the normal case we recognise colours better in daylight than, say, twilight, there is 
no reason why this situation could not be reversed, and that for some speakers twilight is 
ideal, daylight not. So without further information, we cannot hope to legislate on the matter. 
Indeed, if we are to provide an analysis of truth, we need to specify ideal conditions in a way 
which applies quite universally, to all speakers, and for all concepts, which is to say that we 
need a principle governing whether any given situation is ideal or not. The fact that we 
cannot decide between explicitly specified conditions for a particular individual shows only 
that we have not yet identified the underlying principle, but does nothing to establish that no 
such universal specification is possible. 
Kripke does present an auxiliary argument to support his point. He rejects the possibility of 
any specification of ideal conditions for the additional reason that an error may occur at any 
time even in the absence of perturbing factors. To show this, Kripke considers an example in 
which: 
the subject has a systematic disposition to forget to carry in certain circumstances: he tends to give 
a uniformly erroneous answer when well rested, in a pleasant environment, free from clutter etc. 
(Original emphasis. Kripke 1982, pp. 3 1-32) 
Kripke here stresses that the ‘error’ is not the result of extraneous environmental factors, nor 
of physiologically based defects in the subject - he simply, yet persistently, forgets to carry. 
The same dispositions are therefore consistent with two meanings - in the one case the 
failure to carry is a mistake (under the assumption that the subject is adding), under the other 
this oversight is not a mistake at all, for the subject is calculating some other function which 
does not require carrying. Either option is compatible with the subject’s overall dispositions. 
Kripke claims that since it is possible for two people to share the same dispositions yet to 
mean different things, there can be no one set of ideal conditions which yields ‘the’ 
extension fixed by the common disposition. 
Unfortunately, it is not wholly perspicuous that, in the absence of any disturbing factor, the 
type of systematic error that Kripke’s example trades on is possible. For in the given 
situation, if it were pointed out to the subject that, by the normal standards of addition, he 
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had made an error, and at which point in the calculation the ‘mistake’ was made, then if he 
really does meanplus, we should expect him to revise his opinion. If, on the other hand, he 
stuck to the original verdict, we should have to accept that he means something else. 
Kripke considers this scenario, and says: 
One cannot repair matters by urging that the subject would eventually respond with the right 
answer after corroboration by others. First, there are uneducable subjects who will persist in their 
error even after persistent correction. Second, what is meant by ‘correction by others’? If it means 
rejection by others of ‘wrong’ answers (answers that do not accord with the rule the speaker 
means) and the suggestion of the right answer (the answer that does accord), then again the 
account is circular. (Kripke 1982, p. 32) 
We can agree that the notion of correction by others is not going to help matters, for it is 
entirely possible that someone be persuaded to give up a correct response in favour of a 
wrong response; and in any case the verdict of the person doing the correcting is also subject 
to error. But Kripke’s first claim - that there are uneducable subjects - is dubious. If I really 
cannot get someone to add - to recognise that they are making a ‘mistake’ - then why should 
we say that they do indeed mean addition? Surely, if someone does not recognise what we 
should describe as their error as an error, we should accept that they do not mean what we 
thought they meant. So although we should attempt to analyse correctness in terms of 
corroboration, Kripke’s example which is supposed to illustrate a situation in which the 
people with the same dispositions mean different things is not compelling. All that is shown 
is that these ideal conditions (the subject is “well rested, in a pleasant environment, free from 
clutter etc.”) are not sufficient to pin down meaning to uniqueness, but that alone does not 
show that there is no means of doing so. As it is, this example does more to pose the problem 
(that of specifying ideal conditions) than to demonstrate the futility of searching for a 
solution. 
Boghossian’s Holistic Riposte 
Perhaps the most promising argument that there can be no ideal conditions is given by 
Boghossian ( 1989), which centres on the holistic nature of belief-formation. Boghossian 
actually sets the problem up using slightly different conditionals from those used here, but 
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Boghossian notes that the ideal conditions are defined as conditions under which the subject is not prone to 
error - conditions under which any judgement will be correct. Hence, ideal conditions are any conditions 0 which 
satisfy the following conditional a priori (Boghossian 1989, p. 538): 
(BC) For any subject S and concept R: 0 (S judges Rx 3 Rx) 
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the underlying principles are the same, namely for a set of 0 conditions which satisfy the 
following conditional a priori: 
(TG) For all S, R: 0 (Jones applies ‘R’ to x 3 ‘R’ is true of x). 
To show that no such set of conditions 0 exist, Boghossian identifies two additional 
requirements that 0 must satisfy in order to be ideal: 
Clearly two conditions must be satisfied [by 01: (i) the specified conditions must really be such as 
to preclude the possibility of error - otherwise, it will be false that under these conditions ‘horse’ 
will get applied only to what it means; (ii) the conditions must be specrJiedpurely naturalistically, 
without the use of any semantic or intentional materials - otherwise, the theory will have assumed 
the very properties it was supposed to provide a reconstruction of. (Emphasis added. Boghossian 
1989, p. 538) 
From this passage it is clear why Boghossian precludes semantic items (claims about what 
the subject means) from the ideal conditions, for we hope to say what meaning consists in, 
and so cannot use meaning as a raw material. Yet Boghossian also precludes intentional 
i tem in general - that is not only specifically linguistic content, but mental content as well. 
The reasoning here is that mental content is, from the point of view of the rule-following 
considerations, on a par with linguistic content. The concept of addition, for example, 
determines an infinite correctness condition just as much as the meaning of the word ‘plus’ 
does. (It is correct to believe that 2+2=4, just as much as it is to say it.) If we are in the 
business of reducing linguistic content to naturalistic properties, we must, presumably, have 
some objection to the possibility of sui generis norms, which means that we will likewise 
reject the possibility of sui generis mental content. For this reason, as Boghossian says, if we 
specify ideal conditions which refer to intentional mental states, then we seem to have used 
the very thing which we were supposed to be explaining (i.e. content), and such an account 
would be circular. That is why the ideal conditions must be specified naturalistically. 
Boghossian’s conditional concerns the conditions under which the subject is disposed to make correct 
judgements. However, if the aim here is to capture what it is to have a concept R, then it not helpful to refer, 
within the antecedent, to a situation which requires that S has the concept R: if grasp of the concept R is to consist 
in a disposition, it cannot consist in the disposition to apply the concept R. Whatever the disposition is that 
constitutes grasp of the concept, whatever it is that S is disposed to do, must be identifiable without reference to 
the concept R. This does not mean that the disposition must be a disposition to behaviour - it could still be a 
disposition to judge, so long as the judgement in question is independent of the target concept. Thus the analysis 
should refer either to the disposition to judge that ‘R’ is correct, or alternatively to talk in terms of what S utrers, 
and what makes his utterances correct, which is the approach used above. 
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This naturalistic criterion is troublesome, Bogliossian claims, because of the fact that we do 
not make judgements on the basis of experience alone, but also against a web of background 
beliefs. As Boghossian puts it: 
Neil may come to believe Lo, a magpie, as a result of seeing a currawong, because of his further 
belief that this is just what magpies look like; or because of his belief that the only birds in the 
immediate vicinity are magpies; or because of his belief that whatever the Pope says goes and his 
belief that the Pope says that this presented currawong is a magpie. (Boghossian 1989, pp. 539- 
540) 
Generalising, Boghossian notes that “just about any stimulus can cause just about any belief, 
given a suitably mediating set of background assumptions.” (1 989, p. 539). If I have beliefs 
which lead me to disregard tlie evidence of my own senses, then no matter how ‘ideal’ my 
environment is for the appraisal of the question in hand, no matter what sensory information 
I have, I will not believe the magpie before me is a magpie, and therefore 1 will not be 
disposed to call this magpie a ‘magpie’. As a result, if it is to be guaranteed that 1 use my 
words correctly when the ideal conditions obtain, the optimal Conditions must specify that I 
do not have such interfering background beliefs. 
But of course such background beliefs are intentional items. If we can legislate against the 
potentially infinite number of mediating beliefs within our ideal conditions, then, just 
because of the requirement that these be specified in naturalistic terms, the dispositional 
theory becomes redundant. As Boghossian puts it: 
A non-semantically, non-intentionally specified optirnality situation is a non-semantically, non- 
intentionally specified situation in which it is guaranteed that none of this potential infinity of 
background clusters of belief is present. But how is such a situation to be specified? What is 
needed is precisely what a dispositional theory was supposed to provide: namely, a set of 
naturalistically necessary and sufficient conditions for being a belief with a certain content. But of 
course, if we had that we would already have a reductive theory of meaning - we would not need a 
dispositional theory! Which is to say that, if there is to be any sort of reductive story about 
meaning at all, it cannot take the form of a dispositional theory. (Boghossian 1989, p. 540) 
In sum, because of the holistic nature of verification, we have to include intentional items 
within the ideal conditions. But a condition on tlie ideal conditions is that they be specified in 
naturalistic, non-intentional terms, and so in order to give ideal conditions we need a 
naturalistic reduction of content. Therefore the analysis of content in terms of dispositions 
presupposes the very thing which is supposed to be explained, making the dispositional 
explanation of content superfluous. 
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In fact, to augment Boghossian’s argument somewhat, it can be seen far more easily that the 
0 conditions cannot be stipulated without reference to intentional items. Following a rule, 
and speaking the truth, are paradigmatically intentional activities. The use of language 
cannot proceed on a model of stimulus and response, for we do not walk round 
unintentionally describing everything we see: our utterances are voluntary. Hence, a 
dispositional analysis must concern the subject’s dispositions given that he intends to speak 
the truth. And so it must be stipulated within the 0 conditions that S has that intention. 
lntentional items do not have to be included within the 0 conditions just because of 
verification holism, but also because beliefs do not produce actions in isolation - the holism 
of psychological explanation. 
An Objection to Boghossian’s Argument 
Boghossian’s argument is the best attempt there is to show for principled reasons that there 
can be no ideal conditions. Unfortunately it is unsound. This is because there is no need to 
stipulate that the 0 conditions be non-intentional. Certainly, the example which Boghossian 
uses to prove his point does not show that it is circular to include intentional items within the 
0 conditions. In the example, the concept which is analysed in dispositional terms is the 
concept magpie. However, the concepts mentioned in the 0 conditions concern the Pope and 
currawongs, not the concept magpie. Thus, in referring to propositional attitudes involving 
these concepts we have nor assumed the property that is analysed with the conditional. What 
we have assumed is that Jones has the property of believing what the Pope says is true, etc.; 
what we have constructed is the property of believing that x is a magpie. These are different 
properties. In giving an analysis of the property magpie we refer to the concepts currawong 
and Pope, but without comment as to their constitutive natures. So, including such items 
within the 0 conditions does not stipulate, or entail, that grasp of the concept magpie is 
dispositional. In the ideal conditions we do have to refer to intentional items, but if these are 
not the same items as those that the conditional is supposed to capture, then there is no 
circularity. 
Nevertheless, in referring to any concept whatsoever within the 0 conditions have we not, as 
Boghossian claims, assumed a dispositional account of content? Frankly, no. It is quite 
legitimate to refer to certain intentional items as required within the 0 conditions without 
regard to their constitutive nature, and hence without assuming that a dispositional account 
of content is possible. In referring to a concept we do not assume that grasp of the concept is 
dispositional. The project is to give a dispositional analysis of some new intentional item. In 
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order for this analysis to be non-circular, all that is required is that possession of the new 
intentional item be independent of possession of the concepts mentioned in the 0 conditions. 
The independence condition ensures that the new item is constituted by the disposition in 
question, and is not tacitly assumed within the 0 conditions. If the analysis of the new 
concept is successful - that is if at least one concept is dispositional - then there is no reason 
to think that the concepts referred to within the 0 conditions should not also admit of a 
dispositional analysis. In that case it is not assumed that the concepts referred to within the 0 
conditions are naturalistically respectable - it is discovered that they are. The problem only 
arises on the prior assumption that there must be a naturalistic account of content, which is 
manifestly not the case. 
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Although Boghossian’s argument fails as given, there remains a certain amount of scope for 
development. For example, we might note that in order to apply the word ‘magpie’ to a 
particular bird, we need have certain background beliefs about currawongs; and likewise, to 
give a dispositional analysis of the meaning of ‘currawong’, we should have to preclude 
certain background beliefs involving the concept magpie. As a result, we could only give an 
analysis of the concept magpie by referring (via the concept currawong) to that very concept 
within our ideal conditions. So perhaps the account is circular after all. 
What is notable about this situation just described is that we here consider - in contrast with 
the examples used by Kripke - high-level, theoretical terms. It is not at all obvious that with a 
restricted set of beliefs, about more basic properties (such as colour, shape, and the like) that 
the same type of situation would arise. In fact, we cannot be certain that such holistic 
considerations arise at the higher level without a better understanding of the conceptual 
hierarchy involved. 
The overall message is again that there may well be difficulties that the dispositional thesis 
has not yet overcome, but there is nothing to say that they cannot be overcome, and so have 
not established that ideal conditions cannot be given. The second strand of Kripke’s 
argument against dispositions does not achieve its aim either. 
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It is noteworthy that whereas Boghossian treats dispositionalism as a naturalistic thesis, his own 
characterisation of the thesis is given in terms of the disposition to judge. so that it automatically refers to 
intentional items. Although dispositional accounts of content are familiar in the context of dispositions to 
behaviour, there is nothing amiss, even from a Cartesian standpoint, in talk of dispositions to judge, or to feel 
pain, or whatever, where judgements and feelings do not admit of a naturalistic analysis. Dispositional theories 
are not naturalistic per se. 
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The Irreducibility Thesis 
Leaving aside dispositions for the moment, the second contestable part of Kripke’s overall 
argument I wish to concentrate on is his dismissal of meaning as a primitive, irreducible 
state, and of Platonism. As we have seen, in both cases the requirement is that a ‘finite’ 
mental state determines an infinite extension (in the one case directly, in the other via a 
Platonic object). Kripke objects that any ‘finite’ mental state can be variously interpreted, 
and so fails to determine a unique extension. 
To assess this type of argument, it is important to recognise the distinction between the fact 
that something can be variously interpreted, and the fact that it needs to be interpreted to fix 
an extension. It can be accepted without difficulty that any object whatsoever can be 
interpreted in many ways. If interpretation means correlating an object with a correctness 
condition, then we can do this in an entirely arbitrary manner. However, to say that an object 
can be interpreted is not to say that it stands in need of interpretation. Specifically, the 
suggestion that meaning is a sui generis state is motivated by the thought that such a state 
may be intrinsically normative, that is that by its very nature it sets a standard for correct 
behaviour, and so does so without recourse to interpretation of any kind. In that case, the fact 
that it itself determines one unique correctness condition is not undermined by the claim that 
it could determine other correctness conditions under various interpretations. The correct 
extension would be the one extension fixed intrinsically. 
This rebuttal clearly rests on the claim that a ‘finite’ state of mind cannot determine an 
infinite extension, and perhaps the thought underlying Kripke’s position is that to get from 
the finite to the infinite, interpretation is essential - so the regress does arise after all. 
However, the ability of a finite state to determine that each one of an infinite collection of 
answers is correct - and to do so without interpretation - should not strike us as especially 
troubling. Suppose I show you a picture of a (generic) tree, and ask you to go and find one. 
There is no logical reason why there should not be an infinite number of trees, with the 
picture being, in a perfectly ordinary sense, a representation of each one of them. Now the 
actual picture (the marks on the page) seems to be finite (at least it exists on a finite piece of 
paper), and yet it represents an infinite number of objects. 
A physical object such as a picture of a tree is not intrinsically representational, for it 
depends on the mind to bestow it with representational power. However, this fact does not 
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make the example any less relevant as a countermeasure to Kripke’s observations, for it is 
precisely the ability of the mind to represent things which answers Kripke’s concerns about 
infiniteness of meaning. Indeed, the power of representation is the essence of any intentional 
state. It is especially noteworthy that intentional states such as intentions do not stand in need 
of interpretation in order to represent, they are intrinsically representational. 
Correspondingly we ought not entertain for a moment the thought that the mental 
representation necessary for meaning leads to a regress of interpretations. 
Given that intentional states in general are intrinsically representative, and representative 
states can represent an infinite number of objects, then we have no reason to find the 
infiniteness of meanings particularly vexatious. A normative meaning state must at least be 
representational; it must be ‘about’ its correctness conditions in the way that an intention is 
‘about’ its satisfaction conditions. This is not to say that mere representation is the same as 
normativity (a picture of a tree does not determine a correctness condition, for example). For 
normativity we require further that the actions represented by the rule must be represented as 
correct. However, it is not the ability of sui generis states to determine correctness (to 
represent actions as correct) which is at issue, but the ability of a state within a finite mind to 
determine an infinite correctness condition. Once representation is secured, there is no 
reason to think we cannot have representation as correc,t. 
It remains true, of course, that the ability of a state to represent without interpretation is 
somewhat mysterious; but mysteriousness does not warrant the conclusion that such states 
do not exist. In fact, far from producing any reasons to deny the existence of such states, 
Kripke’s argument is blocked by the possibility of them. As previously suggested, we should 
expect any conclusion from the ‘sceptical’ argument concerning our ability to put conceptual 
content into our utterances to apply in a corresponding manner to concept possession in 
general, even in the absence of linguistic expression. Both linguistic content and mental 
content require grasp of the same correctness conditions, and so any argument focused on the 
notion of a correctness condition is likely to apply in both cases. Yet the only thought Kripke 
produces against the possibility of sui generis concept possession is that it is mysterious. In 
this way Kripke mis-locates the onus of proof. We ought not think that grasp of a rule (or 
meaning) is problematic just because it requires us to pack the representation of the infinite 
steps determined by the rule into a finite mind. Instead, we should see that the infiniteness of 
rules is unproblematic precisely because of the infinite character of finite representations. A 
single representation may represent numerous, indeed an infinite number, of distinct objects, 
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and so our ordinary notion of representation allows us to overcome the infiniteness 
problem. 
24 
The same type of observation may be used to counter Kripke’s rejection of the Platonic 
theory of rule-following, but there are additional weaknesses in this part of his argument. As 
we have seen, whilst Kripke accepts that in such an account the Platonic object can 
determine a correctness condition without interpretation (1 982, p.53), he does find the 
manner in which the mind latches on to such a state to be troublesome. He says: 
The idea in my mind is a finite object: can it not be interpreted as determining a quus function, 
rather than a plus function? (Kripke 1982, p. 54) 
Again, the question arises: is it that such a state can interpreted, or is it that it must be 
interpreted? To make the argument persuasive, it has to be established that interpretation is 
essential. 
Presumably the Platonic object in question can be accepted as being infinite - in that it 
determines an infinite extension intrinsically - whereas the mental state is finite, so again it is 
in bridging the gap between the finite and the infinite that the need for interpretation 
plausibly arises. Yet it has already been shown that a finite state can determine an infinite 
extension without interpretation, and so this type of consideration could be put to good effect 
here also. In that case, interpretation would not be an essential part of the account, and the 
regress need not arise. 
In addition, the difficulty Kripke finds here is dissolved when we enquire into the way in 
which the mind grasps an abstract object. It  is difficult to know what we are to make of this 
‘grasping’ function, but the obvious analogy is with the way in which a hand takes hold of a 
physical object. If the analogy is remotely apt, then since a hand may quite easily grasp an 
infinitely long rope simply by grasping any one part of it, then we should likewise accept 
that the mind may readily grasp an infinite Platonic object. The point is that the notion of 
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Perhaps one reason why the infiniteness condition appears more formidable than it really is rests with Kripke’s 
choice - or rather Wittgenstein’s choice - of a mathematical example to illustrate the problem. In such a case the 
idea that a representation of a function has to be an infinite table is reasonably attractive (as opposed to thinking 
for example that grasp of the concept green requires a list of all green things). There is no reason why the 
suggestion that an infinite list must be stored in the mind should be seriously entertained. We actually carry out 
large computations by following an algorithm, and so a more plausible proposition is that we internalise a 
representation (an intrinsic representation) of the algorithm, and that an infinite number of calculations - those 
produced in accordance with the algorithm - are represented by this mental state. 
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grasping is precisely the type of relationship which could enable the gap between finite and 
infinite to be bridged. 
25 
Conclusion 
The result of the preceding discussion is that Kripke’s elimination of putative meaning- 
determinants has failed to exclude some important contenders, namely dispositions, sui 
generis states, and Platonic objects. Contra Kripke, it has not been shown that dispositions 
are inadequate when it comes to constructing correctness, nor that sui generis state and 
Platonic objects succumb to a regress of interpretations. All three options are, in fact, very 
much live positions, and the fact that all three remain is a strong indictment of the ‘sceptical’ 
argument . 
25 
The sui generis response to Kripke’s sceptic is developed by Wright (who develops the analogy with 
intentions) (1  984 and 1989b), is mentioned by McGinn ( 1984), and is the position Boghossian advocates as the 
conclusion of his ( I  989). 
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2. Following a Rule 
In the previous chapter we noted that, although termed ‘sceptical’, Kripke’s attack on rule- 
following actually engages with distinctly ontological matters. Since that approach fails to 
raise a substantive threat to the possibility of rule-following, I want in this chapter to 
consider whether the ‘missing’ epistemological dimension is any more fruitful. A true 
‘sceptical’ argument would aim to show (a) that there is some body of knowledge we think 
we possess, which in fact we do not, and (b) that this lack of knowledge proves damaging to 
our view of ourselves as rule-followers. Is there any such argument? 
To lay things out fully, there are three types of knowledge which I possess as a rule-follower, 
and which are relevant to the discussion. These are: 
Existence: I know that I am following a rule. 
Identity I know that I am following rule R. 
Application: I know that the rule I am following now requires <p. 
Questions concerning the existence, and the identity, of the rules we follow have both been 
raised in connection with Wittgenstein. For example, Kripke briefly asks how we know the 
identity of the rules we follow, and as we shall see in Chapter 5, Wright has developed a 
forceful thesis on the basis that such knowledge is not as straightforward as we might think, 
and indeed uses such epistemological issues to motivate a substantial revision to the notion 
of rule-following. For a complete account of the epistemology of rule-following, this kind 
1 
1 
In the previous chapter I claimed that Kripke’s ‘sceptical’ argument centered on ontological, not 
epistemological, issues. Somewhat exceptionally though, Kripke does raise this objection to the sui generis state 
theory: 
[The sui generis meaning state] is not supposed to be an introspectable state of affairs, yet we supposedly are 
aware of it with some fair degree of certainty whenever it occurs. For how else can each of us be confident 
that he does, at present, mean addition by ‘plus’? (Kripke 1982, p. 5 1)  
As Kripke notes, any meaning-determining state cannot be essentially phenomenological, for a phenomenological 
state i s  not normative. But if the meaning-determinant is not phenomenological, how do we know what we mean 
by our words? 
At this level of development it is not possible to see this ob-jection as particularly powerful. This is because here 
Kripke raises an issue which applies to all propositional attitudes, not just meaning. In a great many cases we 
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of argument has to be examined, but for structural reasons I have deferred scrutiny of this 
type of consideration until later. This is because it is not clear that knowing either that I am 
following a rule, or that I am following a particular rule, is necessary for me to be a rule- 
follower, which is to say a threat to either type of knowledge is not a threat to rule-following 
itself. From this initial appraisal, it seems that a demonstration that such knowledge is 
unavailable would not have the type of destructive consequences which currently hold our 
interest. 
The situation is quite different when it comes to matters of application. The very term 'rule- 
following' indicates that the rule is something which is followed. In following a rule I read 
ofSthe requirements of the rule; the rule informs my actions; it guides me. So, on the face of 
it at least, a rule must be the type of thing with which one can have epistemic contact. And if 
it can be shown that we cannot attain the necessary epistemic contact - if we cannot know 
what the rule requires of me in any given situation - then we cannot be rule followers. A 
failure of knowledge with respect to the application of a rule would then appear to lead to the 
same 'paradoxical' position as was claimed on the basis of the Kripke's 'sceptical' 
argument. 
Kripke's failure to prosecute the epistemological dimension of rule-following is the most 
significant lacuna in his account of Wittgenstein's argument, for the issue was of central 
importance to Wittgenstein. To assess whether there is any merit in this type of approach, I 
want to initially look at the culmination of Wittgenstein's epistemological argument, which 
occurs in the following passages of the Philosophical Investigations: 
217 "How am I able to obey a rule?" - if this is not a question about causes, then it is a question 
about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. 
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am 
inclined to say: "This is simply what I do.'' .... 
2 18. Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails invisibly laid 
to infinity? Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to 
the unlimited application of the rule. 
know with complete certainty what our beliefs and desires are, and yet it is far from obvious how this knowledge 
is obtained. Notably, though, we do not find the fact that beliefs, intentions, and the like are introspectable, but 
non-phenomenological, sufficient grounds on which to deny that such states exist. Correspondingly, the fact that 
a sui generis meaning would also have this property is not sufficient reason to say that there can be no such state. 
What holds for intentions should hold for meanings: although we can produce no convincing account of how we 
come to know what we mean, our ignorance in this respect ought not lead us to deny that meaning is a sui generis 
meaning state. In short, in arguing against a sui generis meaning state, Kripke does nothing to identifL a 
particular problem with rules, meaning, or correctness, but rather one of the characteristics of such state. In 
contrast, Wright does offer a sustained and far more compelling discussion of the connection between knowledge 
of meaning, introspection, and the way in which such factors may have ontological significance. 
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2 19. “All the steps are already taken” means: I no longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped 
with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed throughout the whole of 
space. - But if something of this sort really were the case, how would it help? 
No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. - I should have said: 
This is how it strikes me. 
When I obey a rule I do not choose. 
I obey the rule blindly. 
220. But what is the purpose of the symbolical expression? It was supposed to bring into 
prominence a difference between being causally determined and being logically determined. 
22 1. My symbolical expression was really a mythological description of the use of a rule. 
At the core here there is a blueprint for the type of argument we are after: if we are to think 
of rule-following as involving cognitive contact with a rule, then the rule-follower must have 
a reason for acting as he does. And if no such reason is available - if all reasons really are 
‘exhausted’ - then the model involving cognitive contact falls down. 
With a view to assessing the destructive force of this argument, it is notable that (at least in 
the quoted passage) Wittgenstein does not present this as an argument against rule-following 
per se. (The conclusion is not that rule-following is impossible, only that when following a 
rule we act ‘blindly’.) In light of this it seems reasonable to take the argument as merely an 
advocation for a revision to the epistemology of rule-following: whereas we think we are 
guided (by the rule) when we follow a rule, in fact we are not.2 I myself doubt that 
Wittgenstein intended the result to have such limited scope, but certainly if the eventual 
message is to be more substantial, additional argumentation is required - namely, to show 
that such an epistemological revision is itself unstable. And no matter quite what 
Wittgenstein’s views on the matter were, the important point is that this instability does 
indeed occur, meaning that the ‘exhaustion of reasons’ argument is destructive of rule- 
following. To see why this is, and to appreciate the significance of the argument against the 
existence of reasons fully, it is necessary to look at the overall structure of the argument 
given in the passages quoted above in more detail.’ 
2 
Malcolm (1986), for example, takes the view that the message of these passages is nothing stronger than the 
counter-intuitive result that rule-following does not involve being guided. 
3 
One point which has some bearing on the eventual message of the passage is the significance we accord to the 
picture of the ‘rule-as-rail’. This has been taken to be a reference to Platonism, with the section as a whole being 
directed against a Platonic philosophy of language. On this reading the ‘rail’ is identified with an object in the 
Platonic realm which determines the correct use of a word. I find this reading to be strained, for the analogy is 
only brought in after the central conclusion - that we act without reason - has been reached. Indeed, the advertised 
target of the argument is the very existence of a guiding infinite correctness condition (PI 9219), a view which is 
not explicitly Platonic. Certainly Platonism is one of the intended targets - a Platonic rule only enters the picture 
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Wittgenstein’s stated aim is to explain how rule-following is possible, which means to 
explain how we systematically (if not infallibly) succeed in according with a rule. Whilst this 
is ultimately an account of the way we act, to explain these actions we need do no more than 
explain how we make the right choice of response. Given that following a rule is an 
intentional act, my p i n g  is explained by (a) my intention to follow rule R, (b) my belief that 
R requires <p in C, and (c) my belief that condition C now obtains. The rule enters the 
explanation in so far as it explains (b), that is how I come to believe that the rule now 
requires v. So to explain how it is possible to follow a rule, the search is for an explanation 
for my choice of action - why I believe that a given action is, in present circumstances, 
correct, and how my choices tend to be correct. 
4 
Initially, we assume that the norm (or normative mental state), and one’s opinion as to the 
requirements of the rule, are independent. That is just to acknowledge that the rule 
determines what is correct in advance of any thoughts I have on the matter, and as a rule- 
follower my job is to accord with this pre-established standard. The aim is to explain how the 
rule influences the verdicts I give. To this end, Wittgenstein considers three possibilities, 
marked by three different relationships between rule and verdict: a causal explanation, a 
reason explanation, and the possibility that there is no relevant relation at all (‘blind’ rule- 
following) . 
Only the first two options are at all explanatory, and the role of the rule in each explanation 
is significantly different. If we are talking in terms of causes, then we can only mean that the 
subject’s apprehension of her worldly situation C causes her to believe that cp is correct. If a 
rule is to enter into this account, then it must be that the rule is, not a cause itself (for a rule is 
in as much as it guides one’s actions. But given the doubts expressed above about the very possibility of ‘blind 
rule-following’, the force of the point is not necessarily given such a sharp focus. 
4 
This identification of what is to be explained is important not least because Wittgenstein himself vacillates 
between explanations of (variously) behaviour, action, and belief. For example, in PI $211 he starts by asking 
how someone knows what is required (reason for belieJ), and ends on an observation about what the agent then 
does (no reason for action). Whilst the explanations for such phenomena may well be closely related, it is also 
possible that types of explanation may be available for one category and not for another. I have in mind the way 
Wittgenstein discounts the possibility of causal explanations for certain rule-governed phenomena (see for 
example PI $169), and certainly the treatment we give to causal explanations for beliefs, actions and behaviour 
may be significantly different. 
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not an event), but rather a causally relevant factor - it is only because the subject grasps a 
rule that her apprehension of C causes the relevant belief. 
5 
On the other hand, if the explanation comes in terms of reasons, we should expect both 
worldly situation and the rule each to be a part of the overall reason for the given verdict. 
Here it is because situation C is appraised, and because R requires cp in C, that the subject 
believes that cp is correct. 
Wittgenstein rejects both causal and reason explanations, leaving no explanation for rule- 
governed behaviour. Instead, we merely act in whatever way strikes us as correct. Although 
the expression used to describe this result - ‘blind rule-following’ - has the air of an 
oxymoron (to say you act blindly is to say that you are not following anything at all), the 
notion of ‘blind rule-following’ cannot be dismissed automatically. We initially think that 
rule-following involves some kind of epistemic contact or guidance, which makes an 
epistemic aspect at least desirable, but it is not obvious that this element is absolutely 
essential. In particular, a dispositional theory of rule-following would hold that a rule- 
follower does what seems right without justification. Indeed, if in following a rule I act 
without reason, and without a casual relationship with a rule/grasp of a rule, then following a 
rule must consist in the disposition to form certain verdicts, and correctness is (presumably) 
to be constructed out of these responses. That is, ‘blind’ rule-following collapses into a form 
of dispositionalism. 
It is for this reason that the passage quoted has been taken as an indication that Wittgenstein 
endorsed a dispositional theory. This interpretation is not tenable, however, for Wittgenstein 
explicitly argues against dispositionalism (PI tj 149). The prudent course is to see PI $5 217- 
221 as part of a larger argument: this stage establishes that all that rule-following can be is 
dispositional, with other considerations being raised elsewhere to refute this thesis. 
We have already rejected the argument against dispositionalism which Kripke derives from 
Wittgenstein, and in terms of exegesis, Kripke’s interpretation is not here deficient, for there 
are no further elements presented by Wittgenstein which would strengthen the case presented 
by Kripke. However, once we fully engage with the epistemic dimension of rule-following, 
5 
It should be noted that the claim here is only that the rule has a causal role; it is not the functionalist claim that 
grasp of a rule consists in a causal role. 
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there is, I think, a means of refuting dispositionalism altogether. In fact, the argument is not 
specifically against a dispositional thesis, but is also effective against any position which 
dispenses with reasons (so it is effective against the theory which utilises a causal 
explanation as well). Before giving the argument, I want to show that the attendant refutation 
of the causal account is in itself significant, for although Wittgenstein rejects such a theory, 
he does not properly motivate such a course of action. 
The outcome will be this: of our three accounts of rule-following, the argument to be given 
will refute both the causal and dispositional (‘blind’) theses. As a result, Wittgenstein’s 
conclusion that we follow a rule without reasons becomes untenable - neither option which 
dispenses with reasons is now available. This means that the core argument that we act 
without reasons becomes an argument that rule-following is impossible. To get to this stage, 
we need first look at the causal explanation, and then at the case against both ‘no reason’ 
theories. 
Causal Explanation 
In PI 5 2 17 (quoted above) Wittgenstein merely puts the possibility of a causal explanation 
of rule-following to one side, for it is an options already rejected in preceding sections of the 
Investigations. Taking our cues from PI $5 169, 195, and 198, the reason for rejecting this 
thesis is that: 
(a) 
(b) 
my worldly situation is a reason for my following the rule in the way I do 
a reason is not a cause. 
If my worldly situation is a reason for my belief that cp is correct, and not a cause, then the 
causal explanation of rule-following is not available. 
Certainly, we may accept that the situation I perceive myself to be in is a reason for my 
following the rule in the way I do. My situation is within my awareness, and would be cited 
by me as a relevant factor in my decision to act as I do. What is far more contentious is 
Wittgenstein’s claim that a reason is not a cause. The thesis is forwarded on the basis that the 
receptive epistemologies are quite distinct - it is apriori that we know what our reasons for 
our actionsheliefs are, but we can usually only establish a causal connection by way of 
empirical observation. 
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There are two reasons to treat this premise in the argument with caution. One is Davidson’s 
(1980) argument that a reason must be a cause if the notion of a reason is to carry any 
explanatory value. I do not propose to explore this particular debate, but will merely record 
that the issue is the subject of on-going contention. 
The second difficulty with Wittgenstein’s argument is that even if we accept that a reason 
cannot be a cause, it may still be possible to combine both reason-explanations and causal 
explanations within a single explanatory framework for a given phenomenon. For example, 
suppose that my seeing a red book is my reason for believing that cp is correct. It might be 
that seeing the book caused me to accept that the presence of the book is a reason to believe 
that cp is correct. In other words, it might be that the same situation is both the reason for one 
thing (my belief), and the cause of something else (my acceptance of a certain reason for 
belief), and that both elements contribute to the overall explanation of why I formed the 
belief that I did. In this way we can accept that a reason explanation is not a causal 
explanation, but still incorporate both causes and reasons in one explanation. 
An investigation into whether this type of observation is relevant to Wittgenstein’s dismissal 
of causal explanations is not a project worth perusing here. For the moral is merely that 
Wittgenstein’s rejection is insecure, and so the argument which follows which does preclude 
such a thesis about rule-following is performing a genuine task. 
The Need for Reasons 
To bring out the difficulty faced by any theory of rule-following that does away with reasons 
I shall look at the dispositional theory, and then show that the problem it faces applies more 
generally. One of the chief merits of the dispositional theory is that it not only states what 
grasping a rule consists in, but it also automatically accounts for the way that the 
requirements of the rule come effortlessly to mind. Following a rule consists in doing what 
strikes one as correct, so there is no substantive issue arising as to how one arrives at one’s 
verdicts. 
Unfortunately, these two elements - that knowing the requirements of a rule is a dispositional 
matter, and following a rule is a matter of doing what seems right - are incompatible. The 
conflict emerges when we consider a situation in which a rule-follower - call him D - comes 
to believe in the dispositional thesis itself. By hypothesis, the theory is a correct description 
of the world, and so ought not unduly interfere with the subject’s otherwise correct 
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description of his worldly situation. Yet adoption of the theory may actually have a 
catastrophic effect on D’s classificatory practices. 
As a rule-follower, D must of course aim at correctness - to try to do what the rule requires 
in any given situation. Suppose, though, that upon familiarisation with Wittgenstein’s 
‘exhaustion of reasons’ argument, D comes to acknowledge that he actually has no reason to 
believe that any particular verdict is correct, and that all he does when following a rule is 
manifest certain dispositions. As we have seen (Chapter 1 ), the dispositional thesis requires 
that correctness be constructed out of what seems right under ideal conditions. Given that D 
believes the dispositional thesis, and so knows how dispositions are supposed to yield truth, 
the obvious means for D to aim at correctness would be for him to (a) identify the 
correctness-determining ideal conditions, and (b) ascertain what he himself would do were 
he in those ideal conditions. By aiming to do what he would ideally do, D would thereby be 
aiming at what is correct. Certainly this procedure is beset with difficulties: as we have seen, 
the identity of the ideal conditions is not something which can be readily ascertained; in 
addition, it may be difficult to discern when such conditions are met; let alone to discover 
what you would do were you (counterfactually) under such conditions. Yet the fact remains 
that this is the strategy which anyone aiming at correctness would be justified in pursuing. 
In fact, given that the result of any such enquiry may not be immediate, in the meantime D 
would be rationally warranted in withholding all verdicts as to what his rule requires. Of 
course, aiming at correctness does not require omnipotence, or infallible powers of 
reasoning, so the occasional failure to acknowledge reasons for or against a belief, or making 
an erroneous inference as to the significance of some ‘evidence’, does not undermine one’s 
status as a rule-follower. Yet if D comes to acknowledge a theory of rule-following under 
which it is accepted that he systematically fails to have any reason whatsoever to believe that 
<p is correct, then a rational response would be a global agnosticism: to withhold any 
judgement on the question in hand until more information is in. 
Before identifying the difficulty inherent with this situation, note that the causal theory 
entails a similar result. The theory this time is that sensory inputs cause certain beliefs as to 
what is correct, and that the causal connection between input and belief is mediated by a 
rule. Given that this type of account must accommodate the possibility of error, we should 
accept mistaken verdicts are the result of some kind of disruption to the ‘normal’ causal 
process. In that case, again, there will be a distinction between ideal and non-ideal causal 
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conditions, and consequently the obvious way to aim at truth would be to identify those 
conditions, and to do what you would do were those conditions satisfied. 
Whether the investigation into ideal conditions is instigated in the name of either the 
dispositional or the normative/causative theory, anyone adopting his strategy would 
certainly be someone trying to accord with the requirements of a rule but they would not 
count as a rule-follower, for they could no longer be described as someone who knows the 
requirements of the rule. The essence of rule-following is that the rule’s requirements are 
internalised, and subsequently govern one’s behaviour. In contrast, our example of someone 
theorising about how the rule is to be applied is manifestly someone who does not have 
knowledge of the rule, but rather is someone intent on discovering what its requirements are. 
So, although aiming at correctness in some sense, D is not then someone who uses his 
dispositional knowledge as a (dispositional) rule-follower should. 
In response, the dispositionalist has little option but to claim that although investigating the 
constitutive nature of truth is one way of aiming at truth, the point of the dispositional theory 
is to accept that simply doing what seems right also counts as aiming at correctness - and 
further, that this sense of aiming at correctness is all that is required for rule-following. 
However, such a view is not tenable, for this latter attempt to capture the notion of aiming at 
correctness is inadequate. To see this, we may ask in general terms, what “aiming at F-ness” 
means. Certainly a minimum requirement is that the subject intends to do what is F. In 
addition, they should take into account any relevant indicators which suggest that an action is 
F, or indeed that it is not F. But in addition, we should expect an appropriate reaction to the 
absence of any such indicators: ifyou know you have no reason to believe that 9 is F, then 
do not accept that 9 is F.  For if you know that your belief is unjustified, if you have no 
reason to believe that cp is F, then you cannot rationally forward that opinion as an attempt at 
F-ness. 
There are perhaps situations in which an absence of justification for an action does not 
undermine that action. For example, suppose that someone who is trying to throw balls of 
paper into a waste-paper basket is reliably informed that he has been subject to an illusion, 
and that his visual inputs give no good indication of where the basket is within the room. If 
his aim is to get a ball in the basket because he wins a prize, then he may as well throw as he 
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would have done otherwise - any action gives him a better chance of winning than no action 
at all. The ‘blind’ action is valid in the hope of success as a matter of chance. 
But aiming at correctness is not like this example, in that the urge to act based on the chance 
of success ought not override the urge to withhold action given the possibility of failure. 
Rather, when following a rule, the need to avoid failure (i.e. to act incorrectly) is as 
important as the need for success. Haphazard truths are not what we are aker; the 
predominance of truth over falsity is. In this type of situation, we are not just hoping for 
success, but actively trying to avoid error. Failure is undesirable, not simply because it marks 
an absence of success, but as an intrinsic characteristic of the given endeavour. And it is 
precisely this type of situation in which we have to take the lack of indicators - the lack of 
reasons - seriously. Pot luck is no good, and so anyone aiming at correctness cannot carry on 
regardless of their lack of justification. 
We cannot intend to speak the truth and acknowledge we have no reason for our beliefs as to 
what is true: to do so is simply an admission that you are not aiming at all. What we have 
discovered is that in certain situations both conditions - aiming at truth, and doing what 
seems right - are mutually exclusive. It is because of this incompatibility that all ‘no reason’ 
theories are to be rejected. 
6 
Exhausting Justifications 
In demonstrating that a rule-follower cannot act without reason, we have dismissed both of 
our flanking positions - a causal theory and a dispositional (‘blind’) theory. Our focus now 
falls squarely on Wittgenstein’s central contention, namely that in following a rule all 
reasons are ‘exhausted’, and we are left to act without reasons. If this is right, then given our 
rejection of the other options, rule-following is indeed impossible. 
The key issue here is in what sense justifications for one’s choice of action are ‘exhausted’. 
One interpretation would be a quite general claim about the nature of justifications, that 
justifications come to an end because eventually it is not possible to justify the claim that a 
justification is a justification. For example, suppose I say that Bill has measles, and make my 
6 
It might be countered that belief in a ‘no reason’ theory be ruled out by the ideal conditions of the dispositional 
theory - belief in the theory being exactly the type of background belief which interferes with the production of 
correct actions, and which Boghossian notes has to be excluded if the theory is to be tenable. However the reason 
for excluding background theories was that false beliefs can produce false verdicts. The adoption of an ex 
hypothesi true theory cannot be discounted in this way. 
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claim on the basis that he is covered in red spots. In this particular situation it is a fair 
question to ask why Bill’s being covered in red spots is a justification for the claim that he 
has measles. And if I can provide no answer, then a reasonable view is that I am not justified 
in claiming that he has measles on the basis of his spots. That is, in some circumstances, a 
justification must itself be justified as a justification in order to be justificatory. But clearly, 
if this were always the case, then the notion of justification is regressive: the theory in 
question holds that a justification is only justificatory given a second justification; but then 
that second justification will only be justificatory given a third one, and so on. If this were a 
proper account of justification, then at some point we would always reach a justification 
which could not itself be justified, a situation which would leave us without justification, and 
which could be described as a situation in which our justifications are “exhausted”. 
This regress can only be stopped (and in order for anything to be a justification it must be 
stopped) if some justifications do not need further justification in order to be justificatory. It 
is just this type of argument which motivates foundationalist epistemologies, which state that 
certain statements which can be known (and are thus justified) without recourse to further 
justification. 
Taking our example above, we might cite as evidence for our claim the fact that every 
previous patient manifesting such spots has been found to have the measles virus, and so the 
justification works by induction. Whether we want to say that induction stands as a type of 
justification, or if we choose to justify induction using deduction, the end point will, 
presumably, be a priori, and need no further justification. Similarly, the justification we 
might offer for an observation statement might eventually be given in terms of the contents 
of our experience, and no justification is required for the claim, say, that there is a red spot in 
my field of vision. 
According to Baker and Hacker (1985), it is precisely this limitation to the extent in which 
any justification can itself be justified that Wittgenstein is concerned with. The conclusion as 
applied to the application of a rule is the same as it must be for justification to be possible at 
all: there must be some stage at which a supporting justification is not required: 
Wittgenstein’s point is not that here my action is unjustified (haphazard, a free choice), but rather 
that it has already been justified, and no further justification stands behind the justification which 
has been given. (Baker and Hacker 1985, p. 209) 
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The “justification which has been given” that Baker and Hacker refer to consists in how I 
have been trained to follow a rule, and the sample given. The claim is that it is disingenuous 
to search for any further justification, and we are only tempted to do so because we fail to 
recognise that our training is justification enough. 
This interpretation of the argument is unsatisfactory, since the whole motivation behind the 
rule-following considerations is that past performance cannot justify the choice of one action 
as being in accordance with the rule over any other. Past performance could justify any 
current choice of action. Moreover, this reading is not true to Wittgenstein. He does not 
conclude that the justification I do have is sufficient justification; what he does say is that 
when I follow a rule “I act, without reasons” (Emphasis added, Wittgenstein PI $21 1). To 
say that I act without justification is quite different from saying that the justification on offer 
is adequate. The end of justification is not presented as the result of a bogus requirement for 
a further level of justification. Rather, in the case of rules, there is some judgement which we 
think of as justified, but which genuinely fails to be so. For this reason the correct account of 
the argument cannot be that the “exhaustion” of justifications is due to any such general 
regress. 
The Regress Argument 
An alternative, and ultimately more satisfactory, reading of this passage equates the 
‘exhaustion of justifications’ with the ‘regress of interpretations’ emphasised by Kripke. 
Such a reading is given by Pears: 
The weight of Wittgenstein’s attack falls on the ... suggestion that there is something that actually 
occurs in his mind and gives him infallible guidance. This thing, whatever it is, is supposed to lock 
him onto the fixed rails of correct use because its meaning is instantly self-intimating. It is the kind 
of thing that qualifies as an instant mental talisman. 
But what can it possibly be? As we have seen, mere words will not do the trick because any 
analytical formula will itself stand in just as much need of interpretation. Is it, then, a mental 
image or picture? But though a picture may have a natural application, it will also have many other 
applications, any one of which could be chosen instead of the natural one. It soon becomes 
apparent that Wittgenstein has a general objection to any candidate for the post of instant mental 
talisman: nothing could fill the post, because any single thing in anyone’s mind could always be 
connectable with more than one set of applications. (Pears 1988, p. 469) 
And he sums up: 
All that could possibly be found [to be a mental talisman] is ... an equivocal image or formula that 
itself needs to be interpreted. (Pears 1988, pp. 469-470) 
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The argument here is reminiscent of Kripke’s ‘sceptical’ argument in that it works by 
exhaustive elimination and vicious regress. The significant difference is that whereas Kripke 
claims that no phenomenological episode can determine a norm, here the thought is that no 
such entity can provide a suitable justification for a judgement as to what is correct. 
Nevertheless, it turns out that the items which featured on Kripke’s list fail as justijications 
for much the same reasons they failed as rule-determinants. It is by now a familiar point that 
any finite number of actions fall under an infinite number of rules. But then, if prior use is all 
we have to appeal to, any action which I decide accords with the rule in the present is 
justifiable on the basis that it continues ‘the same’ rule as before. Therefore prior use is 
insufficient as a justification for present action. And if a qualitative mental state is to indicate 
what action is correct, then this can only be on the basis of an interpretation. Just as it is not 
an intrinsic property of, say, a mental image of a square to determine a correctness condition, 
it is not an intrinsic property of such an image square that it tells me to apply the word 
“square” to squares. What I need is an interpretation, a further rule such as: when an image 
of a square occurs, say the word “square”. But then the justification provided by the image 
rests on my ability to follow a rule (the interpretation). If I need a justification for following 
a rule in the way I do, then clearly I need a justification for following the interpretation in the 
way I do, and this leads to a regress of justifications, and a regress of interpretations. The 
regress of interpretations therefore applies just as much at the epistemic level as it does at the 
constitutive level. Yet, if no behavioural episode, and no phenomenological episode can 
justify my choice of action, all the options appear to have been exhausted: we have run out 
of justifications. 
Self- Justification 
In assessing this argument, we may ask: are the items considered (experiences, instructions, 
formulae) the only justifications on offer? The argument proceeds by a process of 
elimination, and so the list of putative justifications ought to be all encompassing if the 
reasoning is to be sound. Yet there is a notable omission, which emerges when we consider 
the way in which statements about many mental states are usually considered to be justified. 
As Shoemaker says: 
It is the distinguishing characteristic of first-person experience statements.. .that it is simply their 
being true, and not the observation that they are true, or the possession of evidence that they are 
true, that entitles one to assert them. (Shoemaker 1963, p. 122) 
Whilst we should often think that the justification for a given statement is distinct from that 
which makes it true, in the case of qualitative mental states (pains, itches, and so on) these 
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are identical: the same state of affairs both justifies a statement and makes that statement 
true. Indeed, this is not only plausible in the case of qualitative mental states, but holds for 
propositional attitudes as well. We ordinarily think that we know the contents of our own 
minds directly, by introspection, and that statements about our contentful mental states do 
not stand in need of any justification: I know what I believe in virtue of my believing it. It is 
thus a characteristic of statements about the mental that they may be self-justifying, by which 
I mean that the following conditional is true: 
7 
(VS) S is F a S is justified in believing she is F 
Can the same be said of the judgement that cp accords with my rule? As we have seen, the 
suggestion which defeated the ‘sceptical’ argument was that grasp of a rule is a sui generis 
mental state. If grasping a rule is a mental state, then it is reasonable to suppose that we do 
indeed know what our rules require in the way that we know what we believe and intend. In 
that case, the claim that I should now cp is justified by the fact that cp accords with the rule I 
am following. If so, then certainly I do not act “without reasons”, nor “blindly”, in the same 
way that I do not identifjl my sensations “blindly”. I say that I have a pain simply because I 
do have a pain: by analogy the reason behind my decision that the rule requires <p is, simply, 
that the rule requires cp. In that case, the conclusion that we act without justification can only 
be reached if we persist in our requirement that the justification for our action be distinct 
from the truth-condition, a requirement which is wholly without foundation. To search for 
any other justification, or any further explanation would be to betray a misunderstanding of 
the nature of the case: the fact justifies the claim, and that is why no justification in any other 
terms can be given. If this is right, then Wittgenstein is simply guilty of overlooking the most 
obvious justification, the fact itself. 
Self-Justification and the Possibility of Error 
The idea that rule-following involves self-justifying beliefs faces one difficulty, in that the 
account appears to make inadequate allowance for the possibility of error. We should first 
7 
The passage quoted from Shoemaker actually occurs in the context of an argument directed against the need to 
appeal to introspection, taken as a mode of inner perception, to explain knowledge of inner states. Whatever the 
merits of that argument, I take ‘introspection’ to mean whatever method by which we come to know of our inner 
states. Whether this phenomenon is to be explained along the lines of inner perception, or is a means of ‘just 
knowing’ as Shoemaker suggests, is of no importance here. 
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note that infallibility is not a consequence of self-justification. Taking our original example, 
the fact that “I am in pain” is self-justifying does not entail that any such judgement is 
necessarily correct. Even if the judgement is self-justified, it is still possible for someone 
who is not in pain to believe they are in pain, and for someone in pain not to believe they are 
in pain. This is because self-justification does not preclude the holding of unwarranted 
beliefs, and such unwarranted beliefs may be false. 
Nevertheless, self-justification does make the occurrence of error somewhat remarkable. 
This stems from the noted result that a self-justifying judgement can only be false if it is 
unjustified. Now, whilst people may be generally rational, there is nothing untoward with the 
occasional lapse of rationality, that is with the formation of an unjustified belief. But with a 
self-justifying predicate, it is a plausible assumption that part of having the concept is to 
(tacitly) acknowledge that it is a self-justifying property. That is, it is part of having the 
concept of pain that you know that the only reason you can have to believe that you are in 
pain is that you are in pain. In this case, not only do you know what justifies the belief that 
you are in pain, but you also know if that justification obtains. So the only way that you 
could form an unjustified (and potentially false) belief would be if you formed a belief for 
which you had no justification, and for which you knew you had no justification. Error, 
although possible, can only arise if the subject forms a belief he knows to be without 
warrant, which is to say he suffers a marked failure in his rationality. 
In claiming that the requirements of a rule are self-justifying, we should expect errors in such 
matters to have the remarkable status noted above. Yet, when following a rule, mistakes are 
commonplace, and do not have to be explained in terms of a lapse of rationality. For 
example, I know the rule for addition, and yet certainly can make a mistake when adding 
large numbers, perhaps because I simply forgot to carry ten at some stage. Similarly, I know 
the rule governing the use of the word ‘red’, and yet can sincerely call things ‘red’ which are 
not red due to the lighting conditions. In both cases I get the requirements of the rule wrong, 
and the explanation in each situation is quite mundane. Yet our reason for suggesting that the 
requirements of a rule are self-justifying is the prima facie similarity between the grasp of a 
8 
The anti-private language argument is directed against the notion that we can have self--justifying beliefs about 
our inner states (see for example PI $289). My own view is that the traditional anti-private language argument is 
unsuccessful, and that (following Kripke) the best hope for establishing such a result lies with the rule-following 
considerations. In any case, our remit is to investigate the scope of the rule-following considerations without 
recourse to any contentious premises. Therefore we cannot base the argument against rule-following on the anti- 
private language argument, and so have no reason to dismiss claims of self--justification at this stage. 
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rule and the holding of a belief. It now appears that judgements about the requirement of a 
rule and about the identity of ones beliefs have quite different epistemologies, which makes 
claim that judgements about the application of a rule are self-justifying difficult to sustain. 
The difficulty, though, is not insurmountable. For note that in some situations (to be 
explained below), we can divide the justification for the application of a rule into two parts. 
That is, the overall judgement: 
Application: The rule I am following now requires cp 
is justified just in case the following two judgements are justified: 
Rule: 
World: 
In situation C the rule I am following requires cp 
1 am now in situation C. 
9 
The first is a judgement about the requirement of the rule, the second about the context in 
which the rule is applied. 
The self-justification thesis applies only to the judgement about the requirement of the rule, 
for whether situation C occurs is a matter of one’s physical environment, and so the worldly 
judgement is empirical, and not self-justifying. Consequently error with respect to the way of 
the world will be quite unexceptional. Yet error in either judgement is liable to produce an 
error in the application of a rule, and so the fact that errors in one’s appraisal of the world 
are mundane will serve to explain why misapplication of the rule is also unremarkable: error 
will usually not be the result of a misapprehension of the requirements of a rule, but of the 
misclassification of the situation in which the rule is applied. To know what the 
10 
1 1  
9 
The fact that rule-following involves the appraisal of two distinct factors - a rule element, and a world element - 
is highlighted by Wright (1  989c). 
10 
Error in one or other of the judgements does not guarantee a misapplication of the rule: if both are wrong, then 
the errors could cancel out. 
I 1  
The possibility of error does arise even without a mis-classification of one’s external environment. Taking the 
example of someone who adds incorrectly, we should note that the rule for addition as usually executed is a 
composite of several rules: those for aligning numbers, adding columns of single digits, carrying, and so on. The 
situation under consideration is when I forget to apply one of these rules - the rule for carrying tens, say. The fact 
that the sum I give is wrong does not then reflect a misreading of the requirements of any one sub-rule, but rather 
an omission in applying the rule. So the possibility for error does not show that my beliefs about the requirements 
of each of the composite rules, or the overarching rule for applying the sub-rules, are not self-justified. Since the 
rule for addition is a composite rule, there is no need to say that one’s beliefs about its requirements are self- 
5 8  
requirements of a rule are does not entail that the rule is followed correctly, and so the 
existence of mundane error does not undermine the self-justification thesis. 
It should be recognised that the diagnosis of error in terms of separable judgements is not 
universally applicable, for some judgements about application are not separable into the two 




The rule I am following requires that I apply ‘red’ to red things. 
The object before me is red. 
As before, we have a judgement as to the requirement of the rule, and a judgement about my 
present context in which I am applying the rule. But in this case the concept red appears in 
the both judgements. Since we have no way of describing the specific contexts in which the 
word ‘red’ should be applied other than by using that concept, the account therefore requires 
that I grasp and apply the concept red, and hence assumes that I know the requirements of 
the rule in question. But this makes the division into separate judgements circular, and so this 
device cannot be used to explain the epistemology involved in following such rules. 
In situations in which there is no classification of the worldly context which does not require 
grasp of the target rule, then there is only one judgement that the rule-follower can make, 
namely: 
Application: In my present situation the rule I am following requires that I say ‘red’. 
Certainly this type of judgement cannot be self-justifying, any more than a judgement about 
any empirical state of affairs can be self-justifying. Yet there is no means of separating the 
judgement into two factors, one of which is self-justifying, the other being responsible for 
any mundane error. 
Although the situation cannot be analysed in terms of separable judgements, the same type of 
diagnosis as was offered above can still be applied in such cases. We merely have to 
recognise that it is not the role of individual judgements which is important, but rather the 
justifying, but only that one’s beliefs about the requirements of each component rule, together with the 
requirements of the rule for composition, are self-justifying. 
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relation between justificatory factors, and truth-makers. All that has been demonstrated is 
that we cannot always ascribe concepts to our subjects which allow the separation of the 
various justificatory factors into distinct judgements - namely a judgement based on sensory 
evidence as to my worldly situation, and a further judgement as to the dictates of the rule. 
But the fact is that the same two factors - the way of the world and the requirements of the 
rule - do still feature in my belief-formation process. That is, although no single judgement 
that I make is justified by the worldly input, and no single judgement is justified by the 
contribution of the rule, both features in combination justify the single judgement I do make, 
namely that the rule I am following now requires q. 
Since we do not have separable judgements, it is not possible to say that one reason supports 
a self-justifying belief, and the other not. Nevertheless, the two inputs do still contribute to 
the justification of the overall belief in different ways. For not only are there two factors 
which contribute to the justification of the judgement, but there are also two factors which in 
combination make the judgement true or false - namely, the way of the world, and the 
requirement of the rule. The difference between these two factors is that in one case the same 
factor provides both the justificatory element and the truth-making element (that is, the rule 
is both a justificatory element, and a truth-making element), whilst in the other case the two 
things are distinct (on the one hand some sensory input will provide the justification, 
whereas it is the worldly state of affairs which contributes to the truth of the judgement). 
In relinquishing a distinct judgement about the requirement of the rule, we cannot continue 
to refer to the situation as one of self-justification, for there is no judgement which is self- 
justified. Nevertheless, the point is that with respect to the worldly contribution, fact and 
justification are distinct, and this is sufficient to explain why mundane errors are possible. 
And the fact that justification and fact are identical with respect to the contribution of the 
rule means that it is fallacious to demand that there be any intermediate justificatory element. 
It is in failing to recognise this situation that Wittgenstein’s regress appears to arise. In 
conclusion, the argument to the exhaustion of justifications fails, and there is no threat to 
rule-following from this particular epistemological direction. 
Platonism 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the epistemology of rules are not wholly unproductive, for the 
materials at hand do serve to discount a Platonic account of rule-following, and so at least 
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remove one of the options on the post-Kripke list of meaning-determinants. The argument 
comes in three stages. 
One: under Platonism, judgements about the requirements of a rule are not self-justifying. 
The distinctive claim of Platonism is that a rule is an abstract object which exists 
independently of anyone’s thought or experience. In that case, it must be possible to be in 
ignorance of the requirements of the rule, which means that the rule cannot be something 
which is automatically within anyone’s awareness. As a result, there must be some 
difference between someone who is in epistemic contact with the rule as compared with 
someone who is not, and this difference must presumably come in terms of a difference in 
occurrent states of mind. So the norm is a mind-independent abstract object, whereas the 
reason for belief as to the requirements of a rule involves an occurrent state of mind. So 
under Platonism, the two things - norm and reason - are distinct, and there is no element of 
self-justification within the attendant epistemology. 
Two: if judgements about the requirements of a rule are not self-justifying, any justification 
must be based on inference. This follows from the fact that the rule, and one’s reasons for 
judging what the rule requires, are distinct. In that case, when I form a belief as to the 
requirements of the rule, I form a belief about one thing on the basis of my awareness of 
something else, a process which must involve an inferential step. 
Three: rule-following based on inference is regressive. This is quite straightforward, for the 
process of inference just is a process of following a rule (rule of inference). So to follow a 
rule, it is necessary to follow a rule, making the whole endeavour impossible. 
12 
The principle claim of Platonism is that a rule is a mind-independent abstract object, and it is 
precisely this which precludes the possibility of the type of epistemology of rule-following 
developed above which involves an element of self-justification. Since that epistemology 
was the only stable means of accounting for rule-following we could identify, Platonism is 
thereby rendered incoherent. 
13 
12 
Put differently, the account requires that we interpret some occurrent mental state as evidence as to the 
requirements of the rule, thus leading us once again to the regress of interpretations. 
13 
The argument here bears a degree of similarity to that given by Pears (1 988), but there are two important 
differences. One, Pears suggests that any object in mind could be variously interpreted (“any single thing in 
anyone’s mind would always be connectable with more than one set of applications’‘ (1  988, p. 469), but he does 
not bring out the important distinction between standing in need of interpretation and being susceptible to 
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Conclusion 
In turning from the ontology to the epistemology of rule-following, we have made some 
important headway. Both the dispositional and the Platonic theories have been discounted. 
Significantly, though, Wittgenstein’s argument that in following a rule we act without 
reasons has not been substantiated. The only way that a rule can at once determine a truth- 
condition, and itself contribute to the justification for a belief as to its own requirements, is if 
the norm is itself constitutive of an occurrent mental state. Only if we reject the existence of 
a mind-independent object can the norm automatically be ‘in mind’. On this picture, there is 
no object - the rule - which is grasped, but rather a unitary state which we call ‘grasp of a 
rule’. Though this appears to label a relation, it need not. There is no object which is 
grasped: there is no such thing as a norm which is not ‘in mind’ - or at least not which 
informs our behaviour. ‘Grasping a rule’ i s  then an esoteric way of saying that someone is in 
possession of a certain normative state of mind. (So there is no such thing as an ungrasped 
rule, in the way that there is no such thing as an unexperienced pain.) We have as yet said 
nothing which serves to discount this sui generis theory of rule-following, and although the 
options have now been somewhat reduced, our search for a case against rule-followingper 
se has not yet proved successful. 
interpretation. (Only the former is regressive, whereas Pears refers to the latter.) The second difference is that 
Pears finds the argument against Platonism as effective against a non-Platonic view of norms. The argument is, 
though, very swift, the principle claim being that a non-Platonic norm also succumbs to the regress of 
interpretations. As I state in the text above, I do not see that a sui generis state needs to be interpreted to give a 
norm, nor to inform our behaviour, which is to say 1 disagree with Pears in this respect. 
62 
3. The Indexical Argument 
Our search for an argument against rule-following has so far proved unsuccessful: neither 
Kripke’ s ‘sceptical’ argument, nor the epistemological concerns raised by Wittgenstein, can 
be sustained. In this chapter my aim is to rectify this situation, to present a fresh argument - 
the indexical argument - which does establish the impossibility of rule-following. As we 
shall see, the indexical argument relies on components generated by the two approaches 
previously rejected. 
One outcome of the foregoing two chapters is to make the target for the indexical argument 
particularly clear. Both the dispositional and Platonic theories have been rejected, leaving 
only the possibility that a rule or a meaning be determined by an intrinsically 
representational, normative mental state. If we are to show that rule-following is impossible, 
we have to discount this option. In accepting the possibility of infinite norms, we accept that 
a rule can be in force, that a speaker’s word can refer determinately to an infinite number of 
objects, in an infinite number of situations. As we have seen, we can also give an adequate 
account for the required connection between the rule and the speaker’s action, so that an 
epistemological challenge to rule-following is no longer viable. So how to proceed? 
In order to find a distinctive problem with rule-following, we need to retrace our steps a 
little. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Kripke sets up the ‘sceptical’ argument by asking for some 
fact about the speaker in the past which determines how she ought to act in the present. That 
is, he portrays the ‘sceptical’ problem as an issue arising between the past meaning and 
present behaviour. Yet we also saw that the relation between prior meaning and present 
action is not instrumental to the ‘sceptical’ argument, but is only a superficial presentational 
device. It was because Kripke could find nothing capable of determining an infinite n o m  at 
a time that the ‘sceptical’ argument arose. A standard, once set, can be followed at any time; 
the fact that nothing determines how I should act in the present merely reflected the 
supposed failure of anything to determine a norm in the first place. 
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At least, there is no problem with this last thought - that it is always possible to follow a past 
standard when in the present - in as much as the rule-following considerations have been 
developed so far. It is the issue of the trans-temporality of norms which I want to focus on 
here. Although when speaking I intend to accord with my present meaning, where my 
present meaning is determined by my present mental state, no doubt the understanding is that 
what I mean now is the same as what I meant in the past. Indeed, unless meanings have the 
ability to remain stable throughout time, then language could not function as a means of 
communication, or as a means of classification. Meaning must remain constant throughout 
periods of change in the environment if language is to categorise those situations which are 
themselves subject to change. And if we are to mean the same thing at different times, then 
we must be able to follow the same rules at different times. If there is no content to the idea 
of following the same rule at different times, then on that basis alone meaning is not possible 
- it cannot fulfil its function. In what follows I argue that it is not possible to mean the same 
thing, to set the same standard, at different times, and that this entails a position identical to 
Kripke’s meaning ‘scepticism’. 
Representation and Context 
To illustrate the problem, we can set up a challenge modelled on Kripke’s own example of 
‘grue’. It will be recalled that ‘grue’ is defined as follows: 
Vx, t: x is grue at time t e x is green at t and t < lst January 2000 
x is blue otherwise. 
(Note that here the temporally relevant issue is the colour of x as it occurs at t - so that t is 
the circumstance of evaluation in Kaplan’s terminology.) The ‘sceptical challenge’ was to 
find some fact which determined that I meant either green or grue by the term ‘green’, given 
that my usage up to now is consistent with either. Our answer to this challenge is that a 
mental state can determine an infinite norm, and so determines that the term applies to green 
things in the future, not blue things. 
Given our acceptance of intrinsically normative mental states, we can grant that when I utter 
a word w today (in 1999) it refers to all green things, throughout time and space. There is 
then no question that I do not mean grue. However, a problem emerges when we ask what it 
is to mean the same thing at a later time. Suppose that in 2001 I utter a word v, and that v 
refers to all blue objects. Initially we might think that w and v mean different things, for they 
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have different extensions. Yet, in the spirit of ‘grue’, we may readily construct a predicate 
which puts this is doubt. Let us define grut as follows: 
b’x, t: rx is grutl is true when uttered at time t e x is green and t 2 2000 
x is blue otherwise. 
(Here t concerns the context of utterance, not the circumstance of evaluation.) The distinctive 
feature of ‘grut’ is that it is an indexical predicate. The idea of an indexical expression is 
clear enough. The referent of “I” ‘‘YOU” “now” “that” etc. depends on some feature of the 
context in which the expression is uttered: “I” refers to the speaker, “you” to the listener etc. 
In addition, tensed expressions are also indexical: the extension of “is red” depends upon the 
time of utterance, for example. Similarly, when used prior to 2000, ‘grut’ refers to green 
things; when used after 2000 it refers to blue things; so its extension depends on the time at 
which it is uttered. (To be clear, the claim is that ‘grut’ refers to green things from the 
context of the year 2000 no matter when the green things exist - we may use the term to 
refer to objects in the past, present or future.) This is in distinct contrast to ‘grue’ which is 
not indexical: whether ‘‘x is grue” is true or not depends only upon the time at which x exists, 
not at the time the utterance is made. 
1 
What ‘grut’ highlights is that the mere determination of a correctness condition is not 
sufficient to determine meaning, for the fact that a word refers to all green things is 
consistent with it meaning either green, or grut. As well as fixing the extension of a word 
when used at a time, meaning must also fix the extension of the word when used at different 
times. On this basis, we may instigate a new challenge: our aim now is to find some property 
of an individual which determines that she means green, not grut. 
The question can be put on a more general level if we note that every referring term must 
have (to use Kaplan’s 1990, p.37 terminology) a character. This is a function from context 
of utterance to a content, where content is a function from possible world to extension. 
(Given a context of utterance, the character determines the extension for a term in each 
possible world.) Thus, the character for “I” would be a function determining that the word 
refers to the person uttering it. Likewise, the character for “in five years time” determines 
that the expression refers to a time five years in the future of the time of utterance, and so on. 
1 
The “is” in the above definition is taken to be eternal; it is not the source of any indexicality. 
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Notably it is not only indexicals which have such functions: a non-indexical has a character 
which is a constant function, so that its extension is invariant with respect to context of 
utterance. 
In these terms, our question is: what determines the character for a given expression? We 
have already established that meaning can only be determined by an intrinsically normative 
mental state - that is a state which represents certain actions in certain contexts as correct. 
Although in reaching this conclusion the phenomenon of indexicality was not uppermost in 
our minds, the consideration of indexicality does nothing to immediately invalidate the 
thesis. To accommodate indexicality, the only new element we need add is that the sui 
generis meaning state must be capable of determining an extension which varies with 
context. 
This point perhaps needs some explanation, if only because with indexicals there is some 
ambiguity about the nature of meaning. For example, if I say “Today is a momentous day” 
on Tuesday, and again on Wednesday, in one sense I have said the same thing (at least I 
uttered the same sentence), whereas in another I said different things (respectively that 
Tuesday was momentous, and that Wednesday was momentous). That is, the same words 
express different propositions on the two occasions. (In Kaplan’s terminology, they have 
different contents.) 
Despite this ambiguity, it is quite in order to say that indexical expressions each have a 
meaning, a meaning which is constant across contexts. This is because, having been taught a 
specific language, it is possible for me to understand sentences containing indexical 
expressions which I have not met previously. In other words, if I know the context of 
utterance of a sentence containing an indexical, I know the truth conditions of the utterance 
in question, because I know the meaning. We can therefore safely say that there is a property 
common to any English speaker who utters “Today is a momentous day” - and a property 
which remains constant between an individual’s utterances at different times - namely the 
property of knowing the meanings of the constituent words. 
So, whether an expression is indexical or not, its meaning must be determined by an 
intrinsically representational state - call it the meaning-state. By definition, to mean the 
same thing is to be in the same meaning-state. And since character is a part of meaning, the 
character is something which must be fixed by the meaning-state. Hence, as stated, the 
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intrinsically representational meaning-state must determine the way in which extension 
(across possible worlds) varies with context. 
Intrinsic Representation and Character 
So far, so good, but it is when we come to ask how a meaning-state is to determine a 
character that problems arise. The obvious way in which a meaning-state may determine an 
indexical meaning is by being indexical itself. Hence the extension of “now” varies with 
time because the correctness condition set by the corresponding meaning-state is itself set 
context-sensitively . 
The idea of an intrinsically representative state which is indexical does require an extension 
of the idea of intrinsic representation. For an entity to be intrinsically representational means, 
of course, that its representational power is constitutive of its identity. It is quite easy to take 
this to mean that in order to identify an intrinsically representational state, you have to 
identify (amongst other things) what it represents. This appears to be the thought behind the 
following, for example: 
for ordinary relations, like x is sitting on y or x is employed by y, x and y are identifiable entities 
quite apart from whether they happen to be thus related to each other. The thing which is x would 
be the same x whether or not it were sitting on y or employed by y. But the same is not true of 
intentional ‘relations’. One and the same belief cannot at one moment be about a fi-og (that it is 
green, say) and another moment about a house (that it is green). The latter is a different belief. 
What a belief is supposed to be about is crucial to which belief it is. (Dennett and Haugeland in 
Gregory 1987, p. 384) 
(This passage is specific to beliefs, but the point raised concerns intrinsically representational 
states in general.) 
Dennett and Haugeland’ s description of the intrinsically representational looks to be too 
restrictive, for it fails to account for the context-sensitivity of certain representational states. 
For example, suppose I believed the thing to my left is green, and that there is a frog to my 
left. My belief was then about a frog - not explicitly about the frog of course, but certainly 
about the frog, for expression “to my left” picks out the frog, and given the way of the world, 
the truth of my belief depends on the colour of the frog. Suppose further that I still believe 
that the thing to my left is green, but that I have moved, so that now to my left there is a 
house. On both occasions I believe (rightly, perhaps) that the thing to my left is green, but 
whereas that belief was formerly about the frog, it is now about the house. 
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As discussed with respect to meaning, whether we want to call this the same belief depends 
on how we taxonomise beliefs (de dicto or de re). But the point is that no matter how we 
classify beliefs, it is necessary to accept that there is a representational state which fixes what 
I am talking about, that this element remains constant between the two cases, and that the 
state is therefore indexical. Yet by combining the notions of intrinsic representation and 
indexicality, it is no longer possible to identifL representational states by what they represent. 
Instead it is necessary to identify how what they represent varies with context, which is to 
say we have to give the character. 
Although the idea of an indexical intrinsic representation appears to be straightforward 
enough, it is actually fundamentally incoherent. The difficulty emerges when we look at the 
nature of representation in general. To be clear, although the most familiar type of 
representation is the way that a picture represents an object in virtue of a resemblance 
between the picture and the thing represented, our concern is somewhat broader, so that 
representation does not refer only to something involving a resemblance relation, but to the 
way in which one entity can be ‘about’ another, or perhaps ‘point to’ or ‘refer to’ something 
other than itself. This, at least is the standard use of the term ‘representation’ when talking 
about the representational power of the mind, in the sense that intentional states (beliefs, 
intentions, etc.) refer to, or represent, things outside themselves. 
The feature I am interested in can be identified using two examples of representational 
objects: firstly, a portrait of the Queen; secondly, an arrow suspended above a row of objects 
(illustrated below). 
U 
A B  C D E  
The picture of the Queen represents a particular person - Elizabeth I1 - and it does so 
independently of where it is, or when it is (i.e. independently of its spatio-temporal location). 
If I move the picture to a different room it still represents the Queen; and, should the picture 
persist into the twenty-second century (even though the Queen undoubtedly will not), the 
picture would still be a picture of Elizabeth 11. 
2 
L 
Causal relations may enter into the correct account of representation here, so that the picture of the Queen would 
not be a picture of the Queen if it had been made before the Queen existed. This type of consideration can be 
ignored in the present case. 
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This is in distinct contrast to the arrow suspended over the row of letters. Under the broad 
notion of ‘represents’, the arrow represents, points to, or refers to, the letter which is directly 
below it. If above the “A”, then it points to the “A”, and so on. What the arrow represents is 
a function of the location of the arrow - move the arrow and you (may) change what it points 
to. One way of putting this is that the representational power of the arrow is context- 
sensitive (i.e. with respect to small changes in spatial location), whereas the representational 
power of the portrait is not. 
3 
The example is formulated in terms of physical objects which are not intrinsically 
representational. In as much as these are physical representations, they have only a derived 
intentionally, a representational power bestowed on them by the mind. Nevertheless, the 
example is instructive, for the general feature of representation which it serves to identify 
does not depend on whether the representational power in question is derived or not. 
The reason for looking at these examples is to highlight what it means to be indexical. 
Restricting our attention, in terms of context, to changes in time only, a representation is 
indexical just in case what is represents varies with time; it is non-indexical just in case what 
it represents does not vary with time. Crucial to this idea, of course, is the possibility of 
having the same representation at different times. With physical pictures, the identity 
conditions of representations are straightforward. If a picture represents in a non-context- 
sensitive manner, then both the identity of the picture, and the identity of what it represents, 
are determined solely by its physical form. Given that a portrait of the Queen represents the 
Queen in a non-context-sensitive way, we know that we have the same picture of the Queen 
on different occasions just because we know what it is to have an object with the same 
physical form at different times. When it comes to context-sensitive physical representations, 
such as the arrow, the situation is similarly uncomplicated. Taking the arrow as the 
representational object, it is clear that the identity of the arrow does not vary with context 
(i.e. it is the same arrow which moves over the series of letters). Again the identity of the 
representational object is given by the identity conditions for physical objects. In both these 
4 
3 
Actually, the relative position of the arrow and letter is what counts - move the letter and you get the same 
effect - but the point is the same: what the arrow points to depends on the spatial relation between the entities 
involved. 
4 
Here the identity of a picture is taken to be determined by its physical form, so that, for example, two physically 
distinct copies count as the same picture. The argument can readily be adapted to accommodate the alternative 
thesis that the identity of a picture is determined by its physical identity. 
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cases, whether context-sensitive or not, the identity of the representation is given not by what 
is represented, but by the physical features of the representational object. Although what is 
represented varies with context, the representational objects have identity conditions that are 
independent of their (derived) representational powers. 
To bring out the problem with indexical representation, consider how issues of indexicality 
relate to our example of ‘grut’. Suppose that yesterday I was in representational state RI, 
which determined that the word w applies to green objects. This situation is consistent with 
my meaning either green or grut, for when uttered yesterday, both terms refer to green 
objects. (In fact, there are countless predicates we could construct along the lines of grut 
which are also consistent with my word having this extension at this given time, but for the 
sake of simplicity we can consider a restricted case between the two given options.) Given 
that RI determines what I meant, then the answer to the question “did I mean green or grut?” 
is simple: if the extension of RI does not vary with time (i.e. it always refers to green things) 
then I meant green, but if the extension of R, changes with time (i.e. it refers to blue things 
today), then I meant grut. My word is indexical just in case the underlying representation is 
indexical. To pin down what I mean is then simply a matter of identifying the character of 
RI. 
To do that, we need merely conduct a conceptual experiment: that is, move R, to the later 
time, and see what it refers to from the new time. It is here that the crucial difficulty arises. 
For to be indexical means that the extension of the representational state varies with time, 
and so clearly the very idea of (time-) indexicality rests on the possibility of re-identifying a 
representational state at a later time: it must be possible to have the same representational 
state at different times if it is to make sense to talk of the extension of that state varying (or 
not) with time. Unless it makes sense to talk of the same representational state at different 
times, it makes no sense to talk of the extension of that meaning-state varying with time. 
And if we are to talk about the same representation at different times, there must be 
something in virtue of which R, at t, is the same as (or different from) R2 at t2. 
That is to say, in order to ensure that representational states satisfy the notion of trans- 
temporal identity, we should hope to identify the property in virtue of which they are the 
same. In the case of intrinsically representational states, this property is already known. As 
discussed above, indexical representations cannot be identified by what they represent, for 
what they represent changes with context. In order to identify an intrinsically 
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representational state it is necessary to say what the representation represents in different 
contexts: we have to give its character. Hence, the criterion we require is that 
representations R, and R2 are the same if, and only if, they share the same character. 
Is this answer satisfactory, though? Reason to suppose that it is not comes when we note that 
conflicting requirements have been made of the relation between character and the sameness 
of representation relation. (For convenience, we can call the sameness of representation 
relation same,).  On the one hand, the essence of the identity condition given above is that it 
shows how same,,, is the product of the respective properties of two representations. 
Notably, this applies not only to actual instances of the relation, but also to possible 
instances. In a case where RI and R2 are the same only in some possible world, we should 
still say that they are the same in that world because they share the same character in that 
world. Hence, to account for the relation is to show how to construct every instance of it. 
In addition to this constructional relation between character and same,,, there is also a 
constitutive relation to consider. To see this, let us continue to restrict our attention to two 
times only, namely t, and t,. In that case, to claim that RI at t, has the character green is to 
claim, roughly speaking, that R, represents green things from the context of t,, and were RI 
to exist at t,, then it would represent green things from then too. To be more accurate, 
though, we should not refer to what R, at t, itselfwould represent were it to exist at t,, for 
strictly speaking RI is a time-slice, and cannot exist at any time other than t,. In saying that 
R, would represent green things from t,, we mean to say that in some possible world there is 
some other representation R, which exists at tZ, such that R, both represents green things and 
is the same as RI. Hence, possession of a character consists in participation in at least one 
instance of the sameness relation, albeit in some possible world. 
This constitutive relation is at odds with the claim that we have shown how to construct 
sameness out of character. For, as soon as we have an instance of character on the table, we 
also have an instance (in some possible world) of same,. Clearly any such instance of the 
relation is not the product of any construction process - we have simply imported it as a unit, 
so to speak, in the guise of a property. That is to say, the observation that R, has such-and- 
such a character does not appear to be part of what accounts for the fact that RI can re-occur; 
rather, it seems to merely record that R, can re-occur. In light of this, our account of same, 
looks to be defective. 
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These observations are, admittedly, somewhat impressionistic. They do serve, though, to 
raise the question of whether the following conditional: 
Vx#y: x is the same representation as y e x has the same character as y 
is wholly satisfactory, and hence whether it succeeds in identifjing the identity condition on 
representations. 
Having raised this question, it is worth noting that in this respect, appearances can be 
deceptive: not everything that looks like an account of a relation is one. To see this, consider 
the following example. Suppose we want to account for a quite different relation - to 
identify what it is that makes two people mutual sisters. To this end, let us appropriate the 
term ‘sisterhood’, and take it to mean a group of females who are mutual (blood) sisters 
(rather than the usual sense of a group of women bound by a common purpose). In that case, 
the following conditional is true: 
Vx # y: x and y are sisters e x is in the same sisterhood as y. 
On formal grounds, this seems to be an account of what makes two people sisters, in that it is 
an analysis of the (mutual) sisters relation in terms of the properties of the people involved. 
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that being in the same sisterhood is not what makes people 
mutual sisters in the relevant sense - that is a matter of being female and sharing the same 
parents. 
Clearly there is some similarity between this case and the case of character, but it is probably 
not worth comparing them directly. The message is simply that, whilst we had thought that 
to account for a relation we simply had to analyse the relation in terms of the respective 
properties of the related entities, this is now shown to be insufficient. The example clearly 
shows that not everything which looks like an account of a relation - not every biconditional 
with an appropriate form - tells us what we want to know. Given that there is some doubt 
about the adequacy of the account of same,,, and given that the form of the account is no 
guarantee of success, the obvious question to ask is this: what must an account of a relation 
tell us in order to be satisfactory? It is only once we have a clearer understanding of this that 
we can properly decide whether our account of same,, really is deficient. 
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The key to this issue is the idea that a biconditional may look like an identity condition and 
yet fail to be an identity condition. How can this be? In general, to identify a condition is to 
identify what is required to satisfy it - to give its satisfaction condition. The form of a 
satisfaction condition for condition C is, at its most basic, this: 
Vx: x satisfies C e Fx. 
It is easy to see that not everything that has this form succeeds in identifying a satisfaction 
condition. For example, suppose we define the property F to be the property satisjes C. In 
this case, the biconditional is certainly true: x satisfies C just in case it has the property of 
satisfying C. However, it should be clear from the way that F was defined that the claim that 
x is F tells us only that x satisfies C, it does not tell us why it satisfies C. Hence this 
biconditional fails to identify the property required to satisfy C. 
The significant feature of the example given above is that, although Fx entails the 
satisfaction of C, it does not do so by satisfving C; it entails the satisfaction of C because F 
consists in the satisfaction of C. The distinction between ‘entails by satisfying’ and ‘entails 
by constitution’ is easy to draw. On the one hand, if Fx entails the satisfaction of C by 
satisfying it, then it can only yield that satisfaction in conjunction with a satisfaction 
condition. That is to say, the entailment from Fx to satisfaction must depend on the existence 
of a satisfaction condition. In contrast, if the entailment from Fx to satisfaction does not 
depend on the existence of a satisfaction condition, then Fx does not produce satisfaction by 
satisfying the condition - rather, it entails satisfaction directly. 
As a result, there is a simple test to tell the difference between a conditional which identifies 
a satisfaction condition, and one which does not. For, if the given property is what satisfies 
the condition, the entailment 
Vx: Fx 3 x satisfies C 
will depend on the existence of a satisfaction condition. Hence, the assumption that there is 
no satisfaction condition ought to undermine this conditional. In contrast, if this conditional 
is not undermined by such an assumption, then the conditional does not depend on the 
existence of the condition, and the property in question yields satisfaction in some other way. 
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It may be useful to present this point in another, more direct, way. Suppose we have a 
biconditional which seems to identify the satisfaction condition for a condition. Of course, 
the biconditional does not explicitly state that such-and-such is the satisfaction condition, but 
it still identifies it. The situation is similar to the way the statement “Grass is green” does not 
state that grass has such-and-such a colour, but it still identifies the colour of grass. Clearly, 
the assumption that grass has no colour ought to falsi@ any such statement. Similarly, on the 
assumption that there is no satisfaction condition for a given condition, any statement that 
identifies it as having a satisfaction condition ought to come out false. The test of a genuine 
satisfaction condition is, therefore, to see how it fares under the assumption that there is no 
satisfaction condition - a genuine condition will be falsified, a sham condition need not be. 
Let us apply this test to our putative identity criterion for representations. To do this, suppose 
that there is no identity condition for representations: nothing makes sameness of 
representation over time possible, and so sameness of representation over time is not 
possible. That is, there is only representation at a time. Under this assumption, clearly no two 
representations RI at t, and R, at t2 (where tl f t,) are the same. In addition, since no 
representation can re-occur at another time, no representation can represent anything at (i.e. 
from the context of) any other time, which means that no representation can have a character. 
If no representation can have a character, then no two representations can have the same 
character. (Perhaps it is better to say that under our assumption of no identity condition, no 
representation can have a total character. Without the possibility of re-identification over 
time, a representation-at-a-time can only represent from the one time at which it exists, with 
the value of the function for all other times remaining undefined. Hence, it will only have a 
partial character, that is, a partial function from the time it exists to whatever it represents 
from that time. Clearly, though, it remains true that no two representations at different times 
can have the same character, partial or otherwise.) 
We have, then, on the basis of our assumption, the following two results: (1) that no two 
representations at different times are the same; (2) that no two representations share the same 
character. This is to say that each side of out putative identity condition, which is this: 
Vx # y: x is the same representation as y e x has the same character as y, 
i s  false. Consequently, the biconditional overall is true. On the assumption that there is no 
identity condition for representations, our putative identity condition remains true. As the 
74 
biconditional is not falsified by the assumption that there is no identity condition, it itself 
cannot be the identity condition. Or, to put the point the other way, although the combination 
of characters entail that two representations are the same, this entailment does not depend on 
the existence of an identity condition, and they do not yield sameness by satisfying the 
identity condition. Either way, we have to conclude that that biconditional does not identify 
an identity criterion at all. 
5 
If character is not what satisfies the identity criterion, we should like to claim that some other 
property performs this role. However, the conditions any such property should meet are 
incompatible. As we have seen, to determine meaning it is necessary to determine character; 
any property that determines character must entail the possibility of re-identification; and 
any property which entails the possibility of re-identification is subject to the argument given 
above. Hence, whatever satisfies the identity condition for representational states must 
determine character, and yet by the argument given above cannot determine character, which 
is to say there can be no such identity condition. 
6 
5 
By way of contrast. consider what happens in a similar situation to an ’acceptable’ trans-temporal identity 
condition. One candidate for the identity condition for persons over time is this: 
b’x # y: x is (a segment of) the same person as y a x has the same soul as y 
To follow the course of the reasoning used above, on the assumption that there is no identity criterion for persons 
over time, it certainly follows that no two persons-at-a-time are the same, so the LHS of the biconditional is false. 
However, we have no reason to deny that two people may have the same soul, for the possession (and identity) of 
a soul does not depend on personal identity over time. Any claim we should make about the possession of a soul 
is unaltered by our assumption that personal identity is impossible. Hence, we have as much reason as we ever 
did to accept that two segments of a person might share the same soul, and so no grounds on which to claim that 
the RHS of the biconditional is false. As far as we can tell, then, the LHS is false, yet the RHS could still be true, 
and hence the biconditional overall seems false. As we would expect, this legitimate example of prospective 
identity condition is rendered false by the assumption that there is no identity condition. 
6 
One characteristic of the exposition is that it proceeds very much on an extensional level: sameness of meaning 
is considered to consist in sameness of character, where character is entirely extensional. Yet we have good 
reason to believe that more than mere extension-determination is involved in meaning (“2+2” and “4” refer to the 
same thing in all possible worlds, but they have different meanings). It is for this reason that we need a notion of 
sense, and it is the sense of an indexical expression which we should expect to remain constant even though its 
extension changes. Could we not find identity conditions on senses, and use that to decide whether any two 
representational states are the same? 
The short answer is: no. The idea is that sameness of representational state is determined by sameness of sense, 
and that sense determines extension across contexts - that is, it determines character - but not vice versa. 
However, (to follow the reasoning used above) on the assumption that there is no identity condition on meaning- 
states, it follows that no meaning-state can re-occur, and so no two states can have the same character (sameness 
of character requires the possibility of re-identification, as above). Since sameness of sense determines sameness 
of character, it follows (by MTT) that no two states can have the same sense. As a result, the claim that sameness 
of sense is equivalent to sameness of meaning is true (i.e. each is impossible) even under the assumption that 
there is no identity condition on meaning, and so sameness of sense would not constitute an identity criterion on 
representations. 
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Since nothing can account for the re-identification of meaning, meaning the same thing at 
different times is impossible. To put the point in terms of our example, suppose that 
yesterday my utterance w refers to green things, and that today it refers to all blue things. 
Then, insofar as we consider only the extensions of these utterances, it is quite possible that 
on both occasions I meant “grut”. It is equally possible, though, that yesterday I meant green, 
and today I mean blue, and that I have changed what I meant. The issue is decided by the 
identity of the meaning-state - has that changed or not? - and to that question there is no 
answer. Nothing determines whether this is the same, or a different state: the matter is 
underdeterm ined. 
A Rule-Following Consideration? 
The immediate conclusion of the foregoing argument is that nothing determines whether I 
mean green as opposed to grut. The destructive power of this result is brought out when two 
additional facts are borne in mind. One is that indexicality is not a peripheral linguistic 
phenomenon: many of the statements we utter include some indexical component (including 
tensed expressions, many names, pronouns, and demonstratives). In light of the 
pervasiveness, indexicality has to be recognised as a central feature of our language, one 
which any theory of meaning has to accommodate. 
I 
The other additional consideration is that temporal indexicality is but one type of 
indexicality. The extension of an expression may also vary with the place of utterance 
(“here”, “five miles away”), the identity of the speaker (“I”, “my granny”), the identity of the 
audience (“you”, “your best friend”), and so on. Indeed, the extension of an expression may 
vary with any alteration in any feature of the context of utterance: anything is a potential 
‘index’ for an indexical. If meaning is determined by a property of an individual, and the 
individual is in some context, then every element of that context is potentially relevant to the 
determination of the extension. However, nothing can determine which elements of the 
speaker’s context are relevant (if any). Change the context in any way, change the extension 
of the expression in any way, and you could have the same meaning on both occasions, 
simply by construing the expression as indexical with respect to the relevant change in 
context. Therefore, whenever there is a change in the context of the speaker (and that means 
7 
The pervasiveness of indexicality is emphasised by Banvise and Perry (1 983) and Searle ( 1979). Whilst in some 
cases an indexicality can be removed if it is replaced with an explicit description, in many others it cannot, a point 
made admirably by Perry (1 979). 
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with every passing second), there is no fact of the matter as to whether he means the same 
thing as he did in the previous context. But that means that the idea of meaning the same 
thing in different contexts is empty, and therefore so is the idea that sui generis mental states 
determine meanings. 
It is quite evident that the example of ‘grut’ borrows heavily from Kripke’s use of ‘grue’; but 
the substance of the argument is significantly different. Kripke, following Wittgenstein, 
notes that any series of utterances may accord with some rule or meaning. Therefore a 
meaning must pick out one series of actions, and determine that just those utterances are 
correct. That means the meaning must discriminate an infinite number of contexts (for an 
action is classified in terms of the context in which it is performed). Kripke wonders how 
any mental state can do this - how can ‘green’ refer to an infinite number of (potential or 
actual) green objects, in any number of different contexts? The answer is of course that the 
meaning picks out all green objects in virtue of their greenness. The representational power 
of a mental state can determine that the colour of the object is the only relevant feature, and 
that any other context is irrelevant. If we accept the intrinsic representational power of the 
mind, then there no reason to think that meanings are underdetermined in the way that 
Kripke proposes. In contrast, in the argument given here, I do not consider the context of the 
objects being referred to, but the context of the speaker. Given that in context X the speaker 
refers (potentially) to an infinite number of objects, we want to know what determines 
whether the fact that the expression has this extension is dependent on the context of the 
utterance. Given that sometimes the extension of a meaning is dependent upon context, what 
makes it so? It is only when we have this that we have what it is that determines meaning, 
and the argument above suggests that nothing can perform this task. 
Why call this an attack on rule-following? Despite the obvious affinity to Kripke’s 
interpretation, is it not rather a direct attack on meaning, akin more to the work of Quine than 
Wittgenstein? Whilst there are several passages in the Investigations in which W ittgenstein 
raises issues concerning indexicality which have some bearing on rule-following (see for 
example PI $163 and §226), it is fair to say that Wittgenstein fails to draw any substantial 
message out of them. Significantly, though, it is a mistake to limit the problem of rule- 
following, as Kripke does, to the problem of determining an infinite correctness condition. A 
rule must do more than determine a correctness condition. It must determine a correctness 
condition which remains stable as the environment changes. It is implicit in the idea of rule- 
following - which is after all an on-going activity - that the same rule governs one’s 
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behaviour over a period of time. The result of the indexical argument, although formulated in 
terms of meaning, can equally be applied to rules. Any two correctness conditions, grasped 
in different contexts, may be the same rule. If yesterday my calling green things ‘green’ 
accorded with the rule, and today calling blue things does, then it is possible that on both 
occasions I am following the rule for put.  It appears that what is needed is a further rule, 
one which dictates how the correctness condition of the rule I am following varies, or does 
not vary, in different contexts. But then of course the same problem arises for that rule. 
Yesterday this second-order rule may have dictated that the extension of my first-order rule 
remains the same over time, today it may dictate that it change in a grut-like way, and yet be 
the same rule. As before, if one rule does not fix a correctness condition across all variations 




How does the example of the arrow fare under the indexical argument? As noted above, an arrow’s 
representational power is derived from the representational power of the mind. An arrow ‘represents’ in the way 
it does because that is how we think of it (i.e. mentally represent it) as representing. In order to have this derived 
representational ability, it is necessary for us to be able to think of the arrow’s representational power in the same 
way over a period of time. That is, the bestowing representation of the arrow’s representational power must 
remain the same over time. Since such re-identification of a representational state is precisely what has proved to 
be impossible, such derived indexical representation as displayed by the arrow is also impossible. 
It might be thought that this loss of our paradigm case of indexicality has an adverse affect on the status of the 
argument. After all, the argument uses the paradigm to characterise representation - if the paradigm turns out not 
to exemplify the phenomenon we are interested in, how can it fulfil its illuminating function? Looking at the 
nature of the argument, though, this worry is unfounded. The purpose behind the arrow example was to identify a 
key feature required for indexical representation (namely possession of a trans-temporal identity condition), 
before showing that this requirement cannot be satisfied in the (more fundamental) mental domain. The fact that 
the apparently straightforward indexicality of the arrow is undermined in the process does not falsify the claim 
that a trans-temporal identity condition is necessary for indexical representation. In the execution of the 
argument, then, the ‘paradigm’ case is of interest not because it actually is an example of indexical representation, 
but rather because it (initially) looks like a paradigm case. Even though the reality proves to be different, this 





4. Meaning Irrealism 
The position now established is exactly that of Kripke’s ‘sceptical paradox’: no property of a 
speaker can determine which rule she is following, no fact about her determines what she 
means. The threatened conclusion is that no one is a rule-follower, and that no one means 
anything when they speak. Our task is to avoid this untenable result. 
The problem of meaning nihilism arises because we have been following a course parallel to 
Kripke’s: both the ‘sceptical’ and the indexical arguments conclude that rules are radically 
underdetermined, and it is such underdetermination which puts pressure on meaning. For his 
part, Kripke goes on to offer a ‘sceptical’ solution to his ‘sceptical’ problem, a position 
designed to avoid meaning nihilism. In outline, the strategy is this: by giving an irrealist 
account of rules and meaning (in a sense to be explained below), Kripke claims that there 
need be no ‘fact of the matter’ in order for us legitimately to say that someone means 
something. As a result, we retain the right to ascribe meanings to people as we normally 
would, despite the underdetermination identified by the ‘ sceptical’ argument, and 
consequently the ‘sceptical’ argument does not give us the right to deny that someone means 
something if we would normally say that they do. Given that there are many situations in 
which we do indeed say that people make meaningful utterances, the ‘sceptical’ argument 
does not licence the conclusion that no one means anything, and so does not entail meaning 
nihilism. 
Given the similarities between the indexical and ‘sceptical’ arguments, it is worth asking 
whether the same type of strategy may be deployed with respect to the indexical argument. 
The motivation is the same, namely that of avoiding meaning nihilism, and given that the net 
result of irrealism is that our ordinary assertoric practices are to be respected, the ‘sceptical’ 
solution should operate with equal effectiveness against any kind of underdetermination 
claim. If irrealism was a suitable response to Kripke’s argument for nihilism, then it ought to 
be appropriate here too. 
As we shall see, the initial idea here is right: the ‘sceptical’ solution is suitably 
indiscriminate; meaning irrealism is as effective as an antidote to the indexical argument as 
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it is to the ‘sceptical’ argument. This, though, raises the questions: how effective is the 
solution in the first place? Providing an answer will be the central concern o f  this chapter. 
However, before offering a critical appraisal of the irrealist position, work has to be done to 
give a characterisation of the ‘sceptical’ solution with adequate precision. As with the 
exposition of the ‘sceptical’ problem, Kripke’s presentation of the ‘sceptical’ solution, 
though generally clear, has spawned various differing interpretations. To assess whether 
meaning irrealism could contain the destructive effects of the indexical argument, it is 
essential we know exactly what the thesis is, and how it operates. 
Kripke’s ‘Sceptical Solution’ 
Kripke makes three basic claims under the banner of the ‘sceptical’ solution. The first is a 
rejection of truth-conditions in favour of assertion-conditions: 
All that is needed to legitimise assertions that someone means something is that there be roughly 
specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable. (Kripke 1982, p. 78) 
The second is the inclusion of utility considerations: 
Wittgenstein’s general picture of language ... requires for an account of a type of utterance not 
merely that we say under what conditions an utterance of that type can be made, but also what role 
and utility in our lives can be ascribed to the practice of making this type of utterance under such 
conditions. (Kripke 1982, p. 92) 
And the third is: 
It turns out that this role, and these conditions, involve reference to a community. (Kripke 1982, p. 
79) 
The picture we get is that we are warranted in saying that “Jane means plus by ‘+”’just in 
case Jane agrees, for the most part, with the rest of the community members when asked to 
do additions. Importantly, Kripke is not saying that agreement with the community is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for rule-following. Nor is it the consensus which 
determines correctness, that whatever answer the community gives to an addition is 
necessarily correct. Rather, agreement with the community merely licences the assertion that 
the speaker is following a rule; that in making an ascription we dignify the subject as a 
member of the linguistic community; and these assertion-conditions and the utility of this 
practice give the content of ‘‘Jane means plus”. 
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In this way, meaning nihilism is avoided. So long as the subject satisfies the assertion- 
conditions (so long as she continues to agree with the community), and so long as the 
practice of making such utterances serves some purpose, meanings may be legitimately 
ascribed. The ascription of content does not then depend on there being any ‘fact of the 
matter’; and consequently the practice of making such ascriptions is not undermined if it is 
shown that there is no ‘fact of the matter’. We can thus continue to say that people mean 
things as we did before. 
Different interpretations of the ‘sceptical’ solution have arisen because Kripke’s critics have 
given each of the three elements Kripke mentions (assertion-conditions, utility, community) 
varying degrees of emphasis, and various different roles within the solution. To quickly 
reduce the number of possible interpretations, we can at this stage remove all mention of the 
community from consideration. Although Kripke’s thesis if often billed as a ‘community 
account’, and although the community is of undoubted philosophical importance, it is a 
mistake to see the community as instrumental to the workings of the ‘sceptical conclusion’. 
This is because the community is only invoked when we come to identzfjl the particular 
assertion-conditions, and the utility, that meaning ascriptions have. Quite what licenses the 
assertion that Jane means plus, and quite what role it plays in our lives, are important issues 
when it comes to assessing the ramifications of the ‘sceptical’ solution, but for the purposes 
of avoiding meaning nihilism (which is the task in hand) all that matters is that such 
utterances can legitimately be made. On the assumption that assertion-conditions and utility 
considerations can between them accomplish this, then all that is needed for the solution to 
be effective is that ‘ Jane means plus’ has determinate assertion-conditions and/or use. To 
discern whether the ‘sceptical solution’ can, in principle, solve the ‘paradox of rule- 
following’, it is thus unnecessary to identifL the particular assertion-conditiondutility 
considerations involved, and so for the time being the community aspect can be ignored. 
1 
2 
With respect to the remaining two elements, Kripke’s insistence that both assertion- 
conditions and use are essential to the theory is puzzling, for each appears in its own right to 
1 
The role of the community is of particular significance for the relationship between the rule-following 
considerations and the anti-private language argument (see Kripke 1982, pp. 98- 105). 
2 
There is something of a consensus that communal aspect of the ‘sceptical’ solution is misguided. (See McGinn 
(1984a p. 1 85), Boghossian (1989b, pp. 520-522), Goldfarb (1  985, p. 483) and Blackburn (1 984b, pp. 293-295).) 
My own view is that neither side establishes their respective view satisfactorily, but the point is that even if 
Kripke is wrong, the remaining elements which capture the essence of the ‘sceptical’ solution remain intact. The 
issue of how the community is involved in the warranted ascription of a rule is taken up in detail in Chapter 7. 
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be satisfactory as a ‘sceptical solution’. To see this, suppose we first drop all mention of 
utility, and hold simply that statements such as “Jane means plus” are assertable when the 
relevant assertion-conditions are satisfied. In doing this, the fundamental benefit of the 
‘solution7 is retained, in that that the right to make a meaning ascription does not depend on 
evidence for the truth of the claim, and so the meaning can be attributed irrespective of any 
‘fact of the matter’. In that case, the ‘sceptical’ result that nothing makes such statements 
true does nothing to undermine our right to say that Jane means plus. 
On the assumption that assertion conditions are at least an element of the meaning of “Jane 
means plus”, it is not clear how the addition of utility considerations can improve the theory. 
In defence of a utility element, Kripke says, “Such a role must exist if this aspect of the 
language game is not to be idle.” (1982, p. 75). Certainly we can accept that if no such role 
existed, no one would have any reason to make the assertion in question, but what is not 
clear is why the use should be dignified as being constitutive of the meaning. The point is 
brought out when we compare the relationship between meaning and use when the meaning 
of an expression is given in terms of truth-conditions. We can use the sentence, 
“Wittgenstein was born in 1889” for many purposes - to express a belief, to get someone to 
do something, to tell a joke, to give an example, etc. - but in each case the meaning of the 
expression is the same. Indeed, it is because we know what the statement means, and 
because we know that our audience shares this knowledge, that we can use the statement in 
these various ways. If this is right, the utility of a statement depends upon its meaning, but is 
not part of that meaning. 
This situation does not appear to be altered if truth-conditions are replaced with assertion- 
conditions. In order to use an expression, a shared grasp of its meaning is crucial, but 
whether the meaning is to be explained in terms of truth-conditions rather than assertion- 
conditions is - in this respect at least - not germane. The fact that a given expression has 
communally grasped assertion-conditions would enable us to use that expression for many 
different purposes; again it would be because the expression has the meaning it has that we 
can use it to influence other people in the way we do. Thus, even when truth-conditions are 
replaced with assertion-conditions, it appears to be unnecessary to include a description of 
use within the account of the meaning. 
The same type of observation applies when we consider an alternative interpretation of the 
‘sceptical’ solution which occurs when we remove all mention of assertion-conditions to 
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leave a theory of meaning given only in terms of utility considerations. Just as an assertion- 
conditional account does not need utility considerations, so too an account which mentions 
utility has no call for assertion-conditions. To see this, though, the sense in which ‘utility’ is 
used has to be explored in more depth. 
Kripke exemplifies the type of use that statements about meanings have as follows: 
the utility of this practice can be brought out by considering ... a man who buys something at the 
grocer’s. The customer, when he deals with the grocer and asks for five apples, expects the grocer 
to count as he does, not according to some bizarre, non-standard rule; and so, if his dealings with 
the grocer involve a computation, such as ‘68 + 57’, he expects the grocer’s response to agree with 
his own .... Our entire lives depend upon countless such interactions, and on the ‘game’ of 
attributing to others the mastery of certain concepts or rules, thereby showing that we expect them 
to behave as we do. (Emphasis added. Kripke 1982, pp. 92-93) 
Even though, when we play this game and attribute concepts to individuals, we depict no special 
‘state’ o f  their minds, we do something of importance. We take them provisionally into the 
community, as long as further deviant behaviour does not exclude them. (Emphasis added. Kripke 
1982, p. 95) 
In light of these comments, Kripke has been interpreted as offering an expressivist account 
of meaning ascriptions. Expressivism (emotivism) is most familiar as an ethical theory, 
according to which saying “x is good” is not to describe the world, but merely to express a 
certain attitude of approval towards x. When applied to semantics, the expressive theory 
holds that to say “Jane means plus” is not to describe Jane in any way, but just to express a 
certain attitude about her. Hence, the purpose of such statements serves to dignim them as a 
member of the linguistic community, to express an attitude of acceptance, and of expectation 
that they should continue to accord with others in their behaviour. 
3 
Expressivism about meanings does offer sufficient resources to assuage the paradox of rule- 
following. If the discourse of rules and meaning merely serves for the expression of 
attitudes, then such discourse is not answerable to any fact. Despite the indexical argument, 
we do still distinguish between those initiated into our linguistic community and those not, 
between those whose use of English we expect to follow established patterns. Under the 
expressive theory, it remains quite proper to express these attitudes by uttering statements 
such as “Jane means plus”. Indeed, to say “Jane does not mean plus” would be to express an 
attitude of exclusion, and of a lack of expectation as to Jane’s future behaviour: attitudes 
3 
The expressivist interpretation of the ‘sceptical’ solution is given by Wright (1 984), Boghossian (1 989b), 
Blackburn (1984b), and Heal (1989). 
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which, despite the indexical argument, we do not have. So under expressivism the statement 
that meaning is impossible (that no one means anything) is certainly not licensed. 
If the expression of an attitude is constitutive of the meaning of meaning ascriptions, then 
there is no obvious role within the solution for Kripke’s other component - assertion- 
conditions - to play. This is because it is the very nature of expressive discourse that it does 
not answer to objective states of affairs, but only to one’s subjective reactions. To take a 
typical situation, we may suppose that A has received a normal induction into the English 
language, and uses it in accordance with the rest of the community. On the basis of A’s past 
performance, B accepts him as an English speaker, and expects him to continue to use the 
language in the normal way. To express this, B says “A means noodle by ‘noodle”’, and the 
like. In this case we may be tempted to say that A’s behaviour is the basis for B’s assertion, 
and that such behaviour features within the assertion-conditions for B’s statement. Yet if “A 
means noodle” is to express an attitude, it does not matter why B has the attitude in question. 
No matter how A has behaved in the past, if B feels that he is a member of the linguistic 
community, then expressing this attitude by saying “B means noodle” is an appropriate thing 
to do. In other words, the expression of an attitude exhausts the linguistic function of the 
statement, leaving assertion-conditions no room in which to make their own semantic 
contribution. 
To consolidate, there are three positions before us: the ‘sceptical’ solution is interpreted as a 
theory based on (a) assertion-conditions alone, (b) expressivism alone, or (c) a combination 
of the two. So far, we have found a certain difficulty in making sense of (c), if only on the 
grounds of parsimony. Otherwise no one option presents itself as preferable to the others. 
Happily, there is not need to decide between the three options, for it turns out that they are 
all versions of the same theory. To see this, consider the class of expressions which 
undoubtedly do have expressive meaning, namely interjections (“Blast!”, “Alas! ” “Eureka!” 
and so on). Certainly such utterances do not serve to describe the world in any way, and yet 
it is still possible to use them inappropriately. For example, were I to hit my thumb with a 
hammer and shout “H~oray!’~, I would not be using the term in accordance with its meaning. 
The fact that there is such a thing as using an expressive in accordance with its meaning 
demonstrates that expressive utterances are governed by appropriate norms. 
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For an utterance to express a certain attitude can only mean that the sentence is only uttered 
with full propriety by someone who has the attitude in question. Transferring this result from 
interjections to indicative sentences with expressive content, in saying that a sentence such 
as “Apple pie is tasty” expresses a certain attitude towards apple pie, what we mean is that 
the assertion is correctly made only by someone who has the attitude in question. By this 
token, we may say that possession of the appropriate attitude licenses the assertion, making 
the attitude the assertion-condition for the given sentence. In that case, the key difference 
between what have so far been labelled ‘expressive’ and ‘assertion-conditional’ theories lies 
only with the type of situation which licenses the utterance. For an orthodox assertion- 
conditional statement the assertion-conditions concern objective, worldly states of affairs, 
whereas for an expressive the norm involves the affective states of the speaker (attitude, 
mood, or emotion). Seen from this perspective, expressivism is actually a version of the 
assertion-conditional theory. 
4 
Applying this result directly to meanings, we still have three available theses, differing only 
in terms of the identity of the assertion-conditions governing meaning ascriptions. To take a 
specific example, my saying “Johnny means plus” may be warranted by: (a) Johnny’s past 
behaviour; (b) my attitude towards Johnny; or (c) a combination of the two. Under the first 
thesis it is only Johnny’s past performance which licenses my assertion that he means plus, 
whether I am confident that we will agree in the future or not. In contrast, the second thesis 
holds that Johnny’s past performance is not semantically relevant to my utterance; although I 
may have the attitude in question because of Johnny’s past performance, it is the attitude 
itself (no matter how it arose) which warrants the assertion. In this case it is my attitude 
which is semantically relevant, whilst Johnny’s behaviour is not. 
It should now be clear that nothing precludes a theory which adopts both of the elements 
mentioned above (which is the closest we can get to the two-factor theory forwarded by 
Kripke), for there is no reason why the assertion-condition for a statement be satisfied only 
by a combination of factors. In the situation at hand, “Johnny means plus” would be 
assertable only if Johnny has behaved in an appropriate manner in the past, and I expect him 
4 
Honvich (1990, pp. 87-88) also suggests that expressive meaning can be considered a type o f  assertion- 
conditional meaning. 
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to continue to behave in a specified way in the future, so that the utterance is warranted by 
both objective and affective elements. 
5 
It is unnecessary at this stage to assess the relative merits of our three theories any further. 
The significant point is that the essence of the ‘sceptical’ solution is captured wholly in terms 
of autonomous assertion-conditions. (Henceforth I shall take ‘meaning irrealism’ to refer to 
the assertion-conditional theory.) It is the existence of assertion-conditions not dependent 
upon truth-conditions which, it is claimed, stymies meaning nihilism. The actual identity of 
these assertion-conditions is not the immediate concern; what does matter is whether the 
underlying principle is sound, whether the adoption of an assertion-conditional theory of any 
kind can have the desired result. 
Assessment of the Irrealist Solution 
To assess the viability of meaning irrealism, I shall concentrate on one question: is meaning 
irrealism coherent? To this end, there are two main charges to consider. One is that meaning 
irrealism does not have the promised placatory effect, that it itself is susceptible to the 
indexical argument. The other is that meaning irrealism is incoherent on quite different 
grounds. Let us consider each in turn. 
6 
The most obvious reason to suspect that irrealism is inadequate as a response to the indexical 
argument is that the theory replaces one norm (truth) with another norm (warranted 
assertability). Since the replacement is motivated by the result that following a rule is 
impossible this appears to be little in the way of an improvement: the theory appeals to the 
very notion - grasp of a norm - which the indexical argument attacks. Following this line of 
reasoning through, irrealism states that the content of “Jane means plus” is given in terms of 
assertion-conditions, so that an understanding of this sentence is given in terms of one’s 
S 
Although he does not advertise it as such, Blackburn (1984b) appears to propose such a ‘conjunctive’ theory. 
Blackburn accepts the negative force of Kripke’s ‘sceptical’ argument, and suggests that the correct response is 
expressivism about meanings. He says: “In my view [the sceptical argument] invites a projectivist [expressivist] 
explanation of these kinds of judgements .... In any event, we are left searching for standards whereby to make 
that judgement.” (Emphasis added, Blackburn 1984b, p. 300). So Blackburn thinks that there must be standards 
which govern use in addition to the presence (or absence) of the attitude in question. which is to combine the two 
elements under discussion. 
6 
To keep the scope of this discussion within reasonable limits, I shall assume that assertion-conditions are 
semantically adequate; that is that they are in general capable of giving an adequate account of linguistic content. 
The matter is contentions - see for example Appiah (1986) and Kirkham (1992) - but the focus of our discussion 
in not assertion-conditional semantics overall, but only the specific application of such a theory to rules and 
meaning. 
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grasp of a norm of warranted assertability. Yet on the basis of the indexical argument, 
nothing determines which norm I grasp - and that includes the norm of warranted 
assertability. So if the meaning of “Jane means plus” is assertion-conditional, it follows that 
no one ever grasps the meaning of that expression. Consequently it would not follow that 
anyone has the right to ascribe meanings to others, and the solution would collapse. 
This objection, however, ignores the very power of the irrealist position. If norms are 
assertion-conditional, then a norm can be ascribed to anyone who satisfies the specified 
assertion-conditions. Therefore, by the light of the theory itself, we can be warranted in 
ascribing grasp of a norm of warranted assertability to a subject even though the indexical 
argument shows that the matter is strictly underdetermined. It is thus assertable that 
someone grasps the norm of warranted assertability that is necessary to say that Jane means 
plus. So the irrealist solution does no more than appeal to irreal norms, and so, does not 
succumb to the indexical argument as suggested. 
7 
A second concern is whether meaning ascriptions do actually have any satisfiable assertion- 
conditions. The issue originates with a criticism directed at Kripke by several authors. Baker 
and Hacker (1984, p. 37), McGinn (1984a, p. 188) and Wright (1 984, p. 770) all state that 
even if meaning ascriptions are assertion-conditional, we still cannot draw an appropriate 
distinction between someone who means green and someone who means q u e .  For, if in the 
past Jane has called all green things ‘green’, then since here behaviour is consistent with her 
meaning either green or q u e ,  the claim that Jane means grue is as warranted as the claim 
that she means green. The point applies with equal force against meaning irrealism proposed 
in response to the indexical argument. In the same way, someone who means green and 
someone who means grut ought to behave in the same way up until a certain point in time 
(the point at which the extensions diverge), and so until that time there wouId be nothing 
they could do which would distinguish between them. So it is always assertable that Jane 
means green, and that she means grue, and that she means grut, and also any number of 
other such predicates. But then we lose grip on the idea that a definite meaning can be 
ascribed to a given individual: there are an infinite number of equally warranted candidates, 
and so which description ought to be used is as radically underdetermined as it ever was. 
7 
This objection to meaning irrealism is mentioned by McGinn (1984, p.183-184) (who attributes it to Field), and 
rejected for the reason as given above. 
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Again, though, the objection fails to recognise an essential feature of the irrealist thesis. 
Usually, we expect that the assertion-conditions for a statement are those states of affairs 
which count as good evidence that the statement is true. To identify a statements assertion- 
conditions, we need merely consider what would make it true, and thus discern what would 
indicate the satisfaction of this truth-condition. In short, assertion-conditions depend upon 
truth-conditions. 
In contrast, under irrealism, there are no truth-conditions to play this determining role; 
rather, any assertion-conditions are autonomous, and constitutive of meaning. Consequently, 
it is not possible to reason from truth to assertability. The best we can do in order to identify 
the assertion-conditions for a given statement is to apply our knowledge as users of the 
language; after all, the claim is that knowledge of meaning consists in knowledge of 
assertion-conditions, so we should all have tacit knowledge of what those conditions are. To 
this end, it is significant that even once we are familiar with the grue-like alternatives, we do 
still accept that people mean green (and not grue, or grut). This in itself is a good indication 
that such behaviour satisfies the assertion-conditions for green and nothing else. There may 
be no rationale behind this assertoric practice, but the point is that none is required. 
Boghossian on Meaning Irrealism and Truth 
With these objections out of the way, we can accept that meaning irrealism is not itself 
susceptible to the indexical argument. The remaining question is whether meaning irrealism 
is internally coherent. The first argument I want to consider which suggests that it is not is 
given by Boghossian, who attempts to exploit the connection between meaning and truth to 
find a weakness in the irrealist thesis. 
Boghossian ( 1989, 1990a) offers a reductio ad absurdum on meaning irrealism. His strategy 
is to show that meaning irrealism entails that truth is both a property and also that it is not a 
property, this being a contradiction. The argument starts with a negative characterisation of 
meaning irrealism: rather than stating that meaning ascriptions have assertion-conditions, 
Boghossian gives irrealism as the denial that they have truth-conditions. That is: 
8 
8 
The presentation of the argument is slightly different between Boghossian’s (1  990a) and (1 989). Although 
Boghossian describes (1990a) as being the more detailed of the two, the structure of the account given here 
follows (1989) more closely, simply because I find that version clearer. I have not followed the numbering 
system Boghossian uses to identify the steps in the argument. 
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(1) For all S, p: ‘S means that p1 is not truth-conditional. 
Here p is a propositional variable, and S ranges over all significant declarative sentences. 
“Significant” and “declarative” means that 
the sentence possesses a role within the language: its use must be appropriately disciplined by 
norms of correct utterance; and that it possesses an appropriate syntax: it must admit of coherent 
embedding within negation, the conditional, and other connectives, and within contexts of 
propositional attitudes. (Boghossian 1990a, p. 163) 
As mentioned, Boghossian’s aim is to show that meaning irrealism entails that truth is both a 
property and not a property. Theories of truth which claim that truth is not a genuine 
property may be termed ‘deflationary’ theories, as opposed to ‘robust’ theories. If truth is not 
a property, then the truth ‘predicate’ must have some grammatical role other than that of 
assigning a genuine property to a truth-bearer. That is, although claims such as “S is true” 
and “It is true that p” appear to ascribe the property truth to a sentence S and a proposition 
respectively, the deflationist holds that the surface grammar here is misleading. Thus, for 
example, on the redundancy theory, to say that “grass is green” is true is just to say that grass 
is green; and, on the expressive theory, to ascribe truth to a sentence is to pay it some kind of 
compliment, to signal one’s endorsement of it. In contrast, robust theories state that the 
surface grammars of “It is true that p” and “S is true” are not misleading, that such sentences 
do attribute a property to a truth-bearer. The various robust accounts then differ in the 
analysis offered of that property (coherence, correspondence, ideal justification, and so on). 
Without restricting himself to any particular version of deflationism, Boghossian claims that 
if truth is deflationary then any assertoric sentence must be truth-conditional: 
Any meaningful, declarative sentence would be (at minimum) a candidate for an assertion; it 
would be, thereby, a candidate for the compliment we pay sentences we are prepared to 
asse rt... .Any such sentence would count, therefore, as truth-conditional in a deflationary sense, 
(Boghossian 1990a, p. 165) 
This is plausible enough. If the truth predicate is just a device for disquotation - for 
cancelling out the effect of quotation marks - or serves simply as a means of endorsing an 
assertion, then anyone asserting S will have as much right to say that S is true. In other 
words, there can be no grounds on which it can be denied that a declarative sentence is truth- 
conditional simply in virtue of its subject matter; the only relevant features are syntactic. 
That is: 
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(2) If truth is deflationary, for all S: rS7 is truth-conditional. 
However, the initial premise - meaning irrealism - states that meaning ascriptions are not 
truth-conditional. That is, (1) is the claim that some sentences do not have truth-conditions. 
Thus we have: 
(3) For some S: rS7 is not truth-conditional. 
Statement (3) is the negation of the consequent of (2), and so by MTT on (2) and (3) we get: 
(4) Truth is robust. 
If truth-conditions are to be denied of certain sentences on the grounds that they have a 
certain subject matter, then truth cannot be merely a device for disquotation, or for the 
endorsement of those statements we are prepared to assert. Meaning irrealism is 
incompatible with deflationary truth. 
The next step is to show that meaning irrealism is also incompatible with robust truth, by 
giving a subsidiary reductio. First, Boghossiaw notes that: 
Since the truth-condition of any sentence S is (in part, anyway) a function of its meaning, a non- 
factualism about meaning will enjoin a non-factualism about truth-conditions: what truth-condition 
S possesses could hardly be a factual matter if that in virtue of which it has a particular truth- 
condition is not itself a factual matter. (Boghossian 1989b, p. 524) 
This seems right. It is precisely because nothing can determine a truth-condition that 
meaning irrealism is required in the first place, so in as much as truth-conditions can be 
ascribed to a sentence, we should expect it to be under the auspices of irrealism. As a result, 
(1) entails: 
(5) For all S,  p: ‘S has truth-condition p7 is not truth-conditional. 
Boghossian continues: 
Judgements about whether an object possesses a robust property could hardly fail to be factual. If 
P is some genuinely robust property, then it is hard to see how there could fail to be a fact of the 
matter about whether an object has P. It does not matter if P is subjective or otherwise dependent 
upon our responses. So long as it is a genuine, language independent property, judgements about it 
will have to be factual, will have to be possessed of robust truth conditions. In particular, if truth is 
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a robust property, then judgements about a sentence’s truth value must themselves be factual. 
(Boghossian 1989, p. 526) 
So given that truth is robust (from (4)), we get: 
(6) For all S: ‘S is true’ is truth-conditional. 
This is the statement to be contradicted for the subsidiary reductio. To establish its negation, 
note that just as the truth-conditions of a sentence are a function of its meaning (premise (2)), 
so too the truth-value of a sentence is a function of its truth-conditions. Yet, as Boghossian 
says: 
There is no way ... that a sentence’s possessing a truth-value could be a thoroughly factual 
matter ... if there is a non-factuality about one of its determinants. (Boghossian 1990a, p. 175) 
Therefore, if the truth-conditions of a sentence are recorded by a statement which is less than 
factual, then so too the truth-value of the sentence must be recorded by a statement which 
has less than factual content. That is: 
(7) For all S, p: ‘S has truth-condition p1 is not truth-conditional 3 For all S :  ‘S is 
true’ is not truth-conditional. 
The antecedent of (7) is (5), and so by MPP on (5) and (7) we get: 
(8) For all S: ‘S is true1 is not truth-conditional. 
Statements (6) and (8) are contradictory. This contradiction rests on premises of meaning 
irrealism (i.e. (1)) and robust truth (i.e. (4)). On the assumption of meaning irrealism, it 
follows that: 
(9) Truth is not robust. 
So meaning irrealism demands that truth is both robust and deflationary, which is why 
Boghossian claims that meaning irrealism is false. 
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Boghossian’s Truth Platitudes 
There is something of a tradition of supporting meaning irrealism against this argument by 
objecting to one or other of Boghossian’s assumptions about the nature of truth. For example 
Kraut (1 993) suggests that a deflationary theory of truth does not entail that every declarative 
sentence is truth-conditional. He says: “It is no part of deflationism as such that ‘true’ 
expresses a compliment we pay all sentences we are prepared to assert; a more selective, less 
promiscuous compliment might be involved (Kraut 1993, p. 257). In that case, on the 
assumption that truth is deflationary, it does not follow that every significant declarative 
sentence is truth-conditional (in short Kraut rejects (2)). Devitt and Rey (1991) criticise 
Boghossian for assuming that there must be some notion of truth applicable to some 
sentences (1991, pp. 95-97). They suggest that it is possible that no sentences are true or 
false - a position they call “austere eliminativism”. Thus Boghossian is wrong to assume that 
truth is either robust or deflationary - it might be that there is no such thing as truth at all. 
Wright (1992, Appendix) in turn thinks that it is a mistake to hold that only one notion of 
truth applies across all discourses. Instead, it could be that different notions of truth apply in 
different situations - so that the truth of a mathematical statement may be different from the 
truth of an ethical statement. If so, then it could be that a deflationary notion of truth applies 
to sentences about semantic issues, with a more robust notion in operation elsewhere. In that 
case, the premise that truth is either robust or deflationary is again false, for it could be both. 
Whatever the merits of these views about truth are, I shall not rely on any one of them as a 
means of refuting Boghossian. The assumptions Boghossian makes about the nature of truth 
are quite orthodox, and certainly occupy the default position. Unless meaning irrealism itself 
can be used to directly motivate the rejection of any one of them - and there is nothing of this 
ilk in sight - then some additional argumentation is required to motivate this type of rebuttal, 
which would take this discussion outside its remit. (Certainly we ought not re-characterise 
truth simply to prop up the irrealist theory.) Instead, I prefer to accept Boghossian’s 
assumptions, and show that the argument fails on its own terms. 
9 
9 
I am not suggesting that such motivations are not forthcoming. Wright ( 1992), in particular, does give reasons in 
support of his claim that truth is many-sorted. 
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Irrealism and Deflationary Truth 
Boghossian’s argument is unsound because meaning irrealism is actually compatible with 
deflationary truth. To isolate Boghossian’s error, let us reconstruct the argument as follows. 
From the premise: 
(2) If truth is deflationary, for all S: ‘S1 is truth-conditional. 
and the logical truth: 
(*) For all S: rS1 is truth-conditional For all S, p: ‘S means that p’ is truth- 
conditional. 
we get the following the conditional by transitivity: 
(**) Truth is deflationary For all S, p: ‘S means that p1 is truth-conditional 
Boghossian then takes irrealism: 
(1) For all S, p: ‘S means that p1 is not truth-conditional. 
to be the contrary of the consequent of (**), giving the result that truth is robust by MTT. 
The core claim is that the consequent of (**), namely: 
For all S, p: ‘S means that p1 is truth-conditional. 
is the contrary of irrealism, namely: 
(1) For all S, p: ‘S means that p1 is not truth-conditional. 
But is this really the case? 
In fact it is not, for there is an equivocation here over what it is to be truth-conditional. This 
comes out when we look at the motivation for irrealism. The aim of irrealism is of course to 
give a competing account to the truth-conditional theory of what it is to know the meaning of 
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statements such as “Jane means plus”. Saying that this sentence is assertion-conditional is to 
make a constitutive claim: meaning consists in, and is to be explained in terms of, assertion- 
conditions. Similarly, the claim that “Jane means plus” is not truth-conditional is the claim 
that the meaning of this sentence does not consist in, and is not to be explained in terms of, 
truth-conditions. 
In contrast, merely stating that S possesses truth-conditions makes no such constitutive or 
explanatory claim. To say that S has a truth-condition is not to say that the meaning of S 
consists in that truth-condition. (Indeed, if possession of a truth-condition is a trivial 
consequence of possession of assertoric content, we cannot explain content in terms of truth- 
conditions on pain of circularity.) Contra Boghossian, it is therefore quite consistent, under 
an assertion-conditional account of meaning coupled with a deflationary theory of truth, to 
say both that S has the truth condition that p, and yet that S is not truth-conditional, 
The apparent contradiction is the product of an inappropriate nomenclature, for under the 
deflationary theory, meaning is not to be explained in terms of truth, and so there are no such 
things as ‘truth-conditions’ in the constitutive sense. What is meant is that any sentence 
which is a candidate for assertion is also a candidate for truth, entailing only that there are 
circumstances in which the sentence may be called ‘true’. A more fitting term for the 
possession of such deflationary ‘truth-conditions’ would be ‘truth-apt’ . Unlike truth- 
conditionality, talk of truth-aptness is not a constitutive claim, and fulfils no explanatory 
role. If truth is deflationary, every significant declarative sentence is truth-apt, but no 
sentence is truth-conditional. It does not follow from the claim that meaning ascriptions are 
not truth-conditional that truth cannot be deflationary: sentences can lack truth-conditions 
and yet remain truth-apt. As a result, there is no inconsistency of the type identified by 
Boghossian between meaning irrealism and deflationary truth, and the reductio fails. 
Meaning Irrealism and Explanatory Power 
The message of the foregoing discussion is not wholly negative, for the manner in which 
Boghossian’s argument fails gives us something to build on. As noted, the above rebuttal of 
Boghossian’s argument exploits the distinction between two senses of ‘truth-conditional’: 
one constitutive and explanatory, the other non-constitutive and non-explanatory . As it 
happens, meaning irrealism is eventually untenable because it both rests on this distinction, 
and yet is unable to maintain a stable position on either side of it. 
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The relation between irrealism and explanation comes out most directly in the present 
context when we consider an explanation of a rule-follower’s behaviour. Looking first at the 
realist position, grasp of a rule is an essential element of a standard psychological 
explanation. In many cases, we think people act as they do because they are following 
certain rules. For instance, the fact that someone expands the series 2, 4, 6, ... is to be 
explained in terms of their intentions, together with the fact that they grasp the rule add 2. 
When ascribing rules to others, we do so in order to explain their behaviour, and so grasp of 
a rule is inferred on the basis of inference to the best explanation. 
Irrealism is motivated by the demonstration that nothing can explain the behaviour of a (so- 
called) rule-follower in the way that a rule should explain it. (Since it is impossible to follow 
a rule, the explanation given above falls down.) As a result, a statement about a rule cannot 
be warranted on the basis of inference to the best explanation, but must be made on some 
other grounds. For the irrealist, the replacement justification is provided at the semantic 
level: it is part of the meaning of the expression that the ascription of the rule is warranted in 
such-and-such circumstances. 
10 
Somewhat more significantly for our purposes, in addition to the descriptive explanation 
mentioned above, irrealism also removes the power of rules to feature in what we may call a 
prescriptive explanation. This type of explanation, rather than accounting for why someone 
behaved in such-and-such manner, is an explanation of why someone ought to so act. The 
form of this explanation will be as follows: to explain why S ought to 9, it need only be 
mentioned that (a) S is following rule R, (b) R requires in C, and (c) S is in situation C. 
To see why irrealism annuls this type of explanation we need to consider the consequences 
irrealism has for truth as identified above. The result of our treatment of Boghossian’s 
argument is that meaning irrealism enjoins a deflationary theory of truth. (The strand of his 
argument showing that irrealism is incompatible with robust truth still stands.) That is, just 
as we may legitimately say things such as: 
S means that p 
we may also just as legitimately say both: 
10 
Kripke notes (1982, p. 97) that meaning irrealism involves a loss of explanatory power. 
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“S means that p” is true 
and: 
“S means that p” has a truth-condition. 
Whilst Boghossian construes this result as being a result about the trivial applicability of the 
truth-predicate, what amounts to the same thing is the claim that, since such sentences are 
assertable, they have assertion-conditions and are assertion-conditional, not truth- 
conditional. (Basically the trivial applicability of truth means that the assertion-conditions 
for “‘S means that p’ is true” are the same as the assertion-conditions for “S means that p”.) 
Hence: 
“‘S means that p’ has a truth-condition” is assertion-conditional. 
Since we can at least say that “S means that p” has a truth-condition, it seems reasonable 
that, when claiming that someone knows the meaning of “S means that p”, we can also claim 
that they know what the truth-conditions for this sentence are. 
Significantly, although we may say that knowing the meaning of “S means that p” is to know 
its truth-conditions, such a description cannot be used to support a prescriptive explanation. 
For otherwise we could argue that since (1) Bill knows the meaning of “S means that p”, and 
(2) this means he knows what makes it true, it follows that (3) he ought to say “S means that 
p” only when he has reason to believe that the truth-condition is satisfied. But as we know 
from the indexical argument the truth-condition for “S means that p” can never be satisfied. 
Therefore (5) Bill (on familiarisation with the indexical argument) ought never say “S means 
that p”. 
It is precisely this type of result which meaning irrealism is designed to overcome. To this 
end it is essential that although we may say: 
Bill knows the truth-condition (truth-rule) for “S means that p” 
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this description cannot be used in a justification - or, equally, to demonstrate the luck of 
justification - for Bill’s actions. Hence the fact that: 
“‘ S means that p’ is truth-conditional” is assertion-conditional 
must entail that the claim: 
“‘S means that p’ is truth-conditional” 
cannot be used in a prescriptive explanation. 
Clearly there is nothing specific to the ascription of truth-conditions here: any statement 
ascribing grasp of a norm (truth-conditions, assertion-conditions etc.) which is itself 
assertion-conditional cannot support a prescriptive explanation. This general point gives us 
our first premise: 
(1) VS, S is assertion-conditional =. S is non-explanatory 
where “non-explanatory’’ relates to prescriptive explanation. 
In a similar vein, it is significant that the statement of irrealism must itself support 
prescriptive explanations. This is because, in replacing realism, the irrealist thesis must 
explain why, despite the indexical argument, it is still correct to ascribe meaning to people, 
and to thereby explain how meaning nihilism is avoided. Of course, it does this by providing 
an alternative explanation of our assertoric practices. In particular, in saying: 
VS, p: ‘S means that p1 is assertion-conditional 
the intention is to offer an explanation for why we ought still to ascribe meanings to people 
despite the fact that the matter is strictly underdetermined. Such a prescriptive explanation 
depends upon the fact that irrealism is a claim about what it is to know the meaning of a 
sentence, and this claim is about the psychological make-up of whoever knows the meaning 
of, say, “Jane means plus”. Unless meaning irrealism constitutes an alternative explanation 
of what it is to know the meaning of “Jane means plus”, it cannot explain why someone who 
understands this sentence is nevertheless warranted in asserting it. Significantly, faced with 
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an argument that meanings are never ascribable, it is necessary to give some reason - an 
explanation - for why this direct conclusion is mistaken. Without such an explanation, 
irrealism becomes merely that flat denial of the conclusion to a sound argument, reducing the 
irrealist thesis to an exercise in stone-walling. Our second premise marks this essential 
feature of the irrealist thesis: 
(2) The claim that VS, p: ‘S means that pl is assertion-conditional is explanatory. 
The final element in the argument has already been mentioned. As noted above, meaning 
irrealism must itself be irrealist: the thesis is a claim about the norms which give the 
meaning of “Jane means plus”, and, by its own lights, it can only be assertable that “Jane 
means plus” has such-and-such assertion-conditions. To make the claim more formally, note 
that assertion-conditions are norms, and hence are subject to the indexical argument. That is 
to say, on the assumption of meaning irrealism (i.e. (l)), in as much as we can ascribe 
assertion-conditions, we can only do so on an irrealist basis. Hence: 
(3) VS, C: ‘S has assertion-condition C1 is assertion-conditional. 
If it is only ever assertable that S has a specified assertion-condition, it can at most be 
assertable that S is assertion-conditional. Hence: 
(4) VS: ‘S is assertion-conditionall i s  assertion-conditional. 
We can of course substitute ‘S means that p1 for S in (4) to give: 
(5) VS, p: r rS  means that pl is assertion-conditional1 is assertion-conditional. 
Similarly, substituting r r S  means that pl is assertion-conditional1 for S in (1) gives: 
(6) VS: r rS  means that pl is assertion-conditional1 is assertion-conditional 
3 r r S  means that pl is assertion-conditional1 is non-explanatory. 
MPP on (5) and (6) gives: 
(7) VS, p: r rS  means that pl is assertion-conditional1 is non-explanatory, 
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11 which contradicts (2). This is a reductio on meaning irrealism. 
To put the argument succinctly, the incoherence arises from the following three propositions: 
( 9  
(ii) 
(iii) Meaning irrealism is self-applicable. 
Meaning irrealism is an explanatory thesis. 
Irrealism strips its subject matter of its explanatory power. 
It is the self-applicability of meaning irrealism - a property peculiar to irrealism about 
content - which makes it unstable. As a statement about meanings, meaning irrealism applies 
to itself; it therefore strips itself of all explanatory power. And yet the very value of the 
thesis rests with its capacity to explain. Meaning irrealism must be explanatory, yet by its 
own lights it cannot be explanatory, and this makes the position self-defeating. 
1 1  
Wright (1984, p. 770), Heal (1989, p. 165) and Boghossian (1989, p. 524) all suggest that meaning irrealism 
globalises, making all discourse irreal. Wright and Heal find this result to be destructive of irrealism, on the basis 
that it makes the statement of irrealism itself irreal, but as Boghossian indicates (1 989, p.525) there is no evident 
incoherence in this. (Wright’s view on the matter has subsequently changed; see his 1991, appendix.) The above 
discussion gives one way in which the argument may be developed. Under irrealism, to identify the meaning of a 
statement, we should look at the conditions under which speakers find the statement to be assertable. The 
significant point is that no argument (such as the indexical argument) could alter the fact that S is assertable in 
just those circumstances. If in fact every statement is assertion-conditional, then plausibly this process could be 
extended to cover the statement of semantic realism. In particular, it is normal practice to say that “S means that 
p” is truth-conditional, and that this statement about truth-conditions is itself an explanatory claim. Under global 
irrealism, we should never have grounds to revise this practice, which would mean that we could not deny that “S 
means that p” is truth-conditional, nor indeed that “‘S means that p’ has truth-condition q” is an explanatory 
claim. The indexical argument would have no power to overturn the licence we have to describe something as an 
explanatory statement, any more than it can overturn our right to ascribe meanings. In that case, we could not 
deny the thesis of meaning realism qua explanatory claim, nor assert the thesis of meaning irrealism. Under 
globalisation, meaning irrealism would not be assertable, which would rule it out of contention. I prefer not to 
rely on this approach, for it is questionable whether meaning irrealism does indeed globalise. 
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5. Creating Rules 
The prospect of meaning nihilism is still with us. The second strategy I want to consider for 
avoiding this disastrous conclusion is catalysed by Wittgenstein: 
“What you are saying, then, comes to this: a new insight - intuition - is needed at every step to 
carry out the order ‘+n’ correctly.” .... It would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition 
was needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage. (Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, 5 1 86) 
If we were to take Wittgenstein’s suggestion without qualification, so that following a rule is 
a matter of making a new decision at every stage, then we would be likening the expansion 
of a series to the improvisation of a melody. At any moment in time, it is up to the musician 
to decide, note by note, what comes next. The musician is continually at the ‘creative 
threshold’: those notes already played are fixed elements of the tune, but beyond this nothing 
is determined. Applying this picture to the expansion of the rule ‘add 2’ - what Imean by the 
rule ‘add 2’ - we get a picture in which, as I expand the series beyond the limits I have so far 
reached, the correct answer is only fixed as and when I make a judgement on the matter. 
Taking our cue from the model of the improviser, we thus think of my verdict as having the 
logical status of a decision, fixing each element at the threshold of enquiry, with respect to 
those elements of the series not considered previously. My verdicts extend the rule into 
virgin territory, as it were. To give an alternative picture, we should not consider a rule as a 
fixed rail, pre-formed, available to be followed; but rather the track is laid, continually, at 
one’s feet. 
It is, though, no accident that Wittgenstein is more cautious: he says only that talk of a 
decision would be “almost more correct”. The modifier (“almost”) is required because in 
‘following a rule’, one does not choose from a number of alternatives (cf. PI  $219); and if 
our verdicts as to the requirements of a rule do play a determining role, we are not 
necessarily aware of this fact. (In contrast, a decision is typically known to be a decision.) 
Instead, one takes the only course of action which seems to be correct, with the belief one is 
responding to an objective, predetermined standard. From a logical point of view, though, 
the difference between actual decision and verdicts which are merely akin to decisions is 
minimal. The central idea Wittgenstein here signals is the shift from a rule-foZZower, 
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someone who acts in the hope of according with a pre-ordained pattern, to rule-maker, 
someone who has a hand in the fixing the requirements of the rule in an on-going fashion. 
1 
How can this type of picture help deal with the indexical argument? It will be recalled that 
the indexical argument shows that, given any two correctness conditions in different 
contexts, nothing determines whether they are the same correctness condition or not. A direct 
response to this argument would be to identifi some factor which could determine the trans- 
contextual identity of rules in a way not previously considered. It is in this capacity that the 
Wittgensteinian suggestion has some bearing. For, to return the picture of musical 
improvisation, the musician’s decision must not only determine which particular note comes 
next, but his decision must also determine that this next note belongs with the preceding 
ones, that it is part of the last tune, and not the beginning of a new one. In deciding what 
comes next, the improviser decides what counts as the continuation of the activity already in 
progress. If there is no more to what comes next than what the musician decides is next, then 
there is no more to being the same tune than that is what the musician decides is the same 
tune. 
Applying this model to rules, if my on-going decisions determine what is the correct 
application of a rule in a given situation, then they must also determine that I am following 
the same rule as before. Whilst the indexical argument shows that nothing about me as I am 
now determines what I have to do in the future in order to follow the same rule, the current 
proposal is that future correctness is not something which has to be determined now, it only 
has to be determined when the time comes. Whether I am following the same rule as before 
has the logical status of a decision, and so we should not expect there to be a ‘fact of the 
matter’ as to whether I am following the same rule as before until my verdict has been made. 
In this way, we should not expect anything to antecedently determine what it is to follow the 
same rule over time; this is a matter to be fixed as we go along. 
2 
1 
An alternative formulation: “A rule is not an extension. To follow a rule means to form an extension according 
to a ‘general’ expression.” (Emphasis added, Wittgenstein Ms 165 c. 1941-44, 78 - unpublished. Malcolm’s 
translation. Quoted in Malcolm 1989, p. 8). 
2 
In keeping with the presentation of the indexical argument 1 here concentrate on the need for trans-temporal 
identity conditions for rules. On-going determination would solve the problem of trans-temporal identity, but the 
indexical argument shows that there are no identity conditions across any context, not just the temporal. It is 
plausible, thought not certain, that whatever factors enter into the determination of trans-temporal identity could 
also supply the more general requirements for trans-contextual identity, but this can only be ascertained when the 
determining factors have been properly identified. For the moment I treat on-going (temporal) determination as a 
test case. 
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To be clear, the basic idea we are interested in is that certain subject matters may be 
judgement-dependent: that whether a certain situation obtains depends on whether a suitably 
placed agent thinks it obtains. In its simplest form, this means that for agent S the following 
conditional holds: 
S judges that p 3 p 
with the additional requirement that it is because S judges that p that p. (As I say, this is the 
simplest form; we shall examine a more sophisticated account below). In this respect there 
are two types of judgement we are interested in. To counter the indexical argument, all that 
is required is that the following be true, with a left-to-right order of determination: 
(1) S thinks she is following the same rule as before 3 S is following the same rule 
as before. 
Call this the identity thesis. In contrast, the more directly Wittgensteinian thesis is that the 
following conditional be true, with a left-to-right order of determination: 
(11) S thinks that the rule she is following now requires cp 3 the rule S is following 
now requires cp. 
Call this the application thesis. If this latter conditional is true, though, then so too must the 
prior one be true, for as discussed, if the subsequent requirements of a rule are to be fixed as 
we go along, so too must the fact that we are following the same rule. The judgement- 
dependence of application (conditional 11) is sufficient for the judgement-dependence of 
(trans-contextual) identity (conditional I), which in turn is sufficient to answer the indexical 
argument. The question is: can either type of judgement-dependence be endorsed? 
3 
3 
If this type of picture is to be of any use in dealing with the indexical argument, then the model of an 
improvisation, or rule prolongation, has to be handled properly. In particular, the predicates ‘grue’ and ‘grut’ 
highlight that it is not just with greater numbers or unobserved objects that we encounter ‘new cases, but that at 
every step, with each passing second, any judgement we make concerns an as-yet unencountered situation. 
Consequently the fact that yesterday I continued as series 1004, 1006, ... does not determine that today I should do 
the same. We should not, therefore, think of the on-going determination as securing anything which has relevance 
for future applications. Each time I come to consider what follows 1002, the matter is not fixed on this occasion 
until my verdict is in. 
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On-Going Determination and Content 
The most obvious difficulty with the application thesis is that it appears to entail that 
whatever seems right is thereby right, a position famously rejected by Wittgenstein (PI 5 
258). Whatever the logical difficulties with such an identification may be, it certainly fails to 
account for our ordinary linguistic practices. In talking about the world, errors are possible - 
what I think is right is not always right - and so can be discarded on the grounds of 
inadequacy. 
However, such an extreme picture is not the only option. All that is required for on-going 
determination (and hence for a response to the indexical argument) is that the verdict of the 
‘rule-follower7 make a contribution to the correctness condition of the rule. The only point 
that need be established is that what is correct at each step is not wholly independent of the 
subject’s judgement on the matter, that there is at least an element of ‘decision’ involved in 
determining what is the right answer. So there is no reason to suppose that judgement- 
dependence cannot accommodate the possibility of error, thus disarming the objection. 
4 
A second concern is that in embracing any form of on-going determination, we lose grip on 
the idea that our words have fixed extensions. If, when John says “Apples are red” the term 
‘red’ does not have a fixed extension - if nothing yet determines what ‘red’ applies to in the 
future - how can we say that ‘red’ has a meaning at all? Is it not precisely because ‘red, has 
the (fixed) extension that it has its meaning? 
In answer to this, it need only be noted that whilst a theory of meaning which encompasses 
some notion of on-going determination would be a radical, wholesale, revision of our 
concept of language (in essence the incorporation of a subjective element to all subject 
matters), the fact that is it a radical overhaul is not sufficient reason for us to reject it. Whilst 
it is always a difficulty to say when a proposed revision exceeds the elastic limit of a concept 
- is this an acceptable revision of F, or have we started talking 
cannot reject a (potential) revision just because it is a revision. 
5 
about something else? - we 
4 
Pears (1988, p. 465) emphasises the fact that for Wittgenstein the rule-follower makes a contribution to, but 
does not wholly settle, the requirements of a rule. 
5 
Sullivan states that “trivially, a rule is not something one can make up as one goes along’’ ( 1994, p. 162), so that 
something which does not determine future applications is not a rule. We should not here get caught up in issues 
of nomenclature: whether we should try to maintain that on-going determination is still worthy of the name “rule- 
following”, or should instead be viewed as a replacement notion, is of little importance. What does matter is 
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Rather than arguing in isolation whether content can withstand the type of revision 
suggested, a more productive method is to look at the motivation for any such a position. 
(Showing that content must involve on-going determination would be the best means of 
answering anyone who claims that such a revision is untenable.) Notably, though, the 
indexical argument, on its own, does not properly motivate a thesis of on-going 
determination. When presented with any argument establishing some kind of 
underdetermination, it is always a potential response to say that the matter is subjective, that 
the missing determinant is one’s own view on the matter. But in the abstract, such a solution 
is entirely ad hoc. Unless there are independent reasons to suppose that anyone’s opinion - 
and in particular the subject’s own opinion - should have any bearing on the matter, then the 
introduction of judgement-dependence is entirely arbitrary. We cannot appeal to judgement 
to play a determining role simply because we have a determination deficit: it has to be 
established that judgement is a determining factor which has hitherto gone unrecognised. 
The question, therefore, is whether, in light of the indexical argument, there is any reason to 
suppose that meaning is subjective in either of the senses suggested. 
Wright on the Epistemology of Intention 
The most promising independent argument for the on-going determination of rules is given, 
over the course of a series of papers, by Wright (1987, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1989~) .  The 
route taken is somewhat elliptical, for Wright’s initial focus concerns, not rules, but the 
nature of intention. It is, though, the similarities between rules and intentions which leads 
Wright to examine intentions in this light in the first place, and so it is no surprise that his 
thoughts about intention in turn have bearing on rules and meaning. 
6 
In Chapter 1 we noted that Wright has been a major proponent of the idea that Kripke’s 
‘sceptical’ argument fails to show that meaning is not sui generis. Whereas Kripke is 
resistant to the possibility that a mental state could determine a norm over an infinite 
whether the theory of on-going determination - whether we describe this as rule-following or not - can support an 
adequate notion of content. 
6 
The lion’s share of Wright considerable contribution to the discussion of rule-following has been concerned 
with some version of on-going determination. In his (1980) he attributes to Wittgenstein an argument, based on 
the anti-realist premise that meaning must be manifestable, to the conclusion that (on-going) communal 
agreement determines the correct application of a word. (The communal theory is one version of a dispositional 
theory. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, no dispositional theory can avoid the charge of arbitrary reduction of 
correctness.) In a later paper (1986) he attempts to establish the same result but without recourse to the 
contentious anti-realist premise. The series of papers referred to in the text offer a more sophisticated argument, 
the central difference as regards the conclusion being that all mention of the community is now missing. 
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domain, Wright, in contrast, hopes to make the sui generis response quite palatable by noting 
that the supposedly troublesome characteristics of meaning - infiniteness and normativity - 
are shared by common-or-garden intentions. An intention is normative in that it determines a 
satisfaction condition - some actions satisfy my intention to mow the lawn, others do not - 
and so the intention provides a standard against which action may be measured. In addition, 
an intention may be, in the relevant sense, infinite: if I intend to call every red thing I come 
across “red”, then the intention determines that, from an infinite stock of possible actions in 
an endless number of different situations, an infinite subset of these actions satisfy the 
intention (i.e. calling red things “red”). Of course, the nature of intention - and particularly 
the possibility of a naturalistic reduction - is a subject of contention, but the idea that 
intentions are sui generis is at least familiar, and the onus is certainly on anyone who thinks 
otherwise to make a case. In light of the similitude between meaning and intention, it is as 
plausible that meaning is a sui generis mental state as it is that intending is sui generis. 
Hence sui generis meanings should be taken as the default position, and accepted unless 
shown to be untenable. Initially, then, it is because of the similarities between rules and 
intentions that Wright is persuaded that rules are immune from Kripke’s ‘sceptical’ attack, 
and that there is nothing manifestly wrong with the conservative, sui generis, account of 
rule-following. 
Having suggested that intentions illustrate the point that infinite normativity is an acceptable 
property of mental states, Wright subsequently argues that the idea of infinite normativity, as 
exemplified by intentions, is not so straightforward after all. The problem arises when we try 
to account for the epistemology of intention, and in particular when trying to give a 
satisfactory account of the way we know our own intentions. Wright finds that the only way 
to accommodate the acknowledged first-person epistemology of intention is to accept that 
intentions are judgement-dependent: that the identity of one’s own intentions depends (in 
part) on what one believes them to be. 
This result is significant in the present context when it is applied to what we may callprolzjic 
intentions - intentions such as the intention to add, which is satisfied only by an on-going 
series of actions. (In contrast the intention, say, to put the cat out is satisfied by a single act.) 
There are two ways that the result of judgement-dependence may be applied to prolific 
intentions. The obvious way is for my intention to add to depend on my belief that I intend to 
add. The second way arises from the fact that to identifL an intention is to identify what 
satisfies it. Given that a prolific intention is satisfied by a sequence of actions, it may be that 
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what satisfied the intention is fixed in a piecemeal fashion. So rather then my judgement 
about the overall identity of the intention fixing all its requirements in one go, I may make a 
sequence of judgements about the sequence of actions which satisfy the intention. In this 
way, the requirements of the intention is subject to on-going determination. 
The conclusion that intentions may be determined in an on-going manner has a bearing on 
rules and meaning in two distinct ways. Most directly, Wright’s thesis, as restricted to 
intentions, is in itself enough to establish that rule-following is not an enterprise governed by 
objective standards. The intention to follow a rule is a paradigmatic prolific intention, and so, 
if the above result stands up, will be subject to on-going determination. Since the identity of 
the intention is fixed as we go along, that can only be because the identity of the rule being 
followed is likewise fixed as we go along. If intentions are judgement-dependent7 then quite 
apart from the objectivity or otherwise of rules themselves, there can be no pre-determined 
fact as to which rule I am following, and so no objective rule-following. 
7 
The alternative strategy is to note that rules and intentions are sufficiently alike that the 
argument developed in terms of intentions may be applied afresh to rules. That is, if rules 
share the same troublesome first-person epistemology of intention, it might be that the only 
means of accommodating their epistemology is to adopt (in addition) judgement-dependence 
with respect to rules. And just as the judgement dependence of prolific intentions gives rise 
to on-going determination, so too might the judgement-dependence of rules give rise to the 
on-going determination of rules. In this second case, then, it is on the basis of an analogy that 
we arrive at the desired conclusion. 
In practical terms both routes reach the same place: the intention to follow a rule does not fix 
a correctness condition in advance. Nevertheless, we should respect the fact that there are 
two distinct theses here (which are both endorsed by Wright). In one case the argument for 
judgement-dependence is applied to intentions, in the other to rules. Although following 
similar paths, the arguments are somewhat independent. Rules and intentions are analogous 
to a degree - and this is the very reason why intentions are considered in the first place - but 
there are differences between them, and so it is possible that the core argument is sound 
when applied to one, but not when applied to the other. In order to assess Wright’s thesis, 
therefore, it is necessary to consider each of the two options on its own merits. The argument 
7 
Wright adopts this type o f  argument (1987, pp. 402-403). 
107 
is originally formulated with respect to intentions, and so we should consider that strand of 
the argument first. 
8 
Intention, Introspection, and First-Person Authority 
With respect to the epistemology of intention, it is commonplace that we each carry a certain 
first-person authority about the contents of our own minds. That is, we can all be presumed 
to know what our own intentions are, and to be able to articulate them as and when we 
choose. Notably, the ground for my self-knowledge is quite different from that available to 
other parties. Whereas others can only infer the identity of my intentions on the basis of my 
overt behaviour, I need have no recourse to such publicly available evidence, nor make no 
use of any kind of inferential practices. I know my own mind in virtue of it being mine. 
The standard explanation for this type of self-awareness is in terms of introspection. 
Introspection is considered analogous to sense-perception, and is considered a kind of ‘inner 
sight’, the essential difference between introspection and sense-perception being that 
introspection is directed inwards, not outwards. As a result, I have a perspective from which 
to appraise the contents of my own mind directly, a perspective which no one else shares. 
The authority of avowal is, on this account, the product of a privileged mode of access. 
Wright argues that the idea that we know our own intentions by introspection rests on a 
conceptual confusion. He develops this thought using specific examples from the writings of 
Wittgenstein - someone coming to understand the meaning of a word, continuing a series, 
whistling a tune, recalling what they were going to say, and deciding to play chess. To 
consider one of these, suppose that I instruct you to continue the series 2,4,6, etc. When you 
get to 1000, 1002, I certainly know that you are doing just what I intended you to do - that is 
I know that saying “1002” after “1000” is in accordance with my initial intention. The 
standard explanation for this is that I know by introspection what accords with my intentions. 
However, when I asked you to continue the series 2, 4, 6, etc. I did not - indeed could not - 
consciously entertain all the (countless) elements of the series. That is, I did not consciously 
9 
8 
Wright’s argument readily falls into the basic structure I have used to characterise the rule-following 
considerations (negative argument/positive proposal). Since Wright’s negative thesis exploits difficulties which 
face the very idea of rule-following from an epistemological point of view, it could have been examined within 
Chapter 2. For structural reasons (mainly to avoid giving separate treatments of his negative and positive theses) I 
have preferred to delay all consideration of Wright’s argument, but as consideration of the negative argument is a 
piece of ‘unfinished business’, the treatment here is perhaps fuller than it might otherwise be. 
9 
See Wright (1987, pp. 396-399). 
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identify each of the particular series of actions which you would have to carry out in order to 
satisfy my intention. But then, as Wright says: 
How ... can my authority for the claim that at the so-and-so manyth place I intend you to write down 
thus-and-such, be based on introspection; if, as has been stressed, nothing which went on in me 
and which has any plausible claim to be regarded as a state of consciousness, explicitly anticipated 
the so-and-so manyth place at all? (Wright 1989b, p. 396) 
The problem is not so much the grounds on which I claim that such-and-such is the next step 
in the series when I come to consider it. Rather, the point is that to identify an intention is to 
identify what satisfies it. If I do not run through all the elements of the series in advance, 
then I cannot be in a position - at least not on the basis of introspection - to say that I 
intended this one function over some quus-like alternative. Since it is not possible to 
introspect what my intention requires at every step, introspection cannot reveal the identity 
of the intention. So how is first-person authority possible? 
Judgement-Dependence and the Provisional Conditional 
Wright takes this argument to show that the idea that first-person authority stems from acts 
of inner cognition - from a special kind of epistemic achievement - is false. To replace this 
picture he says: 
So far as I can see, there is only one possible broad direction ... to take. The authority which our 
self-ascriptions of meaning, intention, and decision assume is not based on any kind of cognitive 
advantage, expertise or achievement. Rather it is, as it were, a concession, unofficially granted to 
anyone whom one takes seriously as a rational subject. It is so to speak, such a subject’s right to 
declare what he intends, what he intended, and what satisfies his intentions; and his possession of 
this right consists in the conferral upon such declarations, other things being equal, of a 
constitutive rather than a descriptive role. (Wright 1989b, pp. 400-40 1) 
In saying that the declaration has a constitutive, not descriptive, role, Wright signals the shift 
to judgement-dependence: I intend to cp because I say/believe that I do. Although we have 
yet to fill in the detail of the account, it is not difficult to see how judgement-dependence 
solves the problem of first-person knowledge. Wright himself compares the situation to that 
of a tennis umpire (1987, p. 401), whose word determines whether a given ball was 
(officially) in or out. (The umpire is, of course, supposed to respond to the actual physical 
location of the ball, but the point is that for the purposes of the game it is the umpire’s 
verdict that counts.) In this case there is absolutely no mystery as to how the umpire knows 
the result of a given rally, nor indeed how he is in a better position to know the result than 
any of the other spectators, for his word goes. If intentions are fixed in a similar manner, 
then likewise we do not have appeal to special modes of cognition to account for privileged 
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self-knowledge (and indeed, there is nothing to cognise): the authority in question is a direct 
product of the ontological status of intention. 
To establish the result more firmly, Wright gives a more detailed characterisation of the first- 
person epistemology of intention, and a more precise diagnosis of why judgement- 
dependence is the correct explanation for it. In order to facilitate the discussion Wright 
introduces what he calls the ‘order-of-determination test’. To pass this test, a property must 
be objective; that is, the truth-value of the judgement that x is F must be independent of 
anyone’s judgement that F is x. If a property passes the test, then since there is no logical 
connection between judgement and fact, it is a contingency that a given true judgement about 
F-ness is true. In such cases, judgements truck the truth. In contrast, for a class of 
judgements to fail the order-of-determination test, it is not always a contingency that such 
judgements are true. Here judgements do not track the truth, but determine the truth. 
To capture the idea of judgement-dependence, and of what it is to fail the order-of- 
determination test, more clearly, Wright considers the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities. Secondary qualities are, traditionally, dispositions to produce certain 
experiences in us, so that to be red is to have the power to produce a certain qualia in a 
normal viewer under normal conditions. This idea may be captured with the following 
provisional (or provisoed) conditional: 
C(Jones) 3 (Jones would experience x as red a x is red) 
where “C(Jones)” states that Jones operates under ideal conditions - in this case stipulating 
that Jones is a normal observer (has statistically normal perceptual equipment), in ideal 
viewing conditions (the conditions that typically obtain at noon on a cloudy summer’s day). 
10 
Wright is concerned to modify this basic model in such a way that is may be applied to 
properties which do not have a distinctive attendant phenomenology (whilst the basic model 
appeals to the qualia of experiencing something as red, there is no correlative ‘experiencing 
10 
Over the course of the cited papers, Wright gives several slightly different versions of the provisional 
conditional. One concern raised by these variations is whether the item that (helps) determine its own truth is a 
judgement, a disposition to judge, an avowal, or a disposition to avow (see for example 1989d. p. 632). A related 
question is whether the core conditional is a biconditional or not (in all cases the claim is that my judgement that 
Fx is sufficient to determine that Fx, but is it also necessary?). Such details have to be settled in a completed 
account, but since the whole pro-ject is somewhat programmatic it would be unwise to focus on the exact 
formulation of the conditional at the expense of the underlying principles. 
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something as an intention’). He therefore replaces the notion of a distinctive experience with 
that of judgement, with the justification that we can augment the C conditions in such a way 
to ensure that the subject willjudge that x is red precisely when it is experienced as red. The 
result is the following conditional: 
C(Jones) 3 (Jones would judge that x is red = x is red). 
On the revised model, there is no more to being red than to be judged to be red by a 
competent agent under suitable conditions. 
The adequacy of this type of account of colour is not our concern. What it provides is a 
means of capturing the idea that the extension of a predicate may be dependent on the way 
people apply it, that the concept in question is judgement-dependent. 
11 
To generalise, the form of the ‘provisional conditional’ is: 
C(Jones) 3 (Jones would judge that Fx = Fx). 
If such a conditional is to capture a conceptual connection between judgement and fact, then 
the conditional must be apriori. However, not every apriori conditional of this form will 
support a claim about judgement-dependence, and so the account must be extended to 
include some additional criteria: 
12 
0 )  
(ii) 
(iii) 
The conditional must be apriori 
The conditional must be non-trivial. 
The C conditions must be logically independent of the class of concepts under 
consideration. 
There is no means of explaining the a priority of the conditional other than in (iv) 
1 1  
In its crudest form the idea that judgements determine truth would be simply that whenever it is judged that P 
then P is true. It might be thought that this is untenable because it leads back to a collapse between what seems 
right and what is right - in which case no content can be given to the judgement in question. Whilst the inclusion 
of the ‘proviso’ (i.e. the C conditions) does ensure that no such collapse occurs, this in itself is not the motivating 
idea (it is certainly not Wright’s reason). Rather, the aim is to make sense of the idea that under certain conditions 
what seems right is right in virtue of seeming right. If this basic idea i s  accepted, then whether it applies with or 
without qualification is not a pivotal issue. 
1L 
See Wright (1989c, p. 248). 
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terms of judgement-dependence. 
Each condition is well motivated. For any set of judgements, an a priori conditional can be 
created by simply stipulating that the C-conditions are conditions under which Jones makes 
correct judgements. Hence, the stipulation of non-triviality is necessary if the a priority is to 
reflect a constitutive relation between judgement and fact. The third condition is required in 
order to ensure that it is Jones’s judgement which determines the extension of F. For 
example, should the C conditions themselves entail that x is F, then the truth of the RHS of 
the conditional need have nothing to do with Jones’s judgement, in which case we lose the 
idea that the extension of F is determined by Jones’s opinion on the matter. Condition (iv) is 
needed to discount cases like that of pain, where the truth of Jones’s judgement is guaranteed 
by the introspective availability of its subject matter. 
What we are working up to is the idea that there is a provisional conditional of the form: 
C --.\ (Jones judges that he intends to cp 3 Jones intends to cp)  
which meets Wright’s criteria. The initial prospects are good, for the fact that avowals carry 
first-person authority makes it reasonable to accept such a conditional as apriori: after all, 
this authority consists in a general presumption that a subject’s views about her own mind 
are right. And the fact that introspection is not the source of this authority rules out the most 
obvious alternative explanation. To complete the project, it has to be shown that there are 
non-trivialising C conditions, and that there is no alternative explanation for the a priority, 
quite apart from judgement-dependence. 
Turning first to the existence of C conditions, it is significant that the authority of avowal is 
not absolute, and we can accept that self-appraisals can be mistaken. The aim of the C 
conditions is to stipulate conditions under which error cannot occur, and to this end Wright’s 
strategy is to enumerate those circumstances which we think could lead to error, and then to 
state in the C conditions that such conditions do not obtain. Wright (tentatively) produces the 
following list of C conditions: 
[(l)] grasp of the appropriate concepts, [(2)] lack of any material self-deception or anything 
relevantly similar, and [(3)] appropriate attentiveness. (Wright 1989c, p. 25 1) 
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Conditions (1) and (3) are straightforward. If the subject is to form a judgement on the 
relevant matter he must be equipped with the concepts necessary to make that judgement, 
and we want his judgement to be the result of diligent consideration of the relevant issue. 
Condition (2) is somewhat more complicated. Self-delusion - the irrational adoption of a 
belief one is in a position to know is false - though intrinsically puzzling, may arise with 
respect to any type of judgement, including judgements about one’s own intentions. Also, as 
Wright alludes, there may be little correlation between the actions of the mad or the 
inebriated and their avowed intentions. Depending on the precise nature of the case, we may 
well conclude that the subject has intentions of which he is not aware, or that he does not 
have the intentions he claims he has. It is to allow for such situations that Wright is forced to 
include the ‘no self-deception’ criterion. 
Unfortunately, the ‘no self-deception’ clause violates the requirement that the conditional 
overall be non-trivial; for stating that the subject is not self-deceived is simply another way 
of saying that the subject’s judgement is right. There is no obvious means of excluding the 
possibility of such error in a non-trivialising manner, and so Wright accepts that C conditions 
which deliver an apriori true conditional cannot be given. However, Wright submits that the 
difficulty is not fatal for his project, for the provisional conditional can be modified in such a 
way that the ‘no self-deception’ condition is EO longer required, and yet the conditional still 
supports a substantial conclusion. He says: 
The suggested measure proceeds on the observation that the absence of self-deception is “positive- 
presumptive”. By that I mean that, such is the ‘grammar’ of ascriptions of intention, one is entitled 
to assume that a subject is not materially self-deceived, or unmotivatedly similarly afflicted, unless 
one possesses determinate evidence to the contrary. Positive-presumptiveness ensures that, in all 
circumstances in which one has no countervailing evidence, one is aprzorz justified in holding that 
the no-self-deception condition is satisfied, its trivial specification notwithstanding. (Wright 
1989~,  pp. 25 1-252) 
To bring this point out we can split the conditions C into those which are trivialising (C,) and 
those which are not (C-). The provisional conditional is thus: 
13 
C, & C, 3 (Jones believes that he intends to q Jones intends to q)  
13 
The notation here is borrowed from Sullivan ( 1  994). 
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This conditional is of the form A & B 3 C, which is equivalent to A 3 (B --4 C). It follows 
that the truth of A guarantees the truth of B --4 C, and consequently that the degree of 
credibility given to B 3 C must be at least as high as that given to A. Thus, if A & B 3 C is 
true, then we can ‘delete’ the antecedent A to leave a conditional (i.e. B --4 C) which is as 
plausible as A. 
Applying this procedure to the provisional conditional, the trivialising C, conditions can be 
deleted to give: 
C, 3 (Jones believes that he intends to cp 3 Jones intends to cp)  
which must be as credible as the deleted C,. 
In claiming that the trivialising ‘no self-deceit’ condition is positive presumptive, Wright is 
claiming that we are apriori justified in believing that people are not liable to make mistakes 
when identifying their own intentions. If this is so, then the conditional above which results 
from the deletion of the trivialising condition will also be apriori credible. 
Although we are no longer dealing with a provisional conditional which is a priori true, 
Wright finds the notion of a priori credibility equally useful as a means of establishing 
judgement-dependence. Certainly, the a priori credibility of the conditional cannot be 
explained away as a triviality, for the trivialising C-condition has been deleted. So the 
question is: why is the post-deletion conditional a priori credible? Why is it a priori 
reasonable to suppose that people can correctly identifying their own intentions? The 
standard answer - that the intention is an item in consciousness, and that it is a necessary 
truth that people know their own minds - is still not an option. In the absence of a better 
account, Wright observes that: 
The matter will be nicely explained if the concept of intention works in such a way that Jones’s 
opinion, formed under the restricted set of C-conditions, play a defeasible extension-determining 
role, with defeat conditional on the emergence of evidence that one or more of the background, 
positive presumptive, conditions are not in fact met. (Wright 1989c, p. 252) 
We can assume that one’s own verdict is correct, unless there is firm evidence that it is 
wrong. But this possibility of error does not indicate that there is, after all, a cognitive 
process at work here. The situation can be explained by the fact that one’s own judgement is 
extension-determining unless there is evidence showing that the verdict is wrong. By making 
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the extension-determining judgement subject to defeat, it can be explained how error is 
possible, but that nevertheless we have the right to assume an avowal is correct without the 
need for prior confirmation. Judgement-dependence would indeed explain the a priori 
reasonableness of the provisional conditional. 
Sullivan’s Objection 
At least one author has found the argument so far to be entirely spurious, and a brief 
consideration of this view is useful to bring out the nature of Wright’s argument. Sullivan 
(1994) holds that the a priori credibility of the provisional conditional is not something 
which stands in need of such a substantive explanation. As we have seen, the provisional 
conditional is the product of ‘deleting’ the positive presumptive antecedents from a trivially 
true (and hence trivially a priori) conditional. In response, Sullivan says: 
14 
Wright’s conclusion is. ..that the a priori credibility of [the provisional conditional] is something 
that stands in need of explanation. And while we could accept that explanatory need, like a 
priority, is a feature transmitted through valid argument, this will not yet justifL that claim, since 
[the pre-deletion conditional], as an acknowledged triviality, had no explanatory deficit to 
transmit. So where does the explanatory deficit come from? (Sullivan 1994, p. 158) 
Sullivan’s claim is that since the trivial conditional does not stand in need of explanation, 
any ‘explanatory deficit’ attached to the non-trivial conditional, produced by the act of 
‘deletion’, is an illusion created by that very process. If the a priority of the trivial 
provisional conditional needs no explanation, then the a priori credibility of the (post- 
deletion) provisional conditional needs no explanation either. And if there is no need to 
explain the apriori credibility of the trivial provisional conditional, then there is no need to 
invoke the idea of judgement-dependence. As Sullivan says: 
When the various conditions under which an avowal of intention indicates an intention are 
“deleted” their influence is not thereby dismissed .... It is only by deleting these conditions from our 
mind, as well as on paper, that we create the appearance of an explanatory deficiency. (Sullivan 
1 9 9 4 , ~ .  158) 
It turns out, though, that Sullivan’s charge against Wright’s argument cannot be sustained, 
for he misconstrues the significance of the deletion process. Certainly, Sullivan is right in 
saying that the a priority of this conditional: 
14 
In this passage Sullivan refers to a priori credibility, not of the provisional conditional itself, but of the core 
conditional that if Jones avows that he intends to P, then he intends to P. That is, Sullivan carries out the process 
of “deletion” to its limit to remove all the C-conditions. As we shall see, Wright does treat all the C conditions as 
positive presumptive (1989c, p. 253), but deletion is only necessary (to avoid circularity) in the case of the 
trivialising ‘no self-deceit’ condition. 
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C, --4 (Jones believes that he intends to cp 3 Jones intends to cp) 
is explained completely by noting that it is the product of a trivially true conditional 
following an act of ‘deletion’. What Sullivan ignores is that in the explanation the a priority 
of the post-deletion conditional, essential reference is made to the notion of positive 
presumptiveness. The deleted conditional is the product of a trivialityplus a claim of positive 
presumptiveness; and so to fully explain the apriori reasonableness of the conditional, it is 
necessary to explain both the process of deletion and the positive presumptiveness of the 
deleted condition. Certainly, the fact that the trivialising C condition is positive presumptive 
is something which stands in need of explanation (why can we assume an absence of self- 
deception?), and it is this which is the source of the ‘explanatory deficit’. And it is precisely 
to explain why the absence of error can be assumed, without the need to first gather 
evidence, that Wright invokes the notion of judgement-dependence. Sullivan is, then, right 
that we should not forget the influence of any C condition just because it has been deleted, 
but by the same token we should not forget the process by which it was removed. It is only 
because he overlooks this that Sullivan finds the whole argument to be contrived. 
The Temporal Spread of Judgement-Dependence 
The argument up to this point has focused on judgements about the identity of one’s own 
intentions. Our interest in the project lies with the eventual conclusion that what satisfies an 
intention is determined in an on-going fashion. To establish this conclusion, Wright first 
notes that it is not only judgements about the intentions one presently has which are 
extension determining, but also present judgement may be constitutive of past intention. He 
says: 
Reflect that the picture, if good at all, ought also to extend to knowledge of our former intentions 
or - what comes to the same thing, barring mistakes about other matters - knowledge of what 
currently would comply with them. For making sense of others’ behaviour depends as much upon 
knowledge of their former as of their present intentional states; and, once again, our practice is to 
give avowals of former intentions, and judgements about what courses of action now comply with 
them, the same kind of default authority. (Wright 1989d, p. 633) 
15 
Hence, we get a corresponding trans-temporal provisional conditional: 
15 
Wright suggests that the C conditions must be suitably modified “SO as to include at least the proviso that there 
is no major disorientation of memory at work.” (1  989b, p. 402). This appears to be another trivialising condition 
(i.e. Jones remembers correctly), and so must be positive presumptive, and hence a candidate for deletion, for the 
argument to work. 
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C a (Jones judges that he intended to cp --4 Jones intended to cp). 
As Wright notes (for example 1987, p. 402), to identify an intention is to identify what fits it, 
and so we also have: 
C (Jones judges that cp accords with his prior intention 3 cp accords with Jones’s prior 
intention). 
If Wright is correct here, since what satisfies a former intention is determined retroactively 
by present judgements, then in the case of a prolific intention - an intention satisfied by a 
series of actions - this is sufficient to yield the intended result of on-going determination. 16 
Knowledge, Authority and Reliability 
As mentioned above, this result is sufficient to undermine objective rule-following in its own 
right. The general structure of the argument is important for the additional reason that Wright 
suggests that it can be applied directly to rules. Before examining that step, though, I want 
first to show what is wrong with the initial thesis as restricted to intention. 
The fatal defect in the theory is that it fails in its raison d’gtre, which is to account for the 
first-person knowledge of intention. The difficulty stems from the initial means Wright uses 
to bring out the fundamental problem of self-knowledge. He does this by contrasting two 
types of psychological state, each with a characteristic first-person epistemology. The first is 
that of an occurrent, phenomenological state, such as a pain, which is knowable by 
introspection, and where the identity of the state is not bound up with any disposition to 
behaviour. The other exemplar is a dispositional character trait, such as modesty or bravery, 
where the ascription of such properties - even to oneself - can only be made on the basis of 
manifest behaviour. With properties in this latter category, there is no first-person authority, 
and self-ascriptions are justified on the same evidence as is available to a third party. 
16 
If both contemporaneous and retrospective judgements are extension determining then the possibility arises of 
a conflict between the two (say if I previously said that I intended to cp, and now say that I intended to w). 
Precisely how such conflicts are to be resolved - what order of priority exists between them - is something to be 
provided by a full account, but the mere possibility of conflict is not fatal to the overall theory. 
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Wright claims that intentions “straddle” these two paradigms. On the one hand intentions are 
knowable with first-person authority; avowals are quite properly made without reference to 
actual or dispositional behaviour. In this sense the epistemology of intentions resembles the 
epistemology of sensations. On the other hand, intentions are also ‘dispositions-like,, in that 
the ascription of an intention to someone is ‘answerable’ to subsequent behaviour, As we 
have seen, the difference between meaningplus and meaning quus is not something which is 
phenomenologically evident. Nevertheless, we should expect the difference to become 
apparent when the subject reaches the point in the number series where the functions 
diverge. Ceteris paribus, we can expect someone who means addition to accept additions, 
whereas someone meaning a quus-like function will give different answers. This is not to say 
that meaning plus or quus consists in a disposition, merely that the difference is only 
betrayed in the unfolding course of events. The fact that neither paradigm gives a satisfactory 
account of the epistemology of intention obliges us to formulate a third option, which is the 
cue for judgement-dependence. 
In saying the epistemology of intention ‘straddles’ the two paradigms, Wright highlights 
elements of the respective routes to knowledge. When forming verdicts about one’s own 
intentions, the process is like that with phenomenological states, in that it involves no 
external observation; but in common with dispositional states, introspection cannot be the 
belief-formation process involved. 
There is, though, another sense in which there is a ‘straddling’, this time concerning the 
status of self-knowledge. As with phenomenological states, it is a priori that I know the 
contents of my own mind, for it is my mind. Yet reference to the answerability of such 
judgements brings with it an aposteriori element. As Wright says: 
It is part of regarding human beings as persons, rational and reflective agents, that we are prepared 
to ascribe intentional states to them, to try to explain and anticipate their behaviour in terms of the 
concepts of desire, belief, decision and intention. And it is a fundamental anthropological fact 
about us that our initiation into the language in which these concepts feature results in the capacity 
to be moved, who knows exactly how, to self-ascribe states of the relevant sorts - and to do so in 
ways which not merely tend to accord with the appraisals which others, similarly trained, can 
make of what we do but which provide in general a far richer and more satisfying framework for 
the interpretation and anticipation of behaviour than any which they could arrive at if such self- 
ascriptions were discounted. (Wright 1989b, p. 402) 
By ‘‘richer and more satisfying framework for the interpretation and anticipation of 
behaviour”, I do not see what Wright can mean other than “pragmatically superior”. That is, 
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taking into account other people’s self-ascriptions often provides a more accurate means of 
predicting their behaviour than is available if avowals are not taken into consideration. 
There is a danger in that it might be thought, because this “fundamental anthropological fact’’ 
is a posteriori, that consequently the authority of avowal is similarly a posteriori. In that 
case, knowledge of one’s own intentions would be deemed to be both a priori and a 
posteriori, which suggests that something must already have gone wrong. 
It would, though, be a mistake to dismiss Wright’s argument so readily. The reliability here 
is without question an aposteriori matter, and in the abstract, reliability with respect to a 
class of judgements is respectable grounds on which to say that the subject knows what he is 
talking about. The fact is that reliability may be sufficient to confer authority on inductive, 
empirical grounds, but it does not follow that the authority avowals have actually relies on 
such aposteriori grounds. For example, it is an empirically ascertainable fact that a tennis 
umpire is reliable in his judgements (i.e. if we compare his stated verdicts with the records 
for the match), but it is not because he is reliable that he has authority; it is the other way 
around. 
Actually, the only problem is our insistence in seeing things as either apriori or aposteriori, 
and in this respect Wright’s thesis is entirely successful in providing a ‘straddling’ 
alternative. Under the thesis of judgement-dependence, self-appraisals can be assumed to be 
right a priori, but such a priori claims of knowledge are defeasible on the basis of 
subsequent behaviour - that is on empirical grounds. I s  such self-knowledge aposteriori or a 
priori? There is, of course, no clear answer: the solution has elements of each, and so does 
indeed straddle the two positions. 
Nevertheless, the mere reconciliation of the tension between the a priori and the a posteriori 
is not sufficient for Wright’s aims: he has to do more if he is to account for our knowledge of 
our own intentions. As noted, it is an a posteriori fact that avowal is a useful guide to 
subsequent behaviour. If it were not, then we should repudiate the knowledge claim. That is 
to say, reliability as measured against subsequent behaviour is necessary if claims of self- 
knowledge are to be sustained. As Wright says: 
What determines the distribution of truth-values among ascriptions of intention to a subject who 
has the conceptual resources to understand these ascriptions and is attentive to them are, in the first 
instance, nothing but the details of the subject’s self-conception in relevant respects. If the 
assignment of the truth-values, so effected, generates behavioural singularities - the subject’s 
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behaviour clashes with ingredients in hisher self-conception, or seems to call for the inclusion of  
ingredients which he/she is unwilling to include - then the self-deception proviso ... may be 
invoked, and the subject’s own opinion, or lack of it, overridden. (Wright 1989c, p. 253) 
Hence it is only when the subject says he intends one thing, and subsequently does another, 
that his own verdict may prove to be incorrect. 
The message that emerges is that the epistemology of intention must not only account for a 
priori authority, it must also account for the aposteriori reliability of avowal - reliability, 
that is, when measured against subsequent behaviour. Since the reliability of one’s 
judgements depends entirely upon the frequency with which such ‘clashes’ occur, to explain 
self-knowledge it is necessary to explain the general absence of ‘clashes’. 
Wright acknowledges that an explanation of reliability is indeed a desideratum of his thesis: 
What needs explanation is rather how a subject can be so much as in a position to be reliable? If 
proof of the pudding is in subsequent performance, what basis can there be for an opinion at a 
stage at which a third party can have none? (Wright 1989b, p. 400) 
17 
And, as it transpires, Wright is happy to credit his theory with this very accomplishment: 
Explaining the a priori reliability of a subject’s C conditioned beliefs about his intentions will do 
nothing to explain the reliability of his avowals - even assuming our right to assume they are 
honest - unless the C conditions in question are likely to be met. But there seems to be no cause to 
anticipate problems on that score. Attentiveness - however precisely it should be elaborated - is 
presumably, like lack of self-deception, a positive-presumptive condition; and a subject’s 
possession of the appropriate concepts is a prerequisite for their being able to effect the avowal in 
the first place. So there is every promise of a straightforward kind of explanation of the authority 
which avowals of intention, qua avowals, typically carry. (Wright 1989c, p. 253) 
If Jones goes around making avowals in situations when the C conditions are not met, then 
the provisional conditional will not be extension-determining, and Jones would not then be 
reliable in his judgements. However, as Wright notes (1989c, p. 253) there is no difficulty in 
the idea that the remaining C conditions - appropriate attentiveness and concept possession - 
are frequently satisfied. 
I t  is telling that in the above quote Wright starts by considering the explanation of reliability 
- and an apriori reliability at that - but he concludes that there are no serious difficulties 
17 
This passage refers directly to avowals not involving intentions, which Wright portrays as not having special 
first-person authority. Nevertheless, from the context there is no doubt that the question of reliability is intended 
to apply to avowals of intention as well. 
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facing the explanation of authority. This would be unobjectionable if our conditional were a 
priori true: with a true conditional, satisfaction of the C conditions guarantees that Jones’s 
verdict is right, and frequent satisfaction of the C conditions would entail that Jones’s 
judgements are frequently right. But we do not have a true conditional. All we do have is the 
right to accept Jones’s judgement as right in the absence of countervailing evidence. The 
very reason for the shift from truth to credibility was to allow for error, with the rider that the 
absence of error can always be assumed, unless we have positive evidence to the contrary. 
Unfortunately, whereas Wright claims to explain the a priori reliability of avowal, all he 
actually explains is why, on a case by case basis, it is apriori reasonable to assume the 
avowal is right. Nothing has been said which has any bearing on the frequency with which 
clashes do, or do not, actually occur, which is to say that the explanation of reliability is 
missing. 
The point can be illustrated using Wright’s own example of the tennis umpire. In tennis, 
whether a ball is in or out is subject to the decision of the umpire. If the umpire were the 
final arbiter, then we should have a complete explanation of why her judgements are reliable, 
this explanation simply being that whatever the umpire says goes. Yet, as Wright notes, the 
umpire’s verdict can be overruled by a higher official, and so the umpire’s verdicts carry 
only a defeasible authority: what the umpire says goes unless the match referee intervenes. 
The possibility of defeat makes a vital difference when it comes to explaining the reliability 
of the umpire’s verdicts, for it is not then sufficient to note the default authority which her 
decisions have. If the match referee habitually overrules the umpire, then although the 
umpire still enjoys a default authority, she would not thereby be a reliable guide to the way 
in which points are actually awarded to the players. To explain the umpire’s reliability (when 
it occurs) it is necessary to give not only an account of the hierarchy of authority involved, 
but also to explain why the match referee tends not to overrule the umpire. 
In more general terms, the point is that an explanation of a subject’s default authority is not 
sufficient to explain his reliability. The difference between the two things is clear. To have 
authority means that, as a default, it can be assumed that you are reliable. To actually be 
reliable, though, requires the frequent absence of countervailing circumstances. Explaining 
why we have the right to assume someone knows, and explaining how they do actually know 
may, therefore, be very different things. In merely describing the defeasible authority of 
avowal, and the nature of the defeat conditions, Wright does not explain why these defeat 
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conditions - ‘clashes’ - are uncommon, and so his theory fails to explains the reliability of 
avowals, and, consequently, the possibility of self-knowledge. 
18 
The difficulty which Wright’s theory faces in the specific context in which it is applied is 
really a re-surfacing of the initial fundamental problem of self-knowledge: how is it that our 
avowals and our behaviour are in harmony, respectively betraying (for the most part) the 
same intentions? To explain this it is imperative to identify a relevant connection between 
self-appraisal and subsequent behaviour. (In the Cartesian case, the connection is one of 
common cause.) The reason why judgement-dependence cannot explain reliability is simply 
that it fails to incorporate any such relation. If intentions are, broadly speaking, dispositional, 
then, just as they cannot be non-dispositional, occurrent objects of inner contemplation, they 
cannot be equally non-dispositional judgement-dependent states. (Dispositions do not arise 
from the mere act of judging.) Judgement-dependence, in precluding an intention from being 
the kind of property which can enter into the causal nexus, ensures that any correlation 
between the two is merely accidental. Whatever the correct account of self-knowledge of 
intention is, it is not the one which Wright gives us. 
Judgement-Dependence and Rules 
It remains to be seen whether the argument for judgement-dependence can be transferred 
from intentions to rules and meaning. Despite the failure of the argument when applied to 
intentions, this project is still worth pursuing, not least because upon investigation it 
transpires there is a significant difference between intentions and rules/meanings which 
makes the case for the judgement-dependence of the latter that much stronger. 
As Wright says, the thesis about meaning: 
does not require construal of meaning as a kind of intention; it is enough that the concepts are 
relevantly similar - that both sustain authoritative first-person avowals, and that this circumstance 
is to be explained in terms of the failure of the order-of-determination test. (Wright 1989c, p. 
2 ~ 4 ) ’ ~  
18 
Interestingly, the flaw is not inherent within the overall model. Continuing with the example of the tennis 
officials, the reliability of the umpire is readily explained by the fact that both the umpire and the official attempt 
to respond to the location of the ball, have sound perceptual faculties, and are in positions offering superior views 
of the court. Given these facts, we have every reason to expect a general correlation between their verdicts. The 
reliability here is explained with reference to judgement-dependence, although not exclusively in such terms. 
19 
In addition see Wright (1989c p.257). Puzzlingly, though, Wright also states that when grasping the meaning of 
a word ‘in a flash’, or coming to understanding how to continue a series “there is no institution of avowal in the 
strict sense - the subject’s word carries no special authority.” (Wright 1987, p.400). 
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20 
Wright does not fully develop this project, but the framework is in place, and it is readily 
seen how the argument ought to proceed. First we should formulate a provisional conditional 
for rules, admitting that Jones has a certain authority as to which rule he follows. It would 
then be necessary to argue that this authority cannot be the result of an act of introspection, 
and that the only explanation for it is in terms of judgement-dependence. There is now an 
additional requirement, for it should also be ensured that the objection raised above to the 
judgement-dependence of intention (concerning the explanation of reliability) does not 
resurface to discount the thesis about rules as well. If, further, the subject has retrospective 
authority about the application of his rule, and this too is to be explained in terms of 
judgement-dependence, then on-going determination would be established. 
This project faces an immediate difficulty. The aim is to see whether a conditional like this: 
C 3 (Jones judges he grasps the addition rule 3 Jones grasps the addition rule) 
is apriori true (or apriori credible), and if so whether this a priority is best explained in 
terms of judgement-dependence. Yet to form the belief that he grasps the rule for addition, 
Jones must have the concept under investigation (namely addition), and hence already grasp 
the rule in question, for grasp of the rule is constitutive of having the concept. It cannot then 
be because he makes the judgement that Jones has the rule; possession of the rule is a 
prerequisite for the ability to make the judgement. As a result, the model cannot be applied 
to judgements about the overall identity of the rules one follows. 
This, though, does not signal the end of the investigation, for consideration of judgements 
about the overall identity of my rules does not exhaust the scope for the application of 
Wright’s thesis. In particular, the very judgement which is targeted by the indexical 
argument - that I am following the same rule as before - ought to be examined in this light. 
The relevant conditional is this: 
21 
20 
Wright says: “I would like to be in a position to offer a supported opinion about whether this can be 
approached along the lines sketched for the cases of colour and intention. But I have, at the time of writing, no 
settled opinion to offer about that, let alone about whether the idea can ultimately be made good.” (Wright 1989c, 
p. 257) 
21 
Wright explicitly identifies this as a credible application of the model. He says: “Challenged to justify the claim 
that I formerly meant addition by ‘plus’, it will not be necessary to locate some meaning-constitutive fact in my 
former behaviour or mental life. A sufficient answer need only advert to my present opinion, that addition is what 
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C --4 (Jones judges he is following the same rule as before 3 Jones is following the 
same rule as before). 
Here, unless the target rule requires us to make the judgement “I am following the same rule 
as before”, the circularity mentioned above does not re-occur. Whilst this does leave 
something of a singularity - it is not clear how the thesis of judgement-dependence could be 
applied to judgements involving the concept of rule-following itself - in most cases the 
problem does not arise. Since judgement-dependence is not immediately precluded in the 
majority of cases, the prudent course of action is, I suggest, to accept that whilst there are 
difficulties which a complete theory will have to address, the initial proposal remains worthy 
of further consideration. 
22 
There is an additional, related concern, that the mere mention of concepts within the C 
conditions makes the account circular. That is, whilst there need be noparticular rule which 
is both mentioned in the C conditions and required for the making of the relevant judgement, 
the model presupposes that some judgements can have content quite independently of 
judgement-determination. We have to assume that there is some judgement which has a 
determinate content in order to get the account up and running. 
23 
Again, though, this worry does not warrant the outright dismissal of the project, for as long 
as the speczjic content which is being analysed in terms of judgement-dependence is not 
presupposed by the C conditions, then the account is not circular. The argument can be put 
like this. Let us assume that some specific concepts can be ascribed to Jones, without 
comment as to their constitutive nature. If, under this assumption, if follows that we have a 
conditional which satisfies all of Wright’s requirements, then we should have shown that 
I formerly meant, and still mean, and to the a priori reasonableness of the supposition, failing evidence to the 
contrary, that this opinion is best.” (1989c, p. 254). 
22 
The only other judgement which might have some bearing on the issue is as to the requirement of my present 
rule. There is a strong intuition that if Jones holds that 1004 follows 1002 according to the rule he has been 
following, then, if perceptual errors and the like can be excluded, his word is to be accepted on the matter. It is 
reasonable to accord such judgements some degree of first-person authority, but in this case there is no bar to an 
explanation in terms of introspection. For with a particular judgement, involving a single application of the rule, 
there is nothing to discount an epistemology based on introspection. For all the considerations raised, it could be 
that when one follows a rule, one identifies the requirements as and when they are needed. Judgements about 
application do not answer to subsequent behaviour in any way, and so there is no objection to the idea that the 
requirements of the rule can be brought into consciousness as and when desired. 
23 
This point is raised by Boghossian (1989b, p. 547). 
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judgements using these concepts are extension-determining. In the first instance, the fact that 
we assume that some concepts are objectively determined does not interfere with the 
conclusion that others are not. In addition, the fact that we assume that Jones is in possession 
of the concepts required to make certain judgements is not to assume that these concepts are 
objective. As already noted, it is a problem to see how judgement-dependence can be applied 
across the board, but the difficulty is not substantial enough to end the project before it gets 
going. 
Turning, then, to questions of detail, we need to know whether the conditional meets 
Wright’s criteria. We have just established that there is no obvious reason to suppose that C 
conditions cannot be given without circularity. It remains to be seen whether there are C 
conditions, specified in a non-trivialising manner, which give an a priori true/warranted 
conditional; and if so, whether the only explanation for this come in terms of judgement- 
dependence. 
First off, there is aprima facie case for first-person authority with respect to the relevant 
judgements. Consider someone who continues the series 1000, 1002, 1004, 1008, 1010. On 
being notified that he has make a mistake (1006 should follow 1004), the agent becomes 
quite adamant: his initial answers were correct, that the rule he is following requires 1008 
and not 1006. In this situation, we should have no option but to accept the subject’s view on 
the matter. If he thinks that 1008 accords with the rule he has been following all along, and 
we cannot explain this abnormal response as a mistake due to perceptual errors or the like, 
then we have no basis on which to disagree. Although it looked as though he were following 
the rule add 2, there is no reason why he should not have been following a different rule all 
along, with the difference becoming apparent only at the point now reached. If the subject 
says he is following the same rule he has always been following, then even though his 
behaviour is not what we expected, we should accept his verdict. In other words, it is at least 
apriori reasonable to take the relevant avowal at face value, making it highly plausible that 
there is a provisional conditional of the type required which is itself apriori reasonable. 
We should not, though, expect any such conditional be apriori true. Major disruptions in 
memory are possible, and as with any psychological state, so too is self-delusion. To ensure 
a correct verdict, both situations must be discounted by the antecedent C conditions, yet both 
are trivialising: saying you have not forgotten is another way of saying that you are right. 
Nevertheless, it can be accepted that the absence of both such interfering factors can be 
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assumed unless there is definite evidence to the contrary. In other words, it is positive 
presumptive that neither situation occurs, so that Wright’s technique of deletion can be 
utilised here too. Upon deletion of these conditions, we are again left with a non-trivial a 
priori reasonable conditional, with the remaining C conditions being as before, that the 
subject has the necessary concepts, and is appropriately attentive. 
How, then, is the apriori reasonableness of the conditional to be explained? Certainly an 
explanation in terms of introspection is not an option. To introspect that I am following the 
same rule as before, I should have to identify both past and present rules to make a creditable 
comparison between them. But as ever, the limitless applications of a rule cannot all be 
scrutinised, and so neither the identity of the present rule, not the identity of the past rule, 
can be ascertained on this basis. 
24 
As a result, we are faced with a reasonable candidate for judgement-dependence: an apriori 
warranted conditional of the correct form, the a priority of which cannot be explained in 
terms of introspection. The way is open for an explanation in terms of judgement- 
dependence. First, though, we should ensure that same problem which arose for intentions - 
that of accounting for reliability - does not re-occur in the present context. 
It is in this respect that there is a marked difference between the two cases. The point comes 
out when we consider the situation in which one’s avowal has to be rejected. With intention, 
were I to say that I intend to cp, but in fact I subsequently y, then the manifest ‘clash’ 
between avowal and behaviour overturns my avowal. This type of situation proved 
troublesome for Wright’s thesis because a knowledge claim requires a strong correlation 
between avowal and behaviour, one which cannot be expected to occur by chance. A 
satisfactory epistemology of intention had to explain the frequency with which such 
correlation occurs, and it is due to its failure to provide any such explanation that Wright’s 
thesis was rejected. 
Turning to rules, the possibility of a ‘clash’ between behaviour and avowal is also ever- 
present. Bearing in mind that the judgement in question does not specify the identity of the 
rule I am following, if I am to follow the same rule, I must at least presently be following 
24 
The fact that one’s prior rule is in the past and hence not available for current introspective scrutiny does not in 
itself preclude an explanation in terms of introspection, on condition that the prior rule could have been identified 
introspectively, and its identity remembered. 
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some rule. Yet, if I am at a complete loss to say what the rule requires in any given situation, 
then the only possible conclusion is that I am not in fact follow a rule at all. In this case my 
claim to be following a rule, and with it my claim to be following the same rule, is seen to be 
false. The mere claim that I am following some rule, without specifying which one, remains 
‘answerable’ to subsequent behaviour: I must do something in the name of the rule if my 
avowal is to stand. 
Even so, the central strength that the case for judgement-dependence gains in its application 
to rules (as opposed to intentions) is that with rules the type of correlation here required is 
relatively loose. This is due to the point noted above that that we are not now concerned with 
judgements about the specific identity of a rule, together with the familiar fact that any series 
of actions accord with some rule. It follows that so long as I come up with some answer as to 
how the rule I have been following ought to be applied, there is no ‘clash’ between my 
behaviour and my claim that I am following a rule, and my own verdict cannot be 
overridden. 
This is not to suggest that it is apriori that genuine ‘clashes’ are rare. The point is rather that 
in light of the vast range of dispositions which do not override one’s avowal - namely 
anything which looks like rule-following - then an explanation of our general reliability is 
not overly troublesome. It might just be that when we think we are following a rule we are 
disposed to give some kind of answer rather then none at all. Achieving consonance between 
avowal and behaviour is effortless, and so the explanatory agenda which arose for intentions 
does not arise for rules. 
An Alternative Explanation 
Even though we have an a priori reasonable conditional, one for which the problem of 
reliability does not arise, the argument for judgement-dependence still fails. Wright’s final 
condition is that there should be no alternative explanation for the acknowledged situation, 
but in this case the a priori reasonableness of the provisional conditional has a quite 
mundane explanation. 
What is to be explained is this: when Jones says “I am following the same rule as before”, 
why should we accept his verdict at face value? On what basis do we disregard the 
possibility that he has lost his previous rule, and is now following another; or that he is now 
no longer following any rule at all? 
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To begin to formulate an answer, we can look again at the example used to motivate the 
claim that “I am following the same rule as before” has first-person authority. The envisaged 
situation was one in which someone follows a rule as we do, but then deviates from the 
expected course. The salient point is that initially - before the deviation - we are left in no 
doubt that a rule is being followed, and the evidence for this is nothing to do with the 
subject’s avowal, but is manifest only in his behaviour. 
Precisely what type of behaviour warrants the claim that someone is following a rule is not 
important for the moment. On the assumption that there is some such evidence, it is notable 
that any reason we have to believe that someone is following a rule must support the claim 
that a single rule is being retained and followed over a period of time. Since a rule-follower 
will typically grasp more than one rule, this requires that the agent be able to re-select that 
specific rule - he must follow that rule and not some other - from his repertoire of rules. The 
evidence in question is, therefore, evidence that (a) a rule is grasped, (b) it is retained over a 
period of time, and (c) can be reliably re-selected at will as the rule which is in force. 
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If we have evidence (which does not involve avowal) that Jones can retain and re-select the 
same rule, then we have a basis on which to say that if Jones thinks he is following the same 
rule, then indeed he is. For to be a reliable rule re-selector means that when you intend to 
follow the same rule as before you can, and hence when you think you are following the 
same rule as before, in the main you are. So the situation described, where the ability to 
follow a rule in the past is not in question, we have a situation in which we have evidence 
which justifies the provisional conditional. Reason to believe the subject is a reliable rule re- 
selector is reason to believe that when he thinks he is following the same rule, he probably is. 
The situation is then that we accept that Jones is a reliable re-selector of rules given evidence 
that he was a reliable re-selector of rules. There is little mystery about the a priority here. 
Although our evidence is itself a posteriori, relative to this evidence it is a priori (indeed, a 
triviality) that we should accept Jones as a reliable rule re-selector, and so there is no call for 
an explanation in terms of judgement-dependence. 
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An examination of the type of behaviour that warrants the ascription of a rule is conducted in Chapter 7. 
There is a possible objection to this criticism of Wright’s argument which may be made at this point. The 
alternative ‘mundane’ explanation offered above relies on the inductive claim that, since the agent has 
demonstrated the ability to follow rules in the past, we can claim that she can continue to do so in the present. 
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This explanation covers only one type of case, in which evidence of the ability to follow a 
rule is central to the example. What happens when such evidence is not available? Do we 
still accept default authority? Certainly it is no accident that the example used above, where 
an acknowledged rule-follower deviates from the expected course, is required to motivate the 
thesis of first-person authority. For when we move away from this type of scenario, things 
become far less clear-cut. 
The situation to be envisaged is one where Jones says “I am following the same rule as 
before”, yet we have no concrete reason to believe that he was actually following a rule at 
the earlier time (suppose we just don’t have any evidence either way). Should we then accept 
the avowal? One way of reaching a decision would be to note that the authority of “I am 
following the same rule as before” can be no greater than the authority of “I was following a 
rule”, for if the latter is false, so too is the former. Further, the authority of “I was following 
a rule” can be no greater than the authority of “I am now following a rule”, for we should not 
expect the passage of time to increase one’s ability to identifj aspects of one’s past 
psychology. Hence, at the very least, “I am following the same rule as before” (in the 
absence of behavioural evidence) can only enjoy first-person authority if “I am now 
following a rule” carries default authority. So the pertinent question is: is this type of 
judgement, about my present activities, to be taken at face value without the need for 
corroborating evidence? 
In fact, the absence of concrete evidence of rule-following alters the situation minimally, for 
in accepting the subject as capable as making an avowal we accept that he grasps, retains and 
Thus, the mundane explanation depends on the fact that the agent exhibits behaviour which warrants the 
ascription of rule-following. However, since the indexical argument shows that objective rule-following is 
impossible, evidence that the agent is a rule-follower can at only be evidence that she is a ’creative’ rule-follower. 
Our explanation of the apriority of the provisional conditional therefore involves the claim that such-and-such 
behaviour warrants the ascription of creative rule-following. This means that the mundane explanation is itself 
couched in terms of judgement-dependence, and Wright’s fourth condition is satisfied after all. 
What this objection neglects to consider is the point made earlier about where the onus of proof lies when it 
comes to making a claim about the subjectivity of rules as a response to the indexical argument. As discussed 
above, we cannot adopt a subjectivity thesis on the grounds that it is the only notion of rule-following which 
survives the indexical argument. To do so would be to appeal to subjectivity simply as a means of ‘saving the 
phenomenon’, a strategy which is unacceptably ad hoc. We have to have some reason other than that objective 
rule-following is impossible to suppose that rules are subjective. It is for this reason that we have been looking at 
an argument which claims to show that rules are judgement-dependent independently of the indexical argument. 
By the same token, we cannot use the conclusion that rules are not objective when defending Wright’s argument, 
for otherwise the argument would no longer be independent of the indexical argument. This being so, the claims 
made in the above paragraph which arise from the indexical argument, namely that since rules are not objective 
they are subjective, and that consequently evidence of rule-following must be evidence of creative rule-following, 
are not ones which can be used in the defence of Wright’s thesis. 
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reliably re-selects a number of different rules (namely those governing the words he uses). 
Whilst the fact that he can retain certain select rules does not entail that he can do the same 
across the board (there is no reason why someone should not be selectively amnesiac, and 
lose hold of certain rules, or certain type of rules, and not others), nevertheless, to accept an 
avowal we accept the subject is a competent linguist, and thus has the ability to follow a 
substantial number of rules. In the absence of evidence against, we should have the right to 
extrapolate this ability. On inductive grounds we should be warranted in saying that Jones is 
a reliable rule-follower, and this warrants acceptance of the claim that he is following a rule, 
and that he is following the same rule. The assumption that the subject is capable of making 
the avowal is then an assumption on which we can describe the subject as someone who can 
retain and follow the same rule at will, in which case we have good reason to accept that 
when he says he is following the same rule, he is. Again, the explanation is mundane, entails 




With the failure of judgement-dependence, we are left with no good reason to suppose that 
the continuing identity of a rule is fixed by one’s own opinion on the matter. In the absence 
21 
The rebuttal offered here is also effective against the earlier attempt by Wright (1 986) to establish on-going 
determination on slightly different grounds. Wright suggests that if a community of speakers have all exhibited 
their competence in applying concepts which concern directly perceptible states of affairs (colours, shapes, 
sounds etc.) then, in the absence of any perturbing factors (funny lighting, trick mirrors etc.), we are necessarily 
justified in thinking that the (non-collusive) communal verdict over a series of judgements are correct. Thus if a 
group of people who have all shown good grasp of the concept red in the past are faced with a ball placed in an 
open field in good sunlight and, over a series of observations, all call the ball ‘red’, then we necessarily have 
reason to believe that the ball is red. 
Wright notes that we can only have such a warrant if we can. on a priori grounds alone, discount the possibility 
that the members of the community should lose the ability to apply the concept correctly, and yet still non- 
collusively concord in their use of the predicate in any given case. That is, we can we discount the possibility that 
the ball in the example is in fact blue, and that our observers have all just failed to apply the word ‘red’ correctly 
by calling the blue ball ‘red’. Wright suggests that the fact that this situation can be discounted shows that 
protracted, non-collusive communal agreement which is mistaken (in the absence of perturbing factors) is not 
logically possible. And the only way he can see to explain such a logical impossibility is if the on-going verdict 
of the community determines how the predicate ought to be applied as it goes along. 
We can agree that the possibility that a number of observers should all just ‘drift away’ in unison from the 
requirements of a rule is not one that we should sanction. Hence, if a group of people who have competently 
identified red things in the past all agree over a period of time that a ball is red when there is no reason to believe 
that viewing conditions are abnormal, then I think we are justified in believing that the ball is red. However, a 
preferable explanation is that if people have displayed competence at applying a concept in the past, and if we 
have no reason to suppose that features in the environment interfere with this ability, then we are justified in 
thinking that they will continue to have this ability in the future, and to exercise it correctly. Therefore the 
warrant to believe that the communal verdict is correct is just the product of induction on the basis that each 
member in the community displayed competence at applying the concept in the past (a condition which Wright 
explicitly requires). There is no indication here of a conceptual connection between communal verdict and truth. 
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of alternative motivating arguments, we cannot rely on subjective on-going determination to 
contain the indexical argument. The Wittgensteinian creativity thesis cannot be sustained. 
There is, though, a useful result to be secured from the foregoing discussion. The instigation 
for Wright’s thesis is that there is a fundamental difficulty with the conventional 
epistemology of rule-following: on the one hand grasp of a rule can only be ascribed on the 
basis of manifest behaviour; on the other, the claim “I am following a rule” is not made - nor 
is it expected to be made - on the observation of one’s own actions. For Wright the problem 
is to accommodate both characteristics. However, an accommodating solution is not the only 
option. A more direct approach would be to acknowledge that these two paradigms are 
irreconcilable, so that one of them must be rejected. In particular, it might be that one of the 
views about the epistemology of rules depends upon a defective, or more likely simply 
underdeveloped, view of the nature of rules. Once that situation has been rectified, we should 
not hesitate to alter the epistemological picture accordingly. In pursuing this strategy, the 
ensuing choice is not difficult to make. For it is only upon the systematic examination of 
rules that we realise that introspection is not applicable, and that it is possible to think that 
one grasps a rule and yet not grasp a rule (someone may think that they grasp a rule, but on 
execution of it, find themselves at a total loss as to how the rule ought to be applied). In light 
of these revelations (by Wittgenstein), it becomes quite reasonable to attribute any adherence 
we may have to first-person authority as the product of our failure to make these 
observations. Once the results are exposed, we should not hesitate to reject the first-person 
authority of avowal with respect to rules. 
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Given that I cannot directly perceive (introspect) my grasp of a rule, and given also that my 
belief that I am following a rule does nothing to determine that I am indeed following a rule, 
there is little option but to conclude that I do not know directly that I do indeed grasp a rule. 
If I am to be justified in making such a claim, then there must be specific evidence on which 
it is made, and in turn, since it is not directly observational, the claim must be made on the 
basis of inference. As we shall see, this result, and the ensuing details of the nature of the 
inferential procedure involved, opens the way to an alternative response to the indexical 
argument, a response which is developed in the following two chapters. 
28 
One way of putting this would be to describe Wright’s argument as, broadly speaking, transcendental: taking 
the premise that we have a certain kind of self-knowledge (with respect to our own rules) he argues that such 
knowledge is possible only if rules are subjective - this subjectivity is thus a necessary condition for the existence 
of the knowledge in question. The response is correspondingly sceptical: the failure of the introspection model 
shows that such knowledge is not to be had. 
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PART THREE 
MEANING WITHOUT RULES 
132 
6. Eliminating Rules 
Taken at face value, the indexical argument shows that rule-following is impossible. 
Correspondingly, the most direct response to the argument would be to accept this 
conclusion as is, and to simply eliminate rule-following from our ontology. The main 
objection to this ‘rule-elimination’ is the thought that rules are essential for meaning. On the 
basis of the constitutive claim: 
(CC) To grasp a meaning it is necessary to grasp a rule, 
in eliminating rules, we eliminate meaning as well. But we cannot ever conclude on the basis 
of an articulated argument that meaning is impossible, for the very formulation and 
presentation of any argument depends on the possibility of language. It is the prospect of 
meaning nihilism which renders any argument against rule-following paradoxical, and which 
motivates the search for a position, such as irrealism or on-going determination, which 
salvages some notion of rule-following, and which thereby lessens the destructive effect of 
the indexical argument. As we have seen, irrealism is untenable, and on-going determination 
is unmotivated. In the absence of further ‘salvaging’ options, I suggest that we relinquish 
the aim of saving rules, and instead accept the obvious conclusion: nothing determines which 
1 
1 
In Chapter 5 ,  Wright’s creative notion of rule-following was found to be an unmotivated response to the 
indexical argument. Given, though, that that position has not been shown to be incoherent, it should perhaps 
remain as an option. Indeed, intuitively the elimination of rules has to be the least favoured option, one which 
should only be endorsed once every alterative has been exhausted. Is Wright’s thesis, then, not preferable to 
elimination simply because it is not eliminative? 
The matter (still) comes down to one of motivation. In the case of rules, certainly every intuition is to reject 
elimination as wholly unworkable. It is for this reason that elimination seems to be the least favourable option. 
Without rules, content is impossible, so we must salvage rules somehow. If, however, it can be shown that 
elimination is coherent - as is attempted here - the need to reconstruct rules is removed. In addition, it should be 
noted that the damage done to the notion of a rule by the sceptical argument is enormous. Whilst it may be 
substantive to think of a rule being extended by new applications at the limits of its reach (the type of picture 
offered by strict finitism, for example), Kripke’s insight (fully exploited by the indexical argument) is that at 
every moment, with every application, and with every re-application of a rule, nothing is fixed, The picture we 
have is not one in which we lay down a track that then remains fixed for others to follow; instead every time I 
come to follow rule, every time I start the series 2,4,  6.. ., any answer is possible, no matter how far or how well I 
or anyone else followed the rule last time. If rules never dictate anyone’s behaviour, if they never fix any 
response, what is the point of saving them? If we fully take on board the message of the indexical argument, the 
revisionary project is wholly unmotivated, and so unless there is some positive reason to suppose that created 
rules are essential for content, the przmufucie conclusion that rule-following is impossible should stand. If viable, 
and other things being equal, elimination wins. 
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rule I grasp, therefore I do not grasp, or follow, a rule at all. In that case, the only means of 
avoiding meaning nihilism is to reject CC. For if rules are not constitutive of meaning, then 
eliminating rules does nothing to threaten the possibility of language. Rule-elimination, 
together with the rejection of CC, is, I propose, the correct conclusion to draw from the 
forgoing rule-following considerations. The purpose of this chapter is to establish the 
viability of this thesis. 
Motivating the Rejection of CC 
This method of avoiding meaning nihilism can only succeed on the understanding that the 
indexical argument is directed against the possibility of grasping a rule - a correctness 
condition - and not against the grasp of meaning per se. (If the indexical argument showed 
that meanings are underdetermined quite apart the supposed constitutive role of correctness, 
then eliminating rules would, of course, do nothing to save meaning.) That this is indeed the 
case is perhaps concealed somewhat by the initial presentation of the argument; for the claim 
was made that there is no fact of the matter as to whether I mean green or g u t ,  and so the 
argument appears to affect meanings as much as it affect rules. However, the argument 
actually only shows that nothing determines trans-contextual identity for correctness 
conditions, and so only has bearing on meaning on the assumption that meanings determine 
correctness conditions. If this is assumption is not true - that is, if CC is rejected - then the 
indexical argument does nothing to threaten the possibility of language. 
The indexical argument is, though, insufficient in itself to warrant rejection of CC. As it 
stands, we have a choice: either endorse CC, and end up with the incoherent conclusion that 
meaning is impossible, or reject CC. The former is position is untenable, which in itself 
seems to recommend that CC be rejected. However, the very motivation for the rule- 
following consideration is the established position that rules are necessary for content, which 
is to say that the received wisdom is that rejection of CC is itself incoherent. Whilst we do 
have a reason to consider the possibility that CC is false - it being the only potential means 
of avoiding incoherence - we cannot claim that rejection of CC is coherent by default. In 
short, we cannot reject CC in order to avoid the incoherence of meaning nihilism unless we 
can be sure that the rejection of CC is itself a coherent option. 
Ideally, the way to proceed would be to show directly that the rejection of CC is a coherent 
position, perhaps with the construction of a counterexample to CC, or by giving a 
characterisation of meaning acceptable to all parties in which rules play no essential part. Yet 
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we should not expect any such counterexample, or characterisation, to be forthcoming. For if 
we could provide either, then we should be able to establish that rules and meaning are 
independent of each other without recourse to the rule-following considerations, in which 
case the whole investigation of rules would be redundant. It is precisely because there is such 
persistent conviction that rules are essential to meaning that the examination of rules, along 
with arguments which threaten the very possibility of rule-following, gain significance. If it 
were not so difficult to overthrow the accepted view that meaning is rule governed, then we 
should not bother with the rule-following considerations in the first place: the fact that the 
rule-following considerations are compelling indicates that convincing counterexamples or 
characterisations of the type sought are hard to come by. 
An alternative strategy is therefore required. Rather than show directly that the rejection of 
CC is coherent, I propose to show that we have no reason to believe that CC is true. This 
result ought to be quite sufficient for our purposes, for if we have no reason to believe that 
CC is true, then we have no reason to believe that it records a necessary truth, and so no 
reason to believe that its rejection is incoherent. The only objection to the proposed rejection 
of CC was that the negation of CC is incoherent; in showing that there is no justification for 
CC we remove this obstacle, and the invited conclusion - that CC is indeed false - can then 
be endorsed. 
In execution of this strategy, my aim is to identify a necessary condition on any justification 
of CC. I then show that the indexical argument falsifies this necessary condition, so that 
given the indexical argument, CC cannot be justified. In short, the indexical argument 




So why do we think that rules are necessary for meaning? (What justification could there be 
for CC before the indexical argument is brought to bear?) Perhaps one reason is that we feel 
like we are following rules when we use language. That is, in describing the world around 
Some may find the argument here superfluous. Should anyone accept that the indexical argument shows that 
rule-following is impossible, and that the only apparent way to save meaning is to reject CC, and that this in itself 
is sufficient to warrant the claim that the rejection of CC is coherent, then I would have no particular objection to 
raise. However, the onus lies squarely with anyone proposing such an extreme manoeuvre as the elimination of 
rules from meaning to make the strongest case possible, and here that includes persuading those who think that 
rejection of CC is incoherent that their view is baseless. 
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us, we try to follow certain rules, we are rarely in doubt as to how a word should be applied 
in a new situation, and the activity seems to be as good an instance of rule-following as 
anything ever does. Yet this phenomenological justification is wholly undermined by the 
observations made at the end of the previous chapter, that, for the reasons highlighted by 
Wright, I cannot know that I grasp a rule by introspection, and so am not justified from a 
first-person point of view in saying that I do grasp a rule. And if I cannot be so justified in 
saying I grasp a rule, I cannot be so justified in saying I follow a rule. So as far as one’s 
subjective experience goes, when using language we may feel that a rule is being employed, 
but that does not indicate that a rule actually is employed, much less that a rule is essential to 
the activity. 
3 
As it turns out, to identify what would justify CC apart from introspection, it is sufficient 
merely to follow through the consequences of this failure of introspective availability of 
rules. In particular, if grasp of a rule cannot be known directly by introspection, then even in 
one’s own case, the property (grasping a rule) can only ever be ascribed on the basis of 
inference. In the case of the third-person, there is nothing unusual in this. To a third party a 
rule can only ever be ascribed on the basis of their behaviour, in which case the rule is an 
element within a framework of psychological explanation. With the failure of introspection, 
though, our knowledge of our own rules must have a similar status: I can have no reason to 
describe myself as a rule follower other than as part of an explanatory framework. 
Of course, in one’s own case it is not necessary observe one’s own behaviour before 
describing oneself as a rule-follower, but despite that the distinction between the first- and 
third-person cases here is negligible. Grasp of a rule is paradigmatically ascribed on the basis 
that we believe someone is following a rule, that is, that they intend to follow a rule, and that 
their subsequent actions are informed by that rule. The explanatory power of rules thus arises 
from their role within belief/desire psychology. To explain the fact that someone continues 
the series 1002, 1004, 1006 ..., I need merely cite the fact that she grasps the rule add 2, and 
that she intends to follow it, and that nothing obstructs this aim. In more detail, the 
explanation for the speaker’s utterance ‘1006’ is that she intends to follow the rule add 2, 
that she beZieves that ‘1006’ accords with the rule in her present context, where the 
explanation for her belief that ‘1006’ is correct is just that she grasps the rule add 2, and so 
3 
Wittgenstein suggests that the fact that one’s responses come “as a matter of course” is the reason why I myself 
think that I am following a rule (PI $238). This may be a reason we actually use, but as the argument of the 
previous chapter shows, it is not a good reason. 
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knows what the rule requires in any given context. What the rule explains directly is the 
formation of the verdict that ' 1006' is correct in the present situation. (If she did not grasp 
the rule, she would not be able to produce the required series of verdicts.) Although a rule is 
required as part of the explanation of a third party's behaviour, what the rule directly 
explains is the ability to produce a certain series of verdicts, namely verdicts as to what 
accords with the rule over varying situations. In both the first- and third-person cases, rules 
are thus invoked to explain the process of verdict-formation. 
A further consequence of the inferential status of rules is that, for it to be at all plausible that 
rules are constitutive of meaning, then meanings must also be inferential. This follows from 
the simple observation that a property must have the same epistemic status as its constitutive 
properties: if F consists in G, and G is inferential, then F must also be inferential. For there to 
be any hope for a justification for CC, it must be accepted that grasp of meaning fails of 
introspective availability, and can only be inferred on the basis of explanatory power. 
Since both grasp of a rule, and grasp of meaning, are theoretical properties, CC marks a 
connection between theoretical entities. Consequently, in looking for a justification for CC, 
we would be as well to ask how constitutive connections between theoretical entities are 
established in general. 
Let us start with an example of an empirical constitutive claim, such as: for something to be 
an atom, it must contain a nucleus. (The fact that the example is empirical makes it 
somewhat disanalagous to the justification of the non-empirical CC. The fact that the cases 
are relevantly different will be accommodated below.) Both the properties being an atom and 
having a nucleus are inferential, in that they cannot be established by direct observation. The 
typical way we should verify such an empirical claim as: 
Vx (x is an atom x has a nucleus) 
would be to search for a falsieing instance. Th t is, by testing a wide range 
should see if there is ever something which is an atom without a nucleus. 
f s  mples, we 
To simplify matters, suppose that there is a unique test for the existence of an atom, and 
likewise for the presence of a nucleus. That is, we are warranted in saying that x is an atom 
if, and only if, we confirm that x has property Iato,,,; and we are warranted in saying that x has 
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a nucleus if, and only if, we confirm that x has property Inucleus. Under these terms, a 
counterexample to the claim that every atom has a nucleus would arise if we could establish: 
In this case we should have the right to say that x is an atom, but, having looked at the 
appropriate evidence, have no grounds to say that it has a nucleus, thus leaving us unjustified 
in making the constitutive claim that every atom has a nucleus. 
Correspondingly, to justify the constitutive connection between atoms and nuclei, we need 
grounds to dismiss the possibility of any such counterexample. That is, we should have to 
establish: 
Unless we have reason to believe that everything which passes the test for being an atom 
would also pass the test for possession of a nucleus, we would not be justified in making the 
constitutive connection. 
It is not hard to see that this situation should hold quite generally, no matter what theoretical 
entities are involved. Suppose that confirmation of I, is necessary and sufficient for the 
warranted ascription of F, and that confirmation of IG is necessary and sufficient for the 
warranted ascription of G. Unless we have reason to believe that everything which is IF is 
also IG, we could not rule out the existence of something which is I, and not IG, and so would 
have no reason to rule out the existence of a counterexample to the relevant constitutive 
claim. So the general result is that to justify: 
'v'x (Fx --4 Gx) 
we must have reason to believe that: 
4 
In actual fact it may well be that there is no one test for a given property F. (It might be that when x is either G 
or H we can infer than it is F, in which case neither G nor H is the property IF.) For the purposes of the 
discussion, though, it is acceptable to treat a disjunction of properties as a property, so that IF is the disjunction of 
all (strict) properties licensing the inference to the instantiation of F. 
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3x (IFX & 3GX) 
is false, for which it is necessary to just@: 
'dx (IFX + IGX). 
To apply this model to rules and meaning, let M be the property of grasping a meaning, and 
R the property of grasping a rule. The constitutive claim is then: 
(CC) 'dx (Mx --.r Rx) 
And if 1, is the property necessary and sufficient to warrant the ascription of grasp of a 
meaning, and I, is the property necessary and sufficient to warrant the ascription of grasp of 
a rule, then the relevant claim about the relation between evidence for rules and meaning is: 
(IC) VX (IMx + IRx) 
As in the general case, unless IC is justified, CC cannot be justified. 
So far we have been developing an analogy between the atom/nucleus case, and the 
rule/meaning case, but they are not wholly analogous, for the former constitutive connection 
i s  aposteriori, whereas the latter is apriori. This difference has two principle effects. In the 
first place, for CC to be a priori, IC must likewise be a priori. There is no difficulty with 
this, though, for if meaning is a type of rule-following, we should expect evidence for 
meaning to be a type of evidence for rule-following. Mere consideration of various paradigm 
cases - of when we would ascribe rules/meaning, and the evidence we should accept in each 
case - ought then be sufficient to establish that IC is true. 
The second factor relevant to the difference between the a priori and a posteriori status of 
our examples is that in the aposteriori case there is a clear justificatory order of priority. In 
saying that the relevant constitutive claim is empirical, we mean that our judgements about it 
have to be based on suitable evidence, and in particular on the relation between evidence for 
the presence of atoms, and evidence for the presence of nuclei. That is, we have to establish 
that: 
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before we can establish that: 
Vx (x is an atom 3 x has a nucleus). 
If the constitutive claim under scrutiny is instead apriori, there is no obvious reason why 
this order of priority should not be reversed. That is, suppose that we know that: 
(CC) 'dx (Mx * Rx). 
In virtue of this conditional, anything which counts as evidence for M will thereby be 
evidence for R, so that we would also know: 
(IC) VX (IMx -+ IRx). 
In this way, the IC is known in virtue of the fact that we know that CC is true. The point is 
that in saying that the justification of IC is a necessary condition for the justification of CC, 
we make no comment about the order in which the statements are justified, and it remains 
open for either to have justificatory priority. 
This observation is relevant because the question of whether the rejection of CC is the 
appropriate response to the indexical argument is at root a question about justificatory 
priority. To see this, note that the effect of the indexical argument is to show that nothing can 
licence the ascription of a rule. In particular, if grasp of a rule is impossible, then rules have 
no explanatory value, and so cannot be ascribed on the basis of inference to the best 
explanation. That is, an immediate result of the indexical argument is that nothing can have 
the property IR, or, put more informatively, the result of the indexical argument is that what 
we took to be evidence of rule-following is not in fact evidence of rule-following. We have 
to revise our opinion as to the identity of property IR, and given that revision I, remains 
uninstantiated. 
At this point we are faced with a choice, for there are two opposing directions the argument 
could take from the above result. One is to take CC as a premise, and from CC establish IC 
in the way outlined above (i.e. given CC, evidence for meaning will be evidence for rule- 
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following). Then, since the indexical argument shows that no one in fact instantiates the 
property IR, it follows by MTT on: 
(IC). v x  (1,x + IRX) 
that no one instantiates property I, either. Hence we should accept that what we thought was 
evidence for meaning is not in fact such, thus forcing us to revise our thoughts as to the 
identity of I,, leaving it likewise uninstantiated. This results in all meaning ascriptions being 
unwarranted, and is the route to meaning nihilism. 
The alternative direction to take is this. The indexical argument shows that no one 
instantiates the property IR, yet gives us no reason to alter our thoughts about who 
instantiates I,. In other words, the indexical argument undermines our ability to ascribe rules 
to people but not meanings. And since people do indeed exhibit evidence of speaking 
meaningfully (i.e. they instantiate I, as in so far as we can identify it), but do not instantiate 
IR, the prima facie conclusion is that IC is false. As established above, the justification of IC 
is necessary for the justification of CC, in which case it follows that CC is unjustified, and 
should be rejected. This is the route to rule-elimination. 
Put succinctly, the choice here is between using CC to revise our opinion as to the identity of 
I,, or to maintain our conception of property IM, and instead to use this to undermine the 
justification for IC, and hence to undermine the justification for CC. The question is, which 
direction is the correct one to take? 
It is in answering this question that he order of justificatory priority between CC and IC 
becomes relevant. For if IC is justified because we know that CC, then in effect we accept 
that what we think instantiates I, - and hence what we think property I, actually is - is 
determined by CC. And if our identification of I, already rests on CC, we can have no 
objection if CC is used, in conjunction with the indexical argument, to revise that 
conception. If, however, the justification of CC rests on IC, then it must also rest on a pre- 
existent conception of I, (for we then need to know what I, is if we are to tell whether IC is 
true). But if the justification of CC relies on a prior conception of IM, we cannot use CC to 
alter that conception. 
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The dispute is really one between our assertoric practices on the one hand, and our 
conceptual analyses on the other. If the two are in conflict, which should take precedence? In 
the abstract, I doubt that there is any principled means of making the decision - whilst we 
should expect analysis to respect our assertoric practices as far as possible, it can be 
acceptable for analysis to lead to an alteration of these practices (and presumably it is one of 
the principle motivations for engaging in analysis that it should do so). 
However, in the present case there is no question as to which way to proceed. For the 
connection between rules and meaning recorded by CC is not something which anyone 
considers until they come into contact with the rule-following considerations. Although this 
connection is accepted readily, it is a claim which has to be appraised. And indeed, the way 
we appraise it will be to consider paradigm cases of people who speak meaningfully - that is 
a situation is which we should not hesitate to say that someone means something - and then 
to consider whether, in light of this, they are following a rule. 
What this means is that it is only against a background of existing assertoric practices that 
CC can be appraised, and so CC cannot initially inform those practices. We must have some 
notion of what the property I, is, and hence who instantiates it, quite independently of our 
beliefs about the truth or otherwise of CC. It is because in any paradigm case of meaning we 
should also feel warranted in ascribing a rule that CC is accepted, not the other way around. 
In other words, whomever we describe as meaning something (i.e. whomever we believe has 
the property IM) has to be settled in order to justify CC, and so has to be settled before we 
adopt CC. For this reason CC cannot be used to alter our views as to who instantiates 
property I,. Since the indexical argument can only lead us to believe that nothing has I, (that 
a meaning ascription is never warranted) in conjunction with CC, it follows that the indexical 
argument cannot be used to undermine the meaning ascriptions that we would otherwise 
have made. 
5 
The key point here is that the justification of CC depends upon our prior assertoric practices 
with respect to rules. It is only because evidence for meaning coexists with evidence for 
rules - quite apart from any thoughts as to whether rules are necessary for meaning - that CC 
5 
It does not follow from the above argument that analysis may never alter our assertoric practices. Rather, the 
point is that in paradigm cases IC is true, and it is this which makes CC plausible, but this leaves aside the 
possibility that in marginal cases an analysis may be used to settle difficult categorisations. The point is that the 
indexical argument has global effect, undermining IC in even paradigm cases, and it is revision of such cases 
which cannot be supported in the way advocated by the nihilist. 
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is ever justified. In contrast, since prior to the indexical argument we often have reason to 
ascribe meanings to people, and since the indexical argument cannot undermine this practice, 
it follows that we have every reason to believe that people have I,. That is, people instantiate 
I, but riot IR, making conditional IC false. Since the justification of IC was a necessary 
condition on the justification of CC, it follows that CC is unjustified. 
In summary, it is wrong to think that the indexical argument, if unfettered, leads to meaning 
nihilism. That result only occurs given CC, but as we have seen the real consequence of the 
indexical argument is that CC is unjustified, and so is a candidate for rejection. Rather than 
trying to save the constitutive relationship by forging some notion of rule-following which is 
immune to the indexical argument, the solution to our paradox of rule-following is to 
acknowledge that message that rules-following has nothing to do with meaning. 
An Alternative Constitutive Claim 
The project so far has been somewhat negative, establishing only that rules are not 
constitutive of meaning. I now want to put the considerations of the above discussion to a 
more positive use, by identifying a property to replace rules in an alternative constitutive 
account of meaning. 
The strategy I want to adopt rests on the premise that the only reason we have to reject CC is 
the indexical argument. That is, I assume that if it were not for the indexical argument, then 
CC would be fully justified (or at least justifiable). This is a reasonable assumption to make 
in the present context, for the very value of the rule-following considerations arises from the 
accepted view that rules are essential for meaning; it is a background assumption of our 
whole discussion that this claim is more than mere dogma. 
On the basis of this assumption, the strategy is to identify what it is that would justify CC 
were it not for the indexical argument; to thereby formulate a general sufficiency conditions 
for the justification of a claim like CC; and in this way to find an alternative constitutive 
claim which satisfies the identified conditions once the indexical argument is brought into 
consideration. 
We need first, then, to identify a sufficiency condition for the justification of CC. To this 
end, recall that the justification of the conditional: 
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(IC) VX (IMx + IRx). 
is a necessary condition for the justification of CC. In fact, IC can readily used to give a 
sufficient condition as well. Suppose it were indeed the case that I could only ascribe a 
meaning in cases where I could also ascribe a rule (assuming I have access to the relevant 
evidence). This relationship is something which ought to be explained, and part of a suitable 
explanation may be that rules are constitutive of meanings. In particular, if meanings give 
rise, and hence explain the property I,, and rules give rise to, and hence explain the property 
IR, then the fact that a meaning consists (at least in part) in a rule would explain why I, arises 
whenever I, arises. Quite what the best explanation really is would depend very much on 
what the properties I, and I, actually are, but on the assumption that a constitutive 
relationship is required for the best explanation of IC, then on the grounds that we should 
always adopt the best explanation, we should have a warrant for CC. In sum, a justification 
of the following two statements: 
(IC) v x  (IMX -+ 1,x) 
(BE) The best explanation for IC requires that CC be true 
is sufficient to justify CC. 
Of course the indexical argument entails that IC is not justified, for no one has the property 
I,. Yet the above thoughts are in no way specific to rules and meaning, so this framework 
can be used quite generally. That is, to justify the alternative constitutive claim 
(CC") b'x (Mx 3 Fx), 
namely that meaning consists (in part at least) in F, we should need F to satisfy the following 
two statements: 
(IC") VX (IMx -+ IFx) 
(BE") The best explanation for IC" requires that CC" be true. 
In order to identify any such F, the method is to work backwards. To find any such F, we 
first need to identify some property I, which satisfies IC". To find such an IF, we need to first 
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identify I,. And to find I, we appeal again to the fact that without the indexical argument, 
the following conditional: 
(IC) VX (I,x + IRx) 
is (by assumption) justified. 
This fact is useful, for the following reason. Prior to the indexical argument, there is some 
property I, which counts as evidence for rules. Given the indexical argument, we find that 
nothing has the property I,. But we can still identifL that property which would count as 
evidence for rules were grasp of a rule possible. Let that property be called PIA-I, (pre- 
indexical argument I,). By definition, anything which was I, (prior to the indexical 
argument) is still PIA-I, (given the indexical argument). The importance of this is that, 
whereas prior to the indexical argument we would have been justified in stating IC, in the 
advent of the indexical argument we are still warranted in asserting: 
VX (IMx + PIA-IRx). 
simply because what was I, is now PIA-I,. 
It is in this way that what would have counted as evidence for rules can help identify an 
alternative constitutive property F. For if we can find some inferential property F which 
satisfies the conditional: 
V X  (PIA-IRx + IFx). 
then given that the conditional: 
VX (IMx + PIA-1,~). 
is justified (by assumption), then by transitivity we should also be justified in claiming: 
VX (IMx + IFx). 
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Once we have identified some such F, it is just a question of seeing whether the alternative 
constitutive claim is the best explanation for the above conditional. If it is, the alternative 
constitutive claim CC" would be justified; and if it is not, there may be a better explanation 
which in turn may justify some other constitutive claim. Clearly the precise result depends 
very much on the identity of F, which in turn depends on the identity of PIA-IR, and so a 
precise characterisation of PIA-I, - the property which is necessary and sufficient to licence 
the ascription of a rule, were rule-following possible - is now our immediate concern. 
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7. Training and Agreement 
The initial aim of this chapter is to identify the property PIA-IR, which (to recall) is defined 
as satisfying the following: 
Were it not for the indexical argument, confirmation that someone has PIA-I, would be 
necessary and sufficient to justify the ascription of a rule to them. 
That is, PIA-1, is what licensed the ascription of a rule before the indexical argument 
undermined that practice. Once PIA-I, has been identified, we can begin to formulate an 
alternative constitutive account of meaning to replace the now defunct one based on rules. 
The Explanatory Power of Rules 
To identify PIA-IR, the obvious strategy is to simply ignore (for the moment) the indexical 
argument, and to ask: what justifies the ascription of a rule? As noted in the previous 
chapter, a rule can only be ascribed in the context of an explanation for a process of verdict 
formation. Notably, though, the mere fact that someone produces a series of verdicts under 
the intention to follow a rule is not sufficient grounds on which to infer that a rule is actually 
being followed. As we have seen (Chapter 5), first-person authority with respect to the grasp 
of a rule is not to be had, and so the fact that someone thinks they are following a rule is not 
necessarily an indication that they are indeed following a rule. 
As a result, if there is ever a good reason to ascribe a rule to someone (even oneself), it must 
be in virtue of the verdicts they produce, rather then the fact that they think that they are 
following a rule. To illustrate the point, note that we should immediately say that someone 
who produces the series 2,4,6,  ..., is following a rule, even though it is logically possible that 
this series is either the result of a random selection, or that the agent is ‘just disposed’ to 
produce these verdicts, Correspondingly, we should not be so certain that someone who 
produces the series 2, 6, 8, 17, 56 ... (which I just made up) i s  following a rule, even though 
1 
1 
As was established in Chapter 2, rule-following cannot be reduced to the mere manifestation of a disposition. 
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we know that any series accords with some rule, so that the production of the latter series 
above could be explained in terms of a rule. 
The point is that in deciding whether a given series of verdicts is rule-governed or not, since 
the subject’s own thoughts on the matter indicate nothing of relevance, the only factor we 
have to base our decision on is the nature of the verdicts actually produced. Given that we 
are warranted in ascribing rules in some cases but not in others, there must be two different 
types of series; namely those that we can reasonably expect someone to produce only if they 
grasp an appropriate rule, and those series we can reasonably expect someone to produce 
without the aid of a rule. The ability to produce the former type of series is both necessary 
and sufficient for the ascription of a rule, and would thus constitute the property PIA-IR. 
Clearly what is needed is a criterion which would demarcate the two types of pattern: to 
distinguish between those series which indicate that a rule is in force, and those which do 
not. As it transpires, the criterion is this: 
2 
Rules can be ascribed to those who, as the result of training, attain the ability to produce 
verdicts which accord with those of their trainer. 
Naturally, this claim needs to be defended. In this respect, given that we are here concerned 
with training and agreement, and that these two notions have been identified (if 
contentiously) as essential elements of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language, it might 
be thought that Wittgenstein’s writings be the obvious place to look for such a defence. 
However, the multiple layers of exegetical obscurity here already makes the appraisal of the 
given criterion through Wittgenstein’ s writings an inefficient strategy. In addition, my own 
2 
It should be noted that, although rule-following is paradigmatically an intentional activity, the intention to 
follow a rule is not necessary for the warranted ascription of grasp of a rule. If we can say that someone who 
intentionally produces a certain type of series must grasp a rule, then likewise someone who unintentionally 
produces the same series must also be accredited with this property. This is quite unobjectionable, for although 
someone who (say) adds whilst talking in his sleep may not readily be ascribed with the intention to add - 
certainly not the conscious intention - we would accept that his behaviour results from his grasp of the addition 
rule. 
3 
Various different community interpretations (i.e. building on some notion of interpersonal agreement) of 
Wittgenstein’s accounts exist (e.g. Kripke 1982, Wright 1980, Malcolm 1989). The rarer claim, that Wittgenstein 
held that training is essential for rule-following, is made by Fogelin (1987, pp. 175-179), though he goes on to 
reject it as an untenable thesis. Although many passages in the Philosophical Investigations allude to training in 
connection with rule-following (see for example $$ 197- 198), Wittgenstein’s most forthright statement about 
training, given in the Blue Book (Wittgenstein 1958, pp. 12-14), actually states that it is a mistake to think that the 
notion of training makes any contribution to the concept of rule-following. (An apparent change in Wittgenstein’s 
opinion in this respect is discussed by Pears 1988, pp. 373-378.) 
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view is that there is nothing in his writings which could be construed as a convincing 
argument either for or against the relevant (evidential) claim. Consequently, although we are 
dealing with markedly Wittgensteinian themes, I shall not attempt to reconstruct any 
argumeat of Wittgenstein’s as a means of defending the above criterion. The more effective 
strategy is to construct the argument somewhat afresh. 
4 
The aim, then, is to establish that agreement induced by training is both necessary and 
sufficient to warrant the ascription of a rule. At the outset, it is far from obvious that either 
the necessary or the sufficiency condition is satisfied. For one thing, although there is little 
doubt that the subsequent agreement of the pupil with the trainer after a process of training 
could be explained in terms of rules (after all, any series of verdicts could be explained in 
terms of a rule), it has not yet been established that rule-following is the best explanation, 
that training induced agreement is sufficient to warrant the ascription of a rule on the 
grounds of inference to the best explanation. In addition, the claim that any kind of 
agreement - let alone agreement induced by training - is necessary to licence the ascription 
of a rule is strongly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, both conditions do hold, as I shall now 
show. 
Symbols and Practical Success 
The best way to establish that training and subsequent agreement are essential for warranted 
rule-ascriptions is to indicate what is wrong with some other, more immediately plausible, 
proposals. One idea which has been put forward more than once is that the performance of 
certain tasks by utilising a series of written marks is symptomatic of a rule-follower. 
Examples given are: storing, labelling, and relocating things in a storeroom (McGinn 1984, 
pp. 196- 197); following a series of signs as directions allowing one to find one’s way (Pears 
1988, p. 365 fn 11); and using instructions on a piece of paper to solve a rubics cube 
4 
Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein gives one explanation for why we should expect no such argument. For if, as 
Kripke suggests, Wittgenstein gives an irrealist theory of rules, then we should not expect the assertion- 
conditions for rules to answer to any truth-conditions, and so there is no question of asking what the assertion- 
conditions ought, rationally, to be. Consequently, all we can do is describe those situations which we take to be 
indicative of rules. In contrast, our aim is to identify the conditions under which such ascriptions should be made, 
to discern not just what people take to be indicative of rule-following, but what phenomenon actually is best 
explained in terms of rules. The assertion conditions we are after are prescriptive, not descriptive. There is no 
obvious reason why the descriptive and prescriptive assertion-conditions should coincide, which is why the 
descriptive project is not our concern. 
It might be noted that Kripke’s claim that a rule can only be ascribed to someone in the context of a community 
has met with general incredulity (see for example Blackburn 1984b, McGinn 1984, Boghossian 1989). If 
Wittgenstein does refer to the community with the aim of describing the conditions under which a rule can be 
149 
5 
(Blackburn 1984, p. 297). Certainly such examples have strong intuitive appeal - we do 
automatically consider such people to be rule-followers - and of course that is precisely the 
reason such examples are formulated. Quite markedly, these example make no mention of 
either training or agreement, so that they certainly put some pressure on the criterion 
recommended above. Yet the issue is not so much whether we would intuitively say that 
these are examples of rule-following, but to identify those features, common to each 
example, which warrant the claim that a rule is being followed, and to thereby formulate a 
criterion of rule-following. 
In each of the examples there are two elements at work: (a) the series of actions are goal- 
directed (for example, several signs are followed in sequence to reach a desired destination); 
(b) success in the stated aim depends upon the use of a series of written marks. It takes little, 
though, to see that the inclusion of this second element is wholly disingenuous. The intention 
is, of course, that the marks be taken as symbols, that they refer to objects in the world, and 
that this is why they prove to be of (perhaps indispensable) practical benefit. Yet, for a mark 
to function as a symbol, the agent must grasp a rule which determines what each mark 
symbolises - a rule correlating an arrow with a particular direction, say. Importantly, the 
mere fact that the marks are treated as symbols - the agent refers to his piece of paper before 
proceeding in his chosen direction - does not in itself mean that they are symbols, only that 
the agent thinks that they are symbols, that he thinks that he grasps a rule correlating the 
marks with objects in the world. 
In accepting that the agent uses a set of symbols, we thereby tacitly assume that he is a rule- 
follower. But since we are after conditions which warrant the ascription of a rule in the first 
place, this is an assumption we ought not make. Rather, if we are to accept that the marks are 
genuine symbols, then we have to have some reason to say that the agent grasps a rule, a rule 
in virtue of which the marks refer. And it turns out that any such reason must be given in 
terms of what the agent does in response to the marks. 
ascribed, then his answer would appear to be descriptively inadequate. And if the aim is rather to identify the 
prescriptive project, then clearly the argument (whatever it is) has not been compelling. 
5 
Blackburn accredits the example of following instructions to solve a rubics cube to Dummett, but he gives no 
reference. Each one of the cited examples is given as a counterexample to Kripke’s claim (1 982, p. 88 ff.) that an 
individual considered in isolation cannot be deemed a rule-follower, the intention being to give a paradigmatic 
case of an individual we should say is following a rule. 
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The point is readily illustrated if we consider someone placing shells on a beach with the aid 
of a marked piece of paper. The subject uses the paper as he would use instructions; he 
consults them at each stage before proceeding, but without the paper, he does not attempt 
any placement of the shells. If the resultant pattern appears to be random, with no organising 
principle, then we should not be in a position to say that he is a rule-follower: as far as we 
can tell, this is someone who merely thinks that he is following a rule. In this situation we 
have no reason to suppose that the marks on the paper bear any correlation with anything in 
the world (to shells, or patterns, or whatever). By way of contrast, if the resultant pattern is 
the type of pattern which we should expect someone to be able to create only by following a 
rule, then we should say that a rule is being followed. Since the piece of paper is essential for 
the agent to be able to carry out the procedure (without it he does not place any shells at all), 
we have every right to say that the that the marks on the paper do function as symbols, and 
that the agent is a rule-follower. 
As the example illustrates, it is only if we have reason to suppose that the agent is following 
a rule in his overall practice that we have reason to believe that he is following a rule in his 
use of the marks on the paper. To follow a rule, the agent must correlate his present 
circumstance with a given action, the action required by the rule. The fact that he can only do 
this given the piece of paper suggests that the marks function as symbols, that they serve to 
link input circumstances with output actions in the mind of the agent. The only reason we 
have to say that they function as symbols is that they facilitate the following of a rule. So we 
must have some reason to say that the agents in the examples are rule-followers before we 
say that they have a system of symbols. The classification of the marks as a system of 
symbols rests on the prior application of the desired criterion of rule-following, and so 
cannot be used in its initial formulation. 
As a result, if we have good reason to suppose that our examples are indeed paradigmatic 
rule-followers, it must be because of the other common element, the fact that the sequence of 
actions in question is performed in order to meet some overarching goal. To take the 
example of someone solving the rubics cube, given the large number of permutations 
involved, we certainly should not expect someone to repeatedly solve the puzzle by chance. 
The ability to solve it on demand requires an explanation, and the idea that the individual has 
grasped rules for solving the cube would count as just such an explanation. The suggestion, 
in general, is that we can call people rule-followers when they achieve an aim which can 
reasonably be expected to be achieved only by someone who follows a rule, or set of rules. 
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But, of course, the mere fact that a series of actions is performed in pursuit of an overarching 
goal does not ensure that a rule is in force. (For example, I might intend to bore someone by 
reciting a series of random numbers.) What is required, therefore, is a further criterion, to 
distinguish between those overarching goals which we can reasonably expect only someone 
following a rule to reach, and those which can be achieved without a rule. Unfortunately, this 
method does not get us very far, for obviously an overarching aim requires use of a rule only 
if the series of actions required to achieve the aim itself requires use of an appropriate rule. 
And that takes us back to where we started, in search of a criterion for a series of actions 
which only a rule-follower can be expected to perform. 
In sum, our ‘paradigmatic’ rule-followers do not serve to illuminate that which warrants the 
ascription of a rule in the slightest. In referring to processes which we unhesitatingly accept 
can only normally be performed by rule-followers - we know that only rule-followers follow 
directions and solve rubics cubes - it may seem that we must be able to ascribe rules in the 
absence of either agreement or training. But, since it has not been shown why we ought to 
consider these people rule-followers, it has not been shown that our intuitions are right. Such 
examples do not illuminate the difference between rule-explained and non-rule-explained 
behaviour, they only appeal to our conviction that there is such a distinction. 
Communal Agreement 
The above examples were initially designed to show that Kripke is mistaken in thinking that 
rules cannot be ascribed to individuals in isolation. Given our failure to formulate a criterion 
of rule-following on the basis of those examples, perhaps Kripke is right after all, and rules 
can only be ascribed to those whose actions accord with the actions of a community. Indeed, 
should a group of people behave in a similar manner over a wide range of circumstances, one 
possible explanation for this would be that they all grasp and follow a common rule. In 
addition, the existence of such communal agreement would allow us to discount the 
possibility that each member of the community is simply acting in a random, or in a freely 




Note that under Kripke’s irrealist theory, no justification need be given for why someone can be described as a 
rule-follower only in the context of a community, whereas in the present context any such communitarian 
solution must be rationally justified. 
7 
By agreement I mean simply that people do the same thing in similar circumstances (calling red things ‘red’, 
saying ‘6’ after having said ‘4’). No element of collusion, or appraisal of others’ action is intended. 
152 
that we can discount it. So whereas with an individual, any series of acts may be thought to 
be random, this is not plausible given communal conformity. Since we are trying to find a 
situation in which the best explanation for a type of behaviour is given in terms of rules, the 
fact that a certain alternative explanation can be discounted is certainly an advancement. 
The trouble with this suggestion is that whereas ‘free creation’ may be ruled out by 
communal agreement, there are still many circumstance in which a group of people perform 
the same actions in correlated circumstances, but in which they are decidedly not following a 
rule. We all share many dispositions in virtue of a common physical make-up (bones to 
break when struck, to bleed when cut, and so on). We also share many dispositions due to a 
similar psychological make-up (not to stick one’s hand in fire, to eat apples but not stones, 
etc.). In such cases no rules are required - we behave as we do because of inherent 
similarities. For example, the fact that we all tend to eat the same types of things does not 
mean that we have a rule for sorting things into the edible and the inedible; rather, we just 
accord in our (broadly similar) tastes. Our common beliefs about what is edible do not have 
to be explained in terms of rules; rather, the disposition to form such beliefs is a basic feature 
of our ‘form of life’. Although this example concerns decisions related closely to 
physiological matters, there is no apriori reason why this should not be the case with any 
activity - with any belief-formation process - however far removed from basic biological 
functioning. On any matter on which there is general agreement, apossible explanation is 
that we agree because we have a shared constitution (physical/psychological), and hence 
have shared dispositions. There is no apparent reason why this type of explanation cannot 
also be applied when it comes to our common verdicts as to what accords with a rule. If 
other beliefs can be the manifestation of shared dispositions, then why not in this case also? 
To be clear: in any situation of agreement, there are two rival explanations on offer. One is 
that people have a shared disposition to make certain judgements. The other is that people 
have a shared grasp of the relevant rule. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, grasp of a rule does 
not consist in a disposition to judge, and so the fact that people have a shared disposition 
does not entail that a rule is in force. (The difference being that in the latter case the rule 
provides an explanation of the dispositions under investigation, whereas in the former the 
dispositions are taken as a basic fact.) If we are prepared to give an explanation in terms of 
dispositions in the case of an individual, then there is no objection to the thought that we 
share these dispositions; after all, we share the same physiology, psychology, and social 
upbringing. 
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Admittedly, there are situations in which an explanation of communal agreement in terms of 
basic common dispositions (rather than rules) would put severe strain on our intuitions. The 
matter is particularly acute when we consider examples of actions performed under the 
common intention to follow a rule, and hence where all the participants believe they are 
following a rule. Should a group of people spontaneously intend to follow a rule, and happen 
to broadly agree in their verdicts - suppose that there is a community of natural-born 
mathematicians, for example - it is difficult to resist the claim that such people do have an 
inherent grasp of the relevant rules. 
However, the mere fact that the members of the community all think that they are following 
a rule is not in itself a reason to suppose that a rule is indeed being followed. For, since an 
individual may think he is following a rule when in fact he is not, it is likewise possible that 
every member of the community is similarly afflicted. In support of this claim, it might be 
noted that whilst in some situations the existence of non-collusive communal agreement 
makes error less likely (the thought being that many pairs of eyes, say, are often better than 
one), this is not a useful observation in present circumstances. If someone falsely believes 
that they are following a rule, their mistake will not be the result of perceptual error. Rather, 
any error is likely to be either systematic (in that we have false view of what counts as 
evidence of rule-following), or blameless (in that what is good evidence for rule-following 
has arisen, making our judgement fully justified, when, as a contingent fact, a rule is not 
being followed). Under either scenario, the presence of communal agreement offers no 
advantage: there is no reason why the false view as to what counts as evidence for rules 
should not be widespread. And if evidence for rule-following happens to arise in the absence 
of a rule, we are all likely to be taken in. So it would be a mistake to regard the fact that 
everyone in a community believes that a rule is in force as a better indication that one is 
actually in force than it is in the case of an individual. 
The result is that when faced with natural-born adders, as with the example of those using 
written signs, the overriding intuition is that rule-following must be involved, that the 
situation cannot reflect the mere possession of a disposition. On investigation, though, we 
find no rational foundation for this preference. But again, rather than merely recording our 
differing sentiments, we need to know why one explanation should be preferred in some 
cases and not in others. And the fact that communal agreement does not automatically 
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commend an explanation in terms of rules means that there must be other factors at work 
which we have not yet identified. 
Training 
We are now in a position to see why training is an essential for the warranted ascription of a 
rule. The most significant new element that training brings to the picture is mention of the 
origin of the putative rule-follower’s behaviour. Notably, a (successful) training process 
results in the trainee acting differently from the way he would have acted otherwise. Prior to 
induction in the rule the trainee cannot accord with the trainer in new cases; after the training 
he can. This opens up a new explanatory need, for whereas the existence of dispositions may 
not always stand in need of explanation (a person’s dispositions being a basic fact about their 
constitution), a change in someone’s dispositions ought to be accounted for. In particular, we 
should want to know how a process of training produces agreement when before there was 
none. 
To bring the matter into focus, consider a typical situation in which H teaches Johnny how to 
count. In her role as trainer, H will herself follow the rule a number of times by way of 
demonstration, then get Johnny to try to continue the pattern, and either praise or correct the 
responses he gives. At first Johnny’s judgements may be tentative, but with his increasing 
level of success he gains more and more confidence, until at some stage (assuming the 
training is successful) Johnny will be able to reproduce H’s answers quite readily, without a 
moment’s hesitation. We should then say that Johnny has learnt the rule. Before the training, 
Johnny could not have produced the same answers that H produces, but after the training he 
can. It is this change to Johnny that we seek to explain, bearing in mind that it is quite 
typical, that a similar process of training can be expected to produce a similar change in any 
normal person. 
It is clear that an explanation in terms of rules is perfectly adequate to account for this 
change. On the basis of the training, Johnny grasps the same rule as H, and in virtue of their 
respective grasp of the same rule, each knows (ceteris paribus) what the rule requires. The 
only obvious deficiency with this type of explanation arises from the need to account for 
how a finite process of training succeeds in transmitting the intended rule. Training involves 
the demonstration of only a limited number of applications of a rule, and as is well 
established, any finite sequence is consistent with an infinite number of rules. In purely 
probabilistic terms, then, there is no chance that the trainee will arrive at the intended rule, 
155 
the one actually being followed, given the sheer number of rules consistent with the 
evidence. 
To solve this puzzle, we should first note that the trainee does not recognise that there is an 
infinite number of rules each of which is consistent with the trainer’s behaviour. In fact, at 
the outset there can be no rule that Johnny grasps which is consistent with H’s behaviour. 
This is because, were Johnny to grasp some rule consistent with H’s behaviour, he would see 
her behaviour as a manifestation of that rule, and not the inculcation of a new one. It is not 
then a wholly rational process which leads Johnny to give the answers he does - he does not 
infer that the trainee intends one rule rather than another, for he lacks the conceptual 
resources to make that particular inference. And if the responses Johnny gives are not the 
result of a rational hypothesis about which rule is being taught, anyone advocating an 
explanation of Johnny’s behaviour in terms of rules has little option but to accept that 
training causes grasp of a rule. It is then quite plausible that similar training processes 
produce the same result in similar subjects. Given that the trainer and trainee are in many 
ways alike, it is no accident that the same type of process which instilled a specific rule in H 
will instil the very same rule in Johnny. 
As might be expected, in accounting for the whole process of training and subsequent 
agreement, the explanation which refers to rules is not the only option. An alternative 
proposal is that the training causes Johnny to be (merely) disposed to give answers which 
happen to be the same as his teacher’s. Such an explanation does not refer to rules, for the 
disposition to judge does not constitute grasp of a rule. Yet this type of explanation is also 
adequate in accounting for subsequent agreement between trainee and trainer. On the 
assumption that the various training processes undertaken by different individuals bear some 
similarities to each other, and given the similar physical/psychological properties of their 
trainees, we can expect the same training process to yield similar dispositions. On the 
assumption that the training received by the trainer is similar to the training she gives to 
others, we could reasonably expect her pupils to acquire dispositions which accord with her 
own. 
Again, the intuitive view is certainly that here an explanation in terms of rules is preferable 
to the given alternative in terms of dispositions. Yet the purely dispositional explanation 
ought not be discounted out of hand, for causal explanations of a change to one’s 
psychological dispositions - including the disposition to judge - are quite acceptable. For 
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example, a ‘truth serum’ may make people more disposed to tell the truth; alcohol makes 
people disposed to misjudge the width of their cars; and hypnotists can make people believe 
anything at all. Given that causal explanations for dispositions to judge are applicable in 
other contexts, it is necessary to provide a reason why such explanations are not to be 
applied to situations of training induced agreement as to the requirements of a rule. If a rule 
explanation really is superior to a dispositional explanation in such cases, there must be some 
basis to this differentiation. 
To see why the rule-explanation is the best explanation of the training process, it is necessary 
to identify what is to be explained more precisely. In the initial stages, Johnny is presented 
with a series of examples of how the rule is applied, and is then invited to say how the rule 
should be applied next. The most important point to note about this situation is that at each 
stage Johnny forms his opinion as to how H’s rule should be next applied on the basis of H’s 
behaviour. That is, Johnny judges that cp comes next on the basis of what he has been shown 
so far - on the basis of H’s demonstrations, and the appraisals H has made of Johnny’s 
previous attempts at following the rule. So when the training has been deemed a success, 
Johnny not only forms verdicts he would not previously have made (for example that <p 
comes next), he does so for reasons which he would not previously have accepted. 
Explicitly, he now takes H’s behaviour to indicate that cp comes next, when previously he 
would not have. What is to be explained, therefore, is not only why Johnny forms new 
verdicts, but why he comes to adopt what he does as his reasons for those verdicts. 
At the outset, we are still faced with two competing explanations, namely: 
Rule explanation: 
Disposition explanation: 
The training causes Johnny to grasp a rule, and the rule 
explains why he accepts such-and-such as a reason to believe 
that cp is correct. 
The training causes Johnny to (be disposed to) accept such- 
and-such as a reason to believe that cp is correct. 
Both are perfectly adequate explanations for the change which Johnny undergoes during 
training. Yet, as we shall see, only the rule-explanation accommodates the rationality of the 
subject, and this is enough to make it the better explanation. 
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Reasons and Causes 
The superiority of the rule-explanation is established by comparing three types of 
explanation for belief. Suppose we have a situation in which: 
(a) Mary believes that p 
(b) Mary believes that p for reason x. 
One way to explain Mary’s belief would be simply to cite reason x: Mary believes that p 
because x. This would be a reason explanation. 
Suppose, though, that Mary only believes that p because she received a sharp blow to the 
head. However, Mary does not recall being hit on the head, and when asked why she 
believes that p, she still cites x as her reason. Since she would not have held x to be a reason 
to believe that p prior to the blow (for she was aware of x, but yet did not believe that p), it 
seems that the blow caused Mary to adopt x as a reason to believe that p. The situation is 
captured thus: 
( 4  Mary believes that p 
(d) 
(e) 
The reason for Mary’s belief that p is x. 
The cause of Mary’s acceptance of x as a reason to believe that p is y. 
In this case, the explanation of Mary’s belief is a caused-reason explanation. The belief in 
question is still held for a reason, but now the cause of the adoption of that reason as a reason 
is a relevant factor in the explanation. 
It is the distinction between a caused-reason explanation and a reason explanation which is 
of interest, but it is worth introducing a further distinction, concerning a special type of 
caused-reason explanation. Turning to another example, suppose that a doctor gives Mary 
ecstasy for a quite legitimate medical reason. On taking the drug Mary becomes paranoid, 
and suffers delusions of persecution, making her disposed to misinterpret the actions of 
others as being acts of hostility directed against her. As a result, Mary takes the fact that the 
doctor administered the drug to her to be evidence that he (the doctor) intended her harm. In 
this situation the doctor’s administration of the drug is both the (albeit irrational) reason for 
Mary’s belief that the doctor is against her, and the cause of her acceptance of it as a reason. 
This situation is captured as follows: 
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(f) Mary believes that p 
(g) 
(h) 
The reason for Mary’s belief that p is x. 
The cause of Mary’s acceptance of x as a reason to believe that p is also x. 
In this case, where the same state of affairs is both the reason for a given belief and the cause 
of the subject’s acceptance of it as a reason, the appropriate type of explanation for Mary’s 
8 
belief may be termed a self-caused reason explanation. 
This latter type of explanation is pertinent to our discussion, fo f the accounts of 
training induced agreement we are assessing - namely the dispositional account - is in fact a 
self-caused reason explanation. As already noted, this type of explanation accepts: 
ne 
( 9  
6) 
(k) 
Johnny believes that cp comes next 
The reason for Johnny’s belief that cp comes next is H’s behaviour 
The cause of Johnny’s acceptance that H’s behaviour is a reason to believe that cp 
comes next is H’s behaviour. 
This fits the schema for a self-caused reason explanation. 
The fact that the dispositional account is specifically a self-caused reason explanation is not 
overly significant. What does matter is that the dispositional account, qua self-caused reason 
explanation, is a type of caused-reason explanation; and that there is a clear criterion for 
when a reason explanation is preferable to a caused-reason explanation. 
To uncover this criterion, first note that a caused-reason explanation (indeed, a self-caused 
reason explanation) could, in principle, be offered for any belief formed for what are 
ostensibly rational reasons. For example, suppose that Jim says to me “Your house is on 
fire”. As a result, I come to believe that my house is on fire, and the reason for my belief is 
what Jim said. An orthodox explanation - a straightforward reason explanation - for my 
8 
In the discussion above I treat a reason for belief as a worldly state of affairs, whereas more usually a reason for 
a belief is considered to be some other belief. This fact can readily be accommodated within the account: a self- 
caused reason would then involve a worldly state of affairs X which causes me to take my beliefthat X to be a 
reason for some further belief that Y. The central point used in the argument - that such cases involve an 
alteration of one’s rational processes - is not affected if we ignore this distinction, but doing so makes the 
presentation easier. 
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belief would advert to various facts about my overall view of the word, as well as to my 
inferential practices. In particular, we should note that I believe that Jim speaks English, that 
he is a reliable witness, and that as a result of these beliefs I conclude that my house actually 
is on fire. An alternative explanation would be: Jim telling me that my house is on fire 
caused me to accept his telling me that my house is on fire as a reason to believe that my 
house is on fire. This explanation fits the model of a self-caused reason: the same situation is 
both my reason for belief, and the cause of my adoption of it as a reason. 
In most situations we should prefer the reason explanation to the self-caused reason 
explanation, even though each is explanatorily adequate. The reason for this emerges when 
we examine clear-cut cases of caused-reason explanations. Such examples are readily found: 
for example the situation in which Mary is hit on the head, but does not remember it; or 
when she is injected with ecstasy, and becomes paranoid, but without her being aware that a 
drug has been administered. In these case, the cause cannot be the reason for belief, simply 
because the subject is not aware of the occurrence of the relevant event. 
What is notable about all examples of clear-cut caused reasons is that there is no expectation 
that the ensuing beliefs should meet accepted standards of rationality. Thinking of situations 
in which someone receives a blow to the head, is administered psychoactive drugs, or is a 
subject of hypnoses, it is possible that any belief, no matter how bizarre, be the outcome of 
such procedures. Of course, it might be that someone is hypnotised, and so caused to believe 
something perfectly rational which they would not otherwise have believed. But any such 
accordance with rational standards would be entirely accidental, for it is just as likely that 
these events produce wholly irrational beliefs. Indeed, it is only when the subject’s otherwise 
rational belief-formation process is disrupted that we can say for certain that the reason is 
adopted as a result of the relevant event, rather than as the result of their existing belief- 
formation processes. 
In contrast, it is when exercising reason that one sets one’s expected standard of rationality, 
and so when exercising one’s rational faculties, we have every right to expect that rational 
standards be met. And it is in precisely this situation, in describing the use of one’s rational 
faculties, that a reason explanation is appropriate. 
The general result is that if one’s belief-formation processes do accord with broadly rational 
standards, and we have no reason to believe that this is merely accidental, then a causal- 
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reason explanation is to be rejected in favour of a reason explanation. Applying this to our 
trainee, it follows that if in responding to training Johnny meets certain rational standards, 
and this is not accidental, then an explanation for his change in behaviour in terms of (self-) 
caused reasons is inadequate. All that would then be needed to establish the superiority of 
the rule explanation would be to show that it, in contrast to the dispositional explanation, can 
account for the rationality of Johnny ’ s responses. 
The Rational Trainee 
There are, then, two questions before us. One: when responding to training, does Johnny act 
rationally? Two: if so, can a rule explanation of the change which Johnny undergoes during 
training account for this rationality? Let us look at these questions in order. 
In asking whether a trainee acts rationally, what we specifically want to know is what 
happens when Johnny, having been exposed to a limited fragment of a rule (perhaps 
accompanied by some initial corrections of early mistakes and praise for a few correct 
attempts at extrapolation), now decides that <p comes next. Our question refers to the 
pedigree of this belief: is it the product of a rational belief-formation process? 
To raise some initial doubts that a trainee does act rationally, it is certain that Johnny may 
respond to training without any of his actions beingfully justified. For one thing, to respond 
to training Johnny must believe that H is following some rule which she is trying to teach 
him, otherwise he would not attempt to continue the rule in new cases, and not attempt to 
‘latch on’ to the rule. Yet Johnny need initially have no concrete evidence which would 
indicate that H is a rule-follower. As noted above, the fact that someone performs a series of 
actions, even under the belief that they themselves are following a rule, is not in itself a good 
reason to suppose that they are indeed following a rule. Yet this is precisely the situation that 
Johnny may find himself in - he is faced with H who manifests a certain range of behaviour, 
and on this basis alone Johnny must come to believe that she is following a rule. It may well 
be that in order for the actions of H to make any sense to Johnny, he first hypothesises that H 
is following a rule, which is to say that he adopts an unwarranted assumption. 
9 
Saying that someone satisfies certain standards of rationality is not to credit them with grasp of a rule for 
rational belief formation (a situation which would make the search for a criterion of rule-following circular); to 
merely accord with a rule does not mean that a rule is grasped, or followed, or in any way ‘in force’. 
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A second reason why Johnny’s actions may not be fully justified is that any series of verdicts 
accords with some rule. But if any verdict which Johnny gives is consistent with the 
preceding finite behaviour of H (under the hypothesis that H is following a rule), then the 
verdict he chooses to give is as well supported as any other, which is to say that his choice is 
strictly unjustified. 
Neither of these observations precludes the possibility of Johnny acting rationally, for we are 
not interested in absolute standards of rationality. Rather, we want to know whether his 
belief is rational given his existing background beliefs. In particular, no one would respond 
to training unless they accepted that a rule was being demonstrated to them. So, in accepting 
Johnny as a trainee, we require that he already believes that H is trying to teach him a rule. 
This belief is an initial condition, and requires no justification. 
There is another background belief which anyone learning a rule must also utilise, namely 
the belief that a finite fragment of a series can determine a rule to within uniqueness. In light 
of our investigations we know this to be false, but it is generally accepted amongst the 
population at large. Indeed, this assumption underlies one paradigmatic test of rationality, the 
ubiquitous IQ test question: “What is the next number in the series...”. This type of question 
relies on the fact that people do accept that there is one unique answer, that the finite 
fragment does admit of only one expansion, and that we have been given sufficient 
information to identify it. 
10 
With these background beliefs in place, the process of training proceeds as follows. To begin 
with, H demonstrates a fragment of the rule, after which Johnny is invited to continue it in a 
new case. At this stage Johnny may have no firm belief as to what comes next - his answer 
may be tentative, his aim being to discover whether his answer is correct. Should his answer 
be endorsed, he will try to continue to apply the rule in further new cases; upon correction of 
a wrong answer, he will try to take this new information into consideration, and try 
something else. If the training is eventually successful, Johnny will meet with repeated 
success, and will gain confidence in his answers. He then changes from testing tentative 
answers with his trainer to given assured responses. 
10 
Once the Wittgensteinian point has been made we can still infer what the intended rule is because we know 
what tacit principles people adopt when they formulate such questions. The key point, though, is that in everyday 
cases we do not consider that there are possible rules which we fail to take into consideration. 
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What is characteristic of this process is that it is very much like one of hypothesis testing. 
The trainee acts as if he hypothesises that the trainer is following some specific rule: 
continued agreement acts as confirmation, thus adding to the trainee’s confidence that he has 
got it right; dissonance serves to falsify the hypothesis, in which event the trainee rejects it, 
and so starts to test some other hypothesis in its place. 
Given the background beliefs that the trainer is following a rule, and that the identity of this 
rule can be determined from a finite number of applications, a genuine process of hypothesis 
testing following this model would be an entirely rational process. In analysing the process 
of training, though, we ought not take this talk of conjecture and refutation too literally. In 
actually learning a rule, we do not engage in a genuine process of hypothesis testing, for as 
noted a trainee does not yet grasp the rules necessary to make an explicit hypothesis as to the 
rule being demonstrated. 
Nevertheless, to meet standards of rationality, all that is needed is that people act ‘as if 
engaged in a process of hypothesis testing. In particular, in training it is essential that we 
respond to praise and correction respectively in the appropriate manner. No matter what 
verdicts it leads me to suggest next, I must take note of this ongoing appraisal, change what I 
was doing if it is not working, and build on answers which have met with approval. It is this 
process - the retention of approved responses, rejection of censured responses, and 
consideration of both types of fresh information when giving further responses - which 
makes the whole process emphatically rational. On this basis we can discount the self-caused 
reason explanation of the training process, for that explanation does not accommodate non- 
accidental rationality. 
The Rule Explanation 
It remains to be shown that the rule-explanation of training is consistent with the rationality 
of the trainee. This does not mean that the acquisition of a rule must be purely the result of 
ratiocination, only that whatever processes are involved prove to be consistent with the 
application of rational belief formation processes. As mentioned above, in explaining 
Johnny’s behaviour in terms of a rule it is accepted that the training causes him to grasp the 
rule, so there is still an element of causation within the account. The important point is that 
although there is a causal element within the account, this feature does not cause Johnny to 
accept the behaviour of his teacher as reason for his belief. Rather, by utilising his pre- 
existing inferential practices, the caused change enables Johnny to see his teacher’s 
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behaviour as a reason for his belief that cp comes next. It is this causal change which allows 
Johnny to make an inference (i.e. that cp comes next) that he would not otherwise have made. 
Again, the situation can be likened to hypothesis testing. To give an analogous situation, 
suppose that the apple falling on Newton’s head caused him to acquire the concept of a 
force, and so to be able to formulate and entertain the theory of universal gravitation. If so, 
he could subsequently reason with his newly acquired concept, is in the position to test a new 
hypothesis, and so might be able to reach fully warranted conclusions which he could not 
have rationally reached before. Importantly, the scope of his rationality would thus be 
expanded, but the nature of his rational belief-formation processes would remain intact. The 
conclusion that the motion the planets is governed by gravity could then be justified quite 
rationally. In contrast, if the apple falling on Newton’s head caused him to believe something 
he did not believe before (but for which he did have the necessary concepts), or to accept 
something as a reason for a belief which he did not previously accept, then Newton would 
not then be employing his rational belief-formation processes, and the whole procedure is 
not rational. 
Likewise with a rule-follower: in coming to grasp a new rule, the type of behaviour Johnny 
‘recognises’ as being rule-governed is altered. That is, someone who grasps the rule add 2 
will recognise the series 2, 4, 6... as a fragment of the series generated by adding 2, and so 
unhesitatingly forward 8 as the next element of the series. His rational processes do not 
change, but he can now ‘see’ various options for continuing the series in ways not previously 
available to him, and as a result he can reach a new rationalistic conclusion as to what comes 
next. Although there is a causal element in the explanation for the change to the inference he 
makes - he is caused to grasp the rule - the explanation is not wholly causal, and does not 
conflict with our overall view of him as a rational agent. 
In summary, it is the following features which make training induced agreement necessary 
and sufficient for the warranted ascription of a rule. First, what is to be explained is the 
origin of a certain mode of behaviour on the part of the trainee. Second, the change in 
behaviour is a change which is characterised by an on-going agreement with the responses of 
the trainer. Third, training occurs when the trainee puts himself under the authority of the 
trainee, so that his aim is to state how the rule continues based on the evidence of the 
trainer’s prior behaviour. The trainee’s judgements as to what comes next are thus always 
made for a reason. These features of training leave open two possible explanations: one 
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directly causal (the trainee is caused to reason differently), one indirectly causal (the trainee 
is caused to grasp a rule, and this explains why he reasons differently). Fourth, in responding 
to training the subject must reject/endorse answers as indicated by the trainer and use the 
information when forming new verdicts. In other words, the trainee must be a rational agent. 
Fifth, to explain a process which satisfies accepted standards of rationality, a reason 
explanation is superior to a caused-reason explanation. And finally sixth, the explanation in 
terms of grasp of a rule is a type of reason explanation. It is only when the appropriate 
change occurs within a framework of rationality that the rule explanation is markedly better 
than the alternative, and since the rule explanation is wholly adequate, the situation is 
necessary and sufficient to warrant explanation in terms of rules. The ability to agree as the 
result of training is, therefore, the required property PIA-I,. 
11 
Meaning as Communal Use 
Our reason for identifying PIA-I, was to motivate an alternative basis for meaning. Given 
some property F such that: 
( K O )  vx  (IMX + 1,x) 
(BE") The best explanation for ICo requires that F be constitutive of meaning, 
then we should have established: 
(CCO) Vx (Mx 3 Fx), 
i.e. that F is constitutive of meaning. In pursuit of some such property, we noted in the 
previous chapter that should some property F satisfy: 
(*) VX (PIA-IRx + IFx) 
1 1  
Earlier it was noted that in some situations we should intuitively describe people as rule-followers even though 
they have not undergone any training. (The example considered was of people who are born mathematicians.) 
The basis for our inclination to describe such people as rule followers could be given thus: our born 
mathematician behave in a similar manner to ourselves (adding, subtracting, and so forth), and given that we 
explain our own behaviour in terms of rules. we should apply the same explanation to our born mathematicians 
on inductive grounds. Once, however, it is recognised that training is instrumental in the justification of the initial 
ascription of a rule, the inductive basis for this inference breaks down, making the intuitive description 
unwarranted. 
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(i.e. what would be evidence for rules is also evidence for F), then F will automatically 
satisfy condition IC". In this way, using PIA& to identify properties which satisfy IC", we 
may come up with a range of properties, each of which is at least a candidate for a 
constituent of meaning. It would then merely be a matter of seeing which, if any, of these 
candidates also satisfies BE". If one does, then our task is complete. 
So, which properties satisfy (*)? Given that PIA-I, is the ability to agree with one's trainer 
having undergone training, any such F would be ascribable to anyone who manifests that 
ability. One way we could ascribe a property in this situation would be if F explained that 
ability (F thus being ascribed on the basis of inference to the best explanation). It is by this 
route that the constitutive relation between rules and meaning would have been established, 
for a rule is, as we have seen, just the type of thing which could explain training induced 
agreement (that is, until the indexical argument shows that this type of explanation is 
unavailable). Nothing else comes to mind which could take on this explanatory mantle - 
what could explain why we a11 think a given action is correct if not a rule? - which leaves the 
ability a basic property, not to be explained in terms of anything else. 
As a result, there is no option but to accept that F can be ascribed to anyone who has the 
ability to agree with others as the result of training because the property F is the property of 
possessing this ability. The explanation for the fact that that meanings can only be ascribed 
to those who manifest training induced agreement is that meaning consists in this ability. In 
as much as we thought that the truth-rule for a word were necessary for its meaning, it turns 
out that we are as justified in thinking that the ability to use it in accordance with our 
teachers - to agree in our verdicts as to what is correct - is constitutive of meaning. We do 
12 
13 
1 L  
In talking of an ability to agree with the community, the reference to an ability needs careful handling. We 
might analyse abilities in terms of dispositions - so that the ability to ride a bike consists in the disposition to do 
so given both the intention to ride a bike, and the appropriate means. In the present case, though, the ability to 
agree does not mean that we would agree given the intention to agree: the aim is not to agree, but to act correctly, 
or to speak the truth. In this case, the intention is askew from that of a normal ability, but the description of it as 
an ability still appears apt. 
13 
The theory may be considered an explicit answer to the worry expressed by McDowell, who, when criticising 
The problem for Wright is to distinguish the position that he attributes to Wittgenstein from one according to 
which the possibility of going out of step with our fellows gives us the illusion of being subject to norms, and 
consequently the illusion of entertaining and expressing meanings. (McDowell 1984, p. 336) 
The point made here is precisely that the 'illusion of norms' created by collective on-going agreement, far from 
being an illusion of content, is all that content actually requires. 
Wright's (1 980) communitarian account of rule-following, says: 
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not have to follow rules in order to speak meaningfully. Rather, we merely have to appear to 
follow rules. 
Communal Use and the Indexical Argument 
To complete the argument for this, what we may call the training-induced communal use 
theory of meaning (or communal use theory for short) a final step is needed. We have 
already noted that once rules are removed from consideration, the indexical argument poses 
no threat to meaning; and on this basis it is automatic that the communal use theory does not 
itself succumb to the difficulties raised by the indexical argument. Nevertheless, since the 
principle recommendation for the communal use thesis is that its competitor (rule-based) 
theory is precluded by the indexical argument, to make the communal use theory fully secure 
it will help to show precisely how this immunity to the indexical attack is achieved. 
14 
The question underlying the indexical argument is, of course, this: what determines whether 
I mean the same now as I did previously? Under the communal use theory, the answer is 
unsurprisingly that one means the same just in case in using a word, one engages in the same 
communal practice as before. This answer, though, is not wholly satisfactory, for it 
immediately raises the further question: what determines that we are now engaged in the 
same practice as before? 
Here the answer comes in two stages. The first point is that under the communal use theory, 
nothing as yet determines how a community ought to behave if it is to continue a practice in 
the future. Rather, the use of a word will be fixed by the community at the time. In that case 
it looks as though any present communal behaviour could be a continuation of any previous 
practice, in which case we would have the indexical problem all over again. But we have so 
far omitted the vital point that the practice in question must be the result of training, which 
for each individual is a determinate historical process. In that case, the community continues 
the same practice on condition that the behaviour of each member arises from the same 
historical training process. So indeed, although in principle any practice could be the 
continuation of some earlier one, in actual fact it will only be such a continuation if both 
emanate from the same source. It is because of the role training plays in the communal use 
14 
The reference to the community here merely signals the role of interpersonal agreement between trainee and 
trainer within the account. 
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thesis that a communal process, unlike a rule, has determinate trans-contextual identity 
conditions. The communal use theory does indeed neutralise the indexical argument. 15 16 
1s 
To be clear, it is no part of the present thesis that communal verdicts determine the extensions of our words, 
and so this is assuredly not a version of communal rule-following. 
16 
It is worth confirming that the elimination of rules avoids the objection made against Kripke’s ‘sceptical’ 
solution. In Chapter 4 it was argued that meaning irrealism is incoherent on the following basis: meaning 
irrealism is an essentially explanatory theory (prescriptive explanation); irrealism of any kind strips its subject 
matter of its (prescriptive) explanatory power; that meaning irrealism is a self-applicable thesis; and that as a 
result meaning irrealism strips itself of its required explanatory power. Although the use theory here defended is 
also self-applicable (as any theory of meaning must be), it is distinctive in that it explicitly forgoes the role of 
prescriptive explanation. Without norms, there can be no account of what people ought to say because there is 
nothing that people ought to say. In particular, whereas the assertion-conditional theory is designed to explain 
how attributions of rules are still prescribed even in the face of the ‘sceptical’ argument, the communal use theory 
denies meaning ascriptions (like any other ascription) are normatively required. For this reason the same 
incoherence does not arise. 
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8. Meaning, Use and Truth 
The notion of meaning is so intimately connected with that of truth that we cannot be said to 
have a measure of the communal use thesis unless we have some idea of its attendant theory 
of truth. Indeed, a theory of language will likely only have philosophical ramifications in so 
far as it tells us about the language-world relationship, and we can hardly say anything 
informative here without mentioning truth. So, under the communal use theory, what does 
happen to truth? 
The communal use theory has been established on the basis that rule-following is impossible, 
which is to say that all notion of correctness has been relinquished. The prima facie 
conclusion to draw is that since truth is a type of correctness, meaning does not determine 
truth at all; that no linguistic entity has a truth-condition, and no statement or utterance ever 
has the property of being true, or of expressing a truth. This ‘no truth’ theory of truth is 
admittedly an extreme position, carrying with it little inherent plausibility, and indeed it is a 
position of dubious coherence. (If there is no truth, the ‘no truth’ thesis cannot itself be true.) 
There is, though, an altogether more sophisticated approach to the connection between 
meaning and use which ought to be considered in the present context. The thesis, proposed 
by Honvich (1999, is based on a version of deflationary truth, Honvich’s version being that 
the concept of truth is given by the disquotational schema: 
(DS) ‘p’ is true e p 
In saying the DS captures the notion of truth, Honvich means that all the properties of truth, 
the explanatory power of truth, and grasp of the concept of truth, can all be accounted for in 
terms of DS. 
1 
1 
Various characterisations of deflationism are available. I focus on Horwich’s account initially, but consider how 
different formulations stand with respect to the argument below. Note that Horwich uses DS to characterise truth 
in the paper I discuss here (Horwich 1995), but that in his (1990) he gives a different version (namely that truth is 
captured by schema ES given below). As discussed in the main text below, DS is certainly inadequate as the basis 
for a theory of truth, but I defer the discussion of its flaws to allow the principles at work to be exposed quickly. 
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Honvich’s central contention is that apparently non-normative use is in fact normative, and 
can determine truth-conditions, on condition that truth is deflationary. Indeed, in this way 
Honvich re-invigorates rule-following, for use is claimed to determine a correctness 
condition (under a correspondingly deflationary notion of correctness) after all. 
Nevertheless, the thesis in no way conflicts with the foregoing argument that rule-following 
is impossible, for (as shall become clear) that argument was directed against a robust (i.e. 
non-deflationary) theory of correctness. If Honvich’s thesis turns out to be right, then we 
need not reject the earlier argument, but merely recognise that it establishes the impossibility 
of robust rule-following, a result which motivates deflationary rule-following. 
Before assessing the compatibility of the communal use theory and deflationary truth, it is 
important to note that Honvich’s concerns about the relationship between deflationary truth 
and use are slightly different from our own in three respects. First, Horwich accepts that 
truth-determination is a criterion on meaning; that a use theory cannot be endorsed unless it 
allows for truth-determination. In the present context our project is somewhat more 
investigative: having established the communal use theory, our task is to identify the 
consequences for truth, and to ensure that the result is coherent. 
The second minor difference in Honvich’s position is that in talking of the use theory, he 
means simply that meaning is dispositional, without any mention of either training or the 
community. As we shall see towards the end of this chapter, this difference does have some 
bearing on the cogency of Honvich’s argument. However, the initial prospect is that under 
deflationism, any meaning-determining property (and so certainly any version of a ‘use’ 
theory) can determine truth. To avoid prejudice against Honvich, I shall initially consider the 
argument as it is presented, and only then look at how the different ways ‘use’ is employed 
have any bearing. 
2 
The third difference is that Honvich accepts, as a premise, that the deflationary theory is 
correct. I shall not here consider independent arguments either for or against the deflationary 
2 
Field (1994% 1994b) defends a similar position to Honvich, claiming that deflationary truth is compatible with a 
‘use’ theory of meaning (although Field’s definition of deflationism is different from Honvich’s). It is notable 
that Field takes the ‘use’ theory to be inherently normative - ‘use’ involves norms of warranted assertion - 
whereas Honvich appeals to deflationism to provide use with its normativity, so that use is normative in a 
deflationary sense. Clearly any theory which presupposes norms of warranted assertablity cannot be endorsed in 
the present context without begging the question. 
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3 
theory, but merely ask whether it is consistent with a use theory of meaning. This is because 
by defauZt any remotely plausible notion of truth will be better than no truth at all (and 
deflationism is at least initially credible), so that mere consistency with the use theory would 
in itself be a sufficient recommendation for deflationism. 
Horwich’s Deflationary Theory 
The key feature of deflationism which Honvich’s exploits is its claim that “truth is not 
susceptible to conceptual analysis, and has no underlying nature” (Honvich 1995, p. 358). 
This is a direct consequence of the given characterisation of truth. For comparison, a more 
usual (non-deflationary) theory of truth would be of the form: 
‘p’ is true e ‘p’ is F 
Such a theory presents an analysis of the concept true. As Honvich notes (1995, p. 360), 
many such theories have been offered, but so far without widespread acceptance. The 
deflationary theory is signally not of the above form, and entails no statement of this form, 
which is why Honvich states that truth, under deflationism, is not susceptible to conceptual 
analysis. 
The relevance of this distinctive feature of deflationary truth to the use theory of meaning is 
demonstrated in Honvich’s diagnosis of Kripke’s rejection of the dispositional theory of 
meaning. To recall the discussion of Chapter 1, Kripke objects that dispositions cannot 
determine truth on the basis that there is no set of ideal conditions 0 such that: 
S is true e S would be uttered in conditions 0 
This has the form of a traditional analysis of truth, which means that in adopting the 
satisfaction of this conditional as a criterion on a dispositional theory of meaning, Kripke 
thereby assumes that truth must be susceptible to analysis. In doing so he assumes that truth 
is robust. So, Honvich contends, rather than showing that dispositions are not truth- 
determining, all Kripke actually proves is that dispositions cannot determine robust truth. 
The possibility remains that dispositions can determine truth, if truth is deflationary. 
3 
Honvich’s theory is developed and defended comprehensively in his (1 990). 
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Kripke’s assumption (that truth must be analysed in terms of dispositions for the 
dispositional theory to succeed) is quite understandable given the way reductions normally 
work. For example, to say that water reduces to H20, we should first have to show that all 
the properties of water - its transparency, fluidity, boiling point, and so on - are properties of 
H20.  Similarly, before reducing meaning to dispositions, we should show that the properties 
of meaning - including truth-determination - are properties of a dispositional state. Since 
truth-determination is not an empirically verifiable property, the only evident means of 
showing that 
dispositions. 
dispositions determine truth is to give an analysis of truth in terms of 
In setting himself in opposition to this traditional approach, Honvich must show how use 
may determine truth without the benefit of analysis. To this end Honvich makes a distinction 
between strong determination and weak determination. Strong determination is of the type 
just considered, whereby truth can be analysed in terms of, and hence ‘read off,  use. The 
alternative account - weak determination - does not require that truth be ‘read off  from use, 
but merely that “two predicates with the same meaning-constitutional property are co- 
extensional” (Honvich 1995, p. 363). In particular, with weak determination there is no 
means of saying which use determines which truth-conditions (in Honvich’ s terminology, 
you cannot ‘read off the truth-conditions from the use), only that the same use gives the 
same truth-conditions. 
The distinction Honvich draws between strong and weak determination is legitimate, for 
weak determination is a respectable notion of determination. For example, in saying that the 
chemical properties of an element are determined by the number of protons in the nucleus, it 
is certainly meant that the same number of protons gives the same chemical properties. What 
does not follow is that there is any means by which the chemical properties of an element 
can be ascertained simply on the basis of its atomic number. 
The fundamental advantage of saying that use weakly determines truth - i.e. same use, same 
truth-conditions - is that even though we lack the means to correlate specific uses with 
specific meanings, we still have an informative determination statement. With weak 
determination there is no requirement that the identity of the truth-condition be ascertained 
from the use, and so no need to give an analysis of truth in terms of use. 
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So far, everything is in order: weak determination does appear to give a sense of truth- 
determination which is consistent with the use theory. To clinch the argument, though, 
Honvich must do more than establish consistency; he must show not only that deflationary 
truth is compatible with the notion of weak determination, but also that use actually does 
weakly determine truth. For his part, Honvich finds the claim that use weakly determines 
truth to be “uncontroversial” (1995, p. 363), and thus not worthy of serious justification. 
However, it transpires that the matter is far from uncontroversial. For if we cannot ‘read off 
an extension from a given use, how can say that the same use determines the same 
extension? Indeed, what right can we then have to say that an extension is determined at all? 
4 
The problem can be illustrated in terms of our example of atomic numbers. The standard 
strategy to establish a weak determination relation would be to take various samples, identify 
the respective atomic numbers, test for a range of chemical properties, and see if there is any 
correlation. Whilst this method does not allow one to ‘read off the chemical properties from 
the atomic number of an untested element, the process does requires that you be able to tell 
(empirically) which atomic number is associated with which chemical properties. So 
although in this case we cannot give a function from atomic number to chemical nature, if 
we could not in some sense ‘read off the chemical properties of an element from its atomic 
number (in this case empirically), then the weak determination claim could not be justified. 
It is notable that a similar process cannot be applied in the case of use and truth, for by 
assumption, a truth-condition cannot be ascertained from a specified use. To establish weak 
determination in this case, a more inventive strategy is required. 
Establishing Weak Determination 
Honvich does not provide the necessary detail, but it is not difficult to see how the account 
must go, for we have limited materials at our disposal - namely the use theory of meaning 
4 
Honvich does defend the claim that use weakly determines truth to some extent, but only in as much as it is 
threatened by Kripke’s observation that dispositions are finite. A finite disposition cannot determine an infinite 
extension, and so dispositions appear to leave meaning underdetermined - in which case same use would not 
determine same meaning. (It would seem that, as far as finite use can determine, it is possible that two people 
share the same dispositions, but one means plus, whilst the other means quus.) However, as Honvich observes 
(1995, p.366) this argument begs the question in assuming that meaning extends beyond use. If we have an 
independent reason to reduce meaning to use (which the use theorist must have), then there can be no grounds on 
which to say that two people who use a word in the same way mean different things. Honvich’s aim is to counter 
the objection that use does not determine truth-conditions to within uniqueness. Yet the claim in most need of 
support - but which Horwich merely recommends as being ‘uncontroversial’ - is not whether use (weakly) 
determines an extension to within uniqueness, but whether use (weakly) determines an extension at all. 
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and the deflationary theory of truth. However, before constructing the argument it is 
necessary be more precise in our formulation of the deflationary theory. 
In the paper under consideration (Honvich 1995), deflationism is characterised as the claim 
that the disquotational schema: 
‘p’ is true e p 
captures the notion of truth. The intended function of the quotation marks on the left hand 
side is to turn a proposition into the name of a sentence. Yet a sentence only has a truth- 
condition given that it has the meaning that it does. In the above formulation, the fact that ‘p’ 
means that p is a tacit assumption. In the normal course of things such an assumption is quite 
acceptable, but here the aim is to make the nature of truth fully perspicuous, in which case 
such tacit assumptions have no place. As given, the deflationary schema misses out what is 
most important: that a sentence has a truth-condition only because the sentence means what 
it does. 
5 
A better strategy is to formulate deflationism in either in terms of propositions: 
(ES) <p> is true e p 
(‘<p>’ stands for ‘the proposition that p’); or in terms of utterances: 
(DS+) U says that p (U is true a p) 
Whilst Honvich gives his sustained defence of deflationism in terms of ES, he also claims 
(1990, pp. 106-107) that the deflationary theory can equivalently be given in terms of 
5 
To put the point more forcefully it could be argued that DS gives a vacuous formulation. I am prepared to 
endorse both of the following conditionals: 
(In English) “Bill wears suspenders’’ is true iff Bill wears suspenders. 
(In American English) “Bill wears suspenders” is true iff Bill wears braces. 
Do I then endorse the following instance of DS: 
“Bill wears suspenders’’ is true iff Bill wears suspenders? 
Clearly there is no correct answer to this question - if the quoted sentence has its English meaning I do, and if it 
has its American English meaning I do not. There is then no fact of the matter whether I accept this instance of 
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utterances. This form (i.e. DS+) is the most convenient when it comes to showing that use 
weakly determines truth, and so it is the one I shall concentrate on. 
6 
Given this formulation of the deflationary schema, the fact that use weakly determines truth 
is readily established. We start with the use theory of meaning. Suppose that S has a given 
use U, and that U determines that S means that p. That is: 
(1) U(S) = U 3 S means that p 
I 
where ‘U(S)’ stands for the use of the sentence S. 
The deflationary theory of truth gives us: 
(2) S means that p s (S is true e p) 
DS, the matter is underdetermined. For this reason, DS cannot capture truth. This type of consideration - that the 
same sentence may have more than one meaning - is acknowledged by Honvich ( 1990, p. 104). 
6 
Horwich actually gives the deflationary theory for utterances using the following schema: 
(D-tr) U is true e p 
“where ‘U’ is replaced by a singular term referring to an utterance and ‘p’ is replaced by a sentence of our 
language that ... would be the ... translation of that utterance.” (Honvich 1990, p. 106). The formulation of the 
schema D-tr is, however, disingenuous, for the qualification given in text following D-tr (i.e. “where ‘U’ is 
replaced by a singular term ...” (quoted above)) is really part of the theory itself. The situation is more perspicuous 
if we include the qualification as an antecedent, giving the following schema: 
(D-tr+) trans(u) E ‘p’ 2 (U is true a p) 
But this formulation (also) rests on the false assumption that ‘p’ has its content essentially (‘p’ may mean 
anything in some possible language). It is for this reason that the formulation in terms of utterances given above, 
namely DS+, is preferable. 
Honvich ought to find the characterisation of deflationism in terms of DS+ wholly unobjectionable. He claims 
(1 990, pp. 106- 1 OS) that his own versions of deflationism in terms of utterances (i.e. D-trt) and propositions (i.e. 
ES) are interderivable given the following ‘auxiliary assumptions’: 
U expresses <p> e trans(u) E ‘p’ 
U expresses <p> a (U is true e <p> is true) 
If the deflationary theory is given as suggested above, namely: 
(DS+) U says that p 2 (U is true a p is true) 
then given the auxiliary assumption: 
U expresses <p> 2 (U is true e <p> is true) 
which Horwich already endorses, the deflationary theory given in terms of ES can be derived from the theory 
given in terms of DS+, and vice versa. Since DS+ is equivalent to ES given the accepted auxiliary assumption, 
Honvich should accept the DS+ formulation. 
I 
An alternative approach would be to consider the uses of individual words. The form of the argument would of 
course be similar. 
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By transitivity on (1) and (2) we get: 
(3) U(S) = U 3 (S is true a p) 
Of course nothing in the argument is particular to S. By substitution T for S in (1) and (2) the 
same reasoning gives us: 
(4) U(T) = U 3 (T is true a p) 
8 
A logical consequence of (3) and (4) is: 
(5) [(U(S) = U & U(T) = U)] = [(S is true a p) & (T is true a p)] 
which in turn entails: 
(6) (U(S) = U & U(T) = U) 3 (S is true e T is true) 
The choice of U is clearly arbitrary, so on condition that S and T share the same meaning- 
determining use, they will have the same truth-conditions. The conclusion is, then, that use 
does indeed weakly determine truth. 
Against Deflationism 
The question I want to raise with respect to this argument is this: what right do we have to 
use the premise 
S means that p 3 (S is true a p)? 
First note that this step is essential, for we start with a statement about meaning, and aim to 
establish a conclusion about truth-conditions, so at some stage we have to connect meaning 
and truth. The only possible means of doing this is with an instance of the deflationary 
schema DS+. 
8 
Explicitly: A B, C DI (A & C) a (B & D). 
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In normal circumstances, DS+ is taken as a platitude, an indisputable fact about truth, and 
something which is a common starting point for any theory of truth. In the present context, 
though, this conditional cannot be taken for granted, for what it states is that meaning 
determines truth, which is precisely the point in question. Rather than simply assuming that 
meaning determines truth, the deflationist has to just& this claim. 
The justification of any instance of DS+ may appear to be an entirely trivial matter, for the 
deflationary thesis, accepted by hypothesis, consists in the claim that DS+ (or equivalently 
ES) is meaning-determining. As Honvich states: 
The disposition to assert, a priori, all instances of ‘<p> is true iff p’ constitutes an impkit  
(meaning giving) definition of the truth predicate. (Emphasis added. Honvich 1990, p. 23, fn) 
The deflationist claim about the meaning of ‘true’ is made against the background of a use 
theory of meaning. Any claim about the meaning of ‘true’ has to be reconciled with the 
adopted position that the meaning of a word is determined by the use to which it is put. It is 
no accident, therefore, that Honvich gives the following account which combines 
deflationism with the use theory: 
A person’s understanding of the truth-predicate, ‘is true’ - his knowledge of its meaning - consists 
in his disposition to accept, without evidence, any instantiation of the schema 
(E) ‘The proposition thatp is true if and only if p’ 
by a declarative sentence of English. (Emphasis added. Honvich 1990, p. 36) 
In the quoted passage, Honvich refers to his preferred formulation of deflationism in terms 
of propositions, but given that deflationism can also be formulated in terms of sentences and 
utterances, the same thought ought to hold in terms of DS+. Correspondingly, DS+ may also 
be considered a deJinition of the truth predicate. What better justification for DS+ could there 
be? 
On inspection, though, this argument falls apart. The aim is to establish that any instance of 
DS+ has the status of an established premise, thus making it available in the above 
demonstration that use weakly determines truth. The basis on which this is done is (a) the 
fact that meaning is use, and (b) the fact that a significant use of ‘true’ is our disposition to 
assert instances of DS+ (or ES). Combining these latter two points, it appears reasonable to 
hold that the disposition to assert instances of DS+ does indeed give ‘true’ its meaning. 
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Yet, expressing the idea in a slightly different way uncovers its difficulty. Let ‘DS+’ be a 
sentence expressing a particular instance of the schema DS+, and let DS+ be the proposition 
expressed by that sentence. In that case, the claim that our disposition to assert instances of 
DS+ is meaning-determining, and that this makes any instance of DS+ available as a premise 
for our argument, is the claim that the following conditional is true: 
9 
(*) U(‘DS+’) 3 DS+ 
That is to say, our disposition to assert any instance of DS+ without justification entails that 
the proposition that that instance expresses is true. 
This would be a remarkable claim to make, for the antecedent concerns a linguistic fact, 
namely that we utter a certain sentence in certain situations, whereas the consequent records 
a logical relation between meaning and truth, something which should hold irrespective of 
the contingent use of any sentence. This cannot be right, so something must be amiss. 
A precise diagnosis of the error made in (tacitly) endorsing the conditional (*) can be made 
if we go back a few steps. Under the use theory, one thing that does follow from the use to 
which ‘DS+’ is put it that it has the meaning that it actually has. That is: 
(1 ) U( ‘DS+’) 3 ‘DS+’ means that DS+ 
In saying that our disposition to assert ‘DS+’ is meaning determining, Horwich might mean 
that this use makes the sentence true (after all, a definition is usually considered to determine 
a truth by stipulation). If so, the claim is: 
(2) U(‘DS+’) s ‘DS+’ is true. 
Employing the trivial premise: 
9 
Spelling out a specific example of the conditional gives the cumbersome: 
U(“‘Grass is green‘ means that grass is green 2 (‘Grass is green’ is true e grass is green)”) 2 
(‘Grass is green’ means that grass is green = (‘Grass is green’ is true e grass is green)). 
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(3 )  S means that p, and S is true * p 
and with appropriate substitutions, (1) and (2) entail: 
(4) U(‘DS+’) 3 DS+ 
which is the desired result. 
The problem with this argument is not hard to find. Obviously step (2) requires that the use 
of a sentence can determine that that sentence is true. But in taking this step, we help 
ourselves to truth by stipulation, which is to say that we assume that use determines truth. 
Since this is precisely the issue under investigation - can use determine truth? - the argument 
clearly begs the question. 
Naturally, the above is only one attempt to construct the type of argument that Honvich’s 
thesis must rely on. Nevertheless, there is no need to consider other approaches Honvich 
might take to reach the desired goal, for we are now able to see that the very basis of 
Honvich’s position is unsound. The only way that the deflationary theory can make the 
desired connection between use (i.e. meaning) and truth is by appeal to particular instances 
of the deflationary schema (DS+), the idea is being that instances of the deflationary schema 
hold trivially, by definition, and are thus available to everyone, no matter what theory of 
meaning they endorse. But, of course, instances of the deflationary schema can only be used 
to deliver trivial truth-conditions if they themselves are true. This gives rise to the 
fundamental tension in the position, for deflationism is at root a claim about the meaning of 
the word ‘true’, and so the deflationary theory itself comes under the jurisdiction of the use 
theory. So unless our use of ‘true’ can determine that instances of DS+ are true - unless there 
is truth by stipulation - then the deflationary theory is itself powerless to establish that any 
instance of the deflationary schema is true. In short, deflationism only delivers truth- 
determination if use can be truth-determining, which makes the argument inherently circular. 
An Alternative Strategy 
There is an alternative approach which anyone wishing to defend Honvich’s position may 
take. Recall that Honvich claims that the disposition to assert instances of the deflationary 
schema without evidence is constitutive of grasp of the concept true. It follows, of course, 
that anyone who does not have this disposition does not have the concept. And in that case 
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there can be no significant dispute over whether use determines truth: anyone who does not 
accept every instance of DS+ is someone who does not have the concept, and so anyone 
persuaded (perhaps by the indexical argument) that meaning does not determine truth is not 
wrong, they have simply changed the subject. In that case no one who has the concept true 
will deny any instance of DS+, and so will have to accept the argument given above that 
meaning does weakly determine truth. 
As it happens, this argument is also defective, for the boot is on the other foot. At root, the 
central claim is that for some p (i.e. DS+), if you are not disposed to say that p come what 
may - even in the face of a prima facie argument that not p - then you do not have the 
concepts necessary to express p. But this is just an act of stonewalling, for this method could 
be adopted by the use theorist in any situation, to defeat any revisionary argument. 
To bring the point out, note that the aim of the argument is to persuade us that, contrary to 
first appearance, use is a normative, truth-determining, property. That is, deflationism is 
employed to change our opinion about meaning, use and truth. But suppose that my initial 
reaction is to accept my (reasonable) first impression, namely that since use does not 
determine truth, and given that meaning is use, then meaning does not determine truth. The 
job the deflationist theory has is to persuade me that my first impression is in error, and he 
tries to do this by claiming that anyone who knows what ‘true’ means will not accept the 
prima facie argument, and will instead assert instances of DS+ come what may. 
But by hypothesis, I would reject an instance of DS+ were it not for the deflationist’s 
argument. And the only way deflationism can make a difference is if previously I did not 
have the disposition to assert instances of DS+ come what may. According to the 
deflationist, this means that I did not have the concept true - or at least not the concept of 
truth captured by the deflationary theory. But if I change my verdict in light of the 
deflationist’s argument - if he succeeds in altering my opinion - then by the same token I 
have changed my concept. So whereas I previously did not have the (deflationary) concept 
true (in virtue of the fact that I was not prepared to assert an instance of DS+), I now do. 
Yet an argument ought not convince anyone to change their concepts, but only alter the way 
they apply their existing concepts. So I will only be persuaded to alter my opinion if I think 
that the concept of truth I do have is the deflationary concept. In this way deflationism 
becomes a self-fulfilling theory: because I think that deflationism is true, I alter my verdicts 
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in such a way that makes it true. Because I think that those who have the concept of truth are 
disposed to assert DS+ come what may, I assert DS+ come what may. But this process is a 
complete repudiation of rationality: we ought not alter our concepts to sustain our theories 
about them, our theories ought to describe what our actual concepts are. In short, the use 
theory ought to respect our practice of altering what we say in the light of new information, 
and correspondingly ought not stand in the way of a rationally supported overhaul of our 
thoughts about truth. In light of this obvious failing, this defence of deflationary truth- 
determination cannot succeed either. 
10 
Other Deflationary Theories 
The question we have been concerned with so far is whether Honvich’s deflationary theory 
in particular can make use truth-determining, and our answer is that it cannot. Nevertheless, 
Honvich’s theory is only one version of deflationism, and so the additional question arises 
whether some other deflationary thesis might prove more successful. One notable point is 
that Honvich’s version of deflationism maintains that truth is a property, whereas a more 
traditional characterisation - indeed a definition - of deflationsim is simply the denial that 
truth is a property at all. The type of theory in mind here is a type of expressivism, so that 
the sentence “S is true” is not descriptive, but rather expresses a certain type of approval 
towards S. Could not this type of theory make the ascription of truth to sentences legitimate? 
1 1  
Happily, it is unnecessary to investigate the (somewhat dubious) merits of such a theory in 
any detail, for the communal use theory cannot support any such thesis. This is because this 
type of deflationary thesis is normative (as discussed in Chapter 4), in that it holds that “is 
true” ought to be uttered whenever the speaker has the appropriate attitude, and withheld 
otherwise. In short, the theory is a claim about the rules which govern the use of the 
predicate “is true”. Since rule-following is impossible, the expressive thesis is immediately 
untenable. 
10 
This response to Horwich highlights what I believe is a substantial advantage for the communal use theory over 
a standard dispositional theory. According to Horwich, there are certain identifiable uses of a word - such as the 
assertion of instances of DS+ - which are meaning-determining. In that case, such uses are enshrined: contravene 
the meaning-determining use, and you lose the concept. In contrast, the communal use theory does not enshrine 
any particular uses, and under it the meaning of a sentence cannot be given in terms of specific unassailable uses. 
All we can say is that, broadly speaking, those who use a word in the same way mean the same thing. Hence such 
agreement might involve the rejection of firmly held beliefs (even those perhaps previously asserted without the 
need for justification), should the appropriate refutations arise. 
I 1  
See for example Kirkham (1992). 
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Eliminating Truth 
Communal use can neither strongly nor weakly determine truth; under the use theory “is 
true” cannot be expressive. There is no other option but to accept that communal use does 
not determine truth at all. Although strongly counter-intuitive, there is no option but to 
endorse truth-elimination. In that case, the immediate task is to show that the removal of 
1L 
truth does not lead to an unsustainable world view. 
To see whether the loss of truth can be sustained we really need to know what we lose when 
we lose truth, or, put the other way round, to identify why we think we need truth in the first 
place. In asking what we need truth for, there are really two issues to consider: 
(a) 
(b) 
Why do we need the concept true? 
Why do we need anything to have truth-conditions, or to be true? 
We need the concept true, fairly obviously, so that we can say things which otherwise could 
not be said (or to think things which otherwise could not be thought). Established candidates 
are generalisations such as “Every sentence of the form ‘P or not P’ is true”, and sentences 
which allow for the affirmation of a statement without repeating it - ‘blind endorsements’ 
such as “What the Bishop said is true”. 
Yet, no matter which particular statements feature an ineliminable truth-predicate, this issue 
has no bearing on the question of whether anything actually has truth-conditions or a truth- 
value. For to enable us to say things which could not otherwise be said in this way, all that is 
required is that ‘is true’ has a distinct meaning, which on the use theory is to demand only 
that it has a distinct use. 
13 
12 
The complete elimination of truth would require the claim not only that no linguistic item is true, but also that 
no mental state such as a belief, nor abstract object such as a proposition, can be true either. Above I concentrate 
on the failure of truth to adhere to sentences and utterances, but the expectation has to be that mental content 
receives a similar treatment. As for propositions, to say that a sentence or utterance is not true means that what it 
expresses is not true. We are then faced with two options: either sentences and utterances express propositions, 
and propositions are not truth-bearers; or sentences and utterances do not express propositions, in which case 
propositions could be truth-bearers. In the latter case, propositions should cease to hold any interest for us - 
indeed, since propositions are posited precisely in order to account for the common content of disparate 
sentences, we should then have no reason to suppose that such things exist. So either way, we can eliminate 
propositions as truth-bearers. Clearly a satisfactory treatment of these issues would require far more discussion 
than there is room for here, but the prospect is that the thesis as formulated with respect to linguistic items does 
indeed entail the complete elimination of truth. 
13 
It is sometimes claimed that truth is required solely to allow for such generalisations (e.g. Quine 1970, pp. 11- 
12) and blind endorsements. It would be fine for the ‘no truth’ theorist if this were so, for the fact that the concept 
of truth is required in order to make a certain type of statement does not entail that anything has the property of 
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The more important question in the present context is, therefore, the second one: why do we 
need anything to actually have a truth-condition, or a truth-value? Apart from (supposedly) 
accounting for content, a sample of the phenomena which plausibly require truth to be 
adequately explained might include: 
(a) the nature of assertion 
(b) 
(c) 
the success of rational (scientific) enquiry 
the validity of certain forms of reasoning. 
14 
Importantly, it is not just our view of ourselves as agents who engage in such activities 
which is at stake here. For the ‘no truth’ theory is, naturally, supposedly asserted on the basis 
of rational enquiry using valid reasoning. If any one of these activities turns out to be 
unavailable precisely because nothing is true, then clearly the position would be self- 
defeating. 
One point worth making at the outset is that not every explanation in the above list requires 
that any linguistic item actually have truth-conditions or a truth-value. To give an example, 
in saying that truth is required to explain the nature of assertion, what is often meant is that 
truth is a norm on the practice of assertion. That is, to assert is to aim at the truth. But to aim 
at the truth - to assert what you believe to be true because you believe it to be true - does not 
depend on anything actually being true. All that is needed is that you believe what you assert 
to be true. So again, it is only the concept of truth, and not the instantiation of truth, which is 
essential to the explanation, and this i s  quite acceptable to the ‘no truth’ theorist. 
1 5  
truth. (Similarly, the concept of witch is necessary to describe someone as a witch, but that hardly entails that 
anyone actually is a witch.) Hence it is quite consistent to say that truth is (only) necessary to make blind 
ascriptions and certain generalisation, as well as claiming (as the ‘no truth’ theorist does) that no sentence of the 
form “P or not P7’ is true, and that in all cases what the Bishop said is not true. 
14 
Instances where each type of claim is made are: (a) Dummett (1976, p. 83) and Williams (1973, p. 202); (b) 
Putnam (1 978); (c) Dummett ( I  977) and Putnam (1978). 
15 
How can someone who accepts the ‘no truth’ theory, and who thereby believes that truth is unobtainable, still 
aim at truth when making an assertion? Obviously there is immense practical benefit to be had from engaging in 
the practice of assertion, and so it is perfectly rational to suspend one’s belief, and act as Ifone believed in truth. 
We should no more say that such a person is not actually making an assertion than we should say that someone 
who knows he cannot win a game, but continues to act as if he can, is not really playing the game; or that 
someone who tells a lie does not thereby make an assertion. In other words, to engage in the practice of assertion 
is not necessary to aim at truth, but merely to act as if aiming at truth. 
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I shall not attempt to decide whether this strategy can be applied universally, for the more 
important point is that even if the possession of truth-conditions is essential for some 
explanatory task (whether mentioned on the list or not), this type of concern cannot be used 
to overturn the ‘no truth’ theory. The position we are considering is one in which the 
following propositions are taken as established: 
(1) Nothing can have truth-conditions. 
(2) The explanation of X requires that something have truth-conditions. 
The threat to the ‘no truth’ theory arises initially because it is now deemed to be 
explanatorily inadequate, and (more forcefully) on the basis that X (a certain inferential 
process, say) may be required to establish the theory in the first place. 
But to argue in this manner is to overlook the fact that there is no guarantee that everything 
we would like an explanation for can actually be explained. Basically, we are faced with a 
choice: given that X cannot be explained in the terms available, we either accept that X is 
impossible, or we accept that X is inexplicable. If X is some process which really is 
indispensable, on the basis that it is necessary for rational enquiry and so cannot be 
eliminated on the basis of reason, then the latter option - that X cannot be explained - is the 
option to take. In short, we can never overturn an argument that nothing can be F on the 
basis that F is needed in some explanation. Explanations, though clearly desirable, can never 
be demanded as of right. 
This point is really a reiteration of the argument given in Chapter 6. For it may be that 
normally, in as much as we have reason to believe that people engage in activity X, we also 
have reason to believe that something has a truth-condition. Consequently, we have reason to 
believe that X can only be performed if possession of a truth-condition is possible. Yet, once 
it is shown that grasp of a rule, and hence possession of a truth-condition, is impossible, this 
ought to motivate the claim, not that X is impossible, but only that X is not after all to be 
explained in the manner thought. Whilst in the case of content, a replacement notion was 
identified to take the place of rules/truth, there is nothing to ensure that a replacement notion 
is always available. And even if there is not, the outcome is not altered. In such a case, we 
should still conclude that X is not to be explained as previously thought, but given that we 
have as much reason to believe that people engage in the activity as we ever did, the only 
option is to conclude that X admits of no substantive explanation. Explanatory deficiency is 
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not a logical difficulty, and so there can, then, be no argument that the ‘no truth’ thesis is 
incoherent along these lines. 
A Final Rejoinder 
There remains, however, the prospect of a genuine incoherence. The ‘no truth’ theory 
appears to be inherently unstable: if no sentence is true, then the sentence “No sentence is 
true” is itself not true. Does this make the thesis self-defeating? 
It does not, and the explanation is brief. The argument, in slightly more detail, is that given 
the ‘no truth’ thesis, namely: 
(1)  VS, S is not true 
we can substitute the sentence in (1) as an instance of S in (1) itself to get: 
(2) “VS, S is not true” is not true. 
Given that: 
(3 1 ‘p’ is true a p 
then by MTT on the right-to-left conditional of (3) we have: 
(4) Not: VS, S is not true 
which contradicts (1). 
The problem here is by now familiar, for in using the ‘disquotational’ property of truth, it 
should not be forgotten that the meaning of the mentioned sentence is left tacit. That is: 
“VS, S is not true” is not true 3 Not: VS, S is not true 
relies on the contingent fact that the sentence “VS, S is not true” means that no sentence is 
true. So the ‘disquotational’ principle actually involved is: 
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S means that p --4 (S is true G p), 
that is, DS+. Previously it was argued that the use theorist has no right to this platitude. (In 
particular, the minimalist claim that such a platitude gives the meaning of ‘true’ was 
rejected, for under the use theory it is never possible to encapsulate the meaning of a word in 
this way. All we can ever say is that knowledge of meaning consists in possession of a 
certain kind of ability.) The ‘no truth’ theory was adopted precisely because, without DS+ as 
a premise, it is not possible to get truth from meaning. That is, it is because the claim that 
meaning determines truth cannot be justified that the truth-eliminativist accepts that meaning 
does not determine truth. Since DS+ just is the claim that meaning determines truth, the step 
of adopting truth-elimination consists in the rejection of DS+ on the grounds that it is 
unjustifiable. Hence the truth-eliminativist has already rejected DS+, and so it cannot be 




Since DS+ is a statement which most people would accept, the ‘no truth’ theorist’s rejection of it is certainly 
revisionary of our ordinary linguistic practice. Such revisionism is not a problem for the use theorist here 
described. For, as discussed above, the theory does not hold that the endorsement of any particular utterances 
(even though they may enjoy universal communal assent) is part of what it is to know a particular meaning. 
Rather, one must be able to respond to various stimuli, in an on-going fashion, in broadly the same way as others 
would when in the same situation. Hence, if your stimulus is different from that of others, it is to be expected that 
the things you say will also be different; and if you absorb new arguments, it is to be expected that you will alter 
you theoretical position accordingly, even if this puts you out of step with what others currently say. Hence, the 
rejection of various truth-platitudes (as enjoined by truth-elimination) as the result of rational reflection is 
consistent with the engagement in the communal use of the word ‘true’. 
17 
The ‘no truth’ theory of truth is not without historical precedence, having been advocated by Nietzsche 
( 1  873/1979, p. 84). 
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Conclusion 
As things stand, the communal use theory is far from fully developed. Indeed there are many 
pressing questions which would have to be answered for the theory to be anything like 
complete. In particular, though I cannot address any of them here, there are several issues 
arising in relation to the nature and type of the agreement, and the classification of 
communal practices, required by the theory. To give a sample: 
In its present form the theory describes content in terms of agreement in judgement (as to 
what is correct). Is a theory of content which makes essential reference to mental content 
in this way really a stable position? (Specific charges that any reference to content within 
a theory of content leads to vicious circularity were considered, and dismissed, in 
Chapters 2 and 5, but the position remains somewhat uncomfortable. Can it be made 
more secure?) 
To agree is to give the same verdict in the same context, so that the existence of 
agreement would appear to depend upon our existing world view, that is on the way that 
we classify different contexts. Does this make agreement, and hence meaning, somehow 
subjective? 
In talking about agreement there is aprima facie need for publicity - we not only have to 
agree, but have to be seen to agree. How does such a publicity requirement have bearing 
on the occurrence of agreement? Does the need for verdicts to be manifestable in 
behaviour give rise to fresh holistic concerns? 
The communal use theory states that meaningful employment of words requires, not that 
we actually follow rules, only that we look like we are following rules. Is it then possible 
to say which rules you have to look like we are following - which practices we have to 
agree in - for our words to have meaning? (Clearly it cannot require straightforward 
agreement in application, for there are many subject matters - such as aesthetics and 
morals - where such agreement is rare.) Can we say specifically which practices we have 
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to engage in to count as knowing the meaning of a specific word, and if so would such 
result hold any significance? 
Despite these unresolved issues, it is plausible that we already have sufficient detail to 
discern (if somewhat provisionally) the general philosophical message of the communal use 
theory, and it is in outlining this that I should like to end. Unfortunately, it turns out that the 
only message it is possible to discern at the present time is that the philosophical message of 
the communal use theory is hard to discern. 
In ascertaining the metaphysical significance of any semantic theory, we need first to 
consider what metaphysics is. Traditionally, the central aim of metaphysics is to explain (as 
far as possible) the sensible world in terms of the suprasensible. To this end we should (a) 
identi& the various entities in the world required for this explanatory task and (b) uncover 
the various relations holding between them. As a result, we can expect a metaphysical theory 
to include (a) a set of existence claims, and (b) a set of conditionals recording the logical 
relations existing between the items in that ontology. To take a typical example, we might 
explain the behaviour of others in terms of various mental states (and so posit the existence 
of other minds, beliefs, pains, and so on), and hope to capture the nature of such states by 
recording the logical relations holding between them (noting that if x is a belief, it is not a 
desire; that if S is in pain, she knows it; and so on.) 
The connection between these metaphysical aims and a semantic theory arises from the 
dependency which exists between the ability of the relevant statements to perform the duties 
required of them by a metaphysical theory, and the way in which such statements are 
warranted. In particular, the two different types of statement we are concerned with 
(existence claims, and conditionals) must each perform quite specific tasks. As noted above, 
we expect existence statements that are part of a warranted metaphysical thesis to carry a 
certain explanatory burden; and we expect those conditionals which form part of a warranted 
metaphysical thesis to have the capacity to convey information about the way of the world. 
Whether either function - explanatory power, and informativeness respectively -can be 
sustained will depend on the mechanism which bestows the relevant warrants on our 
assertoric and inferential practices, and that is a question for our theory of meaning. 




(b) Conceptual role. 
The truth-conditional theory states that knowledge of meaning consists in grasp of truth- 
conditions, and that on the basis of this knowledge we are able to derive knowledge of what 
warrants the assertion of a particular statement S, and also how S may feature, either as 
premise or conclusion, within various inferences (i.e. its conceptual role). This theory has a 
high degree of explanatory unity, for both assertoric and inferential practices are derived 
from one key concept. 
In contrast, a conceptual role theory (or at least one version of a conceptual role theory) 
relinquishes the idea that both assertoric and inferential practices may derived from a 
common source: instead, assertion- and inference-conditions are themselves basic 
constituents of meaning. That is, grasp of meaning consists in grasping a set of appropriate 
rules governing assertoric and inferential practices. 
In light of the different ways that they account for our linguistic practices, each theory entails 
a different metaphysical view. Taking the truth-conditional theory first, under this theory in 
order that a statement such as “S is in pain” be warranted, we must have reason to believe 
that its truth-condition is satisfied. Clearly, the fact that pain behaviour warrants the relevant 
claim, and so indicates that the truth-condition for “S is in pain” is satisfied is not something 
which is determined purely by the meaning of that expression. Rather, it is a matter 
determined by the way of the world. Specifically, it must be that the fact that the truth- 
condition is satisfied - that is to say, that S is in pain - is the best explanation for the 
existence of her pain behaviour. In this way, the warrant in question must rest on inference to 
the best explanation, and inference to the best explanation is only possible if the existence 
claim in question is genuinely explanatory. 
In addition, if meaning is truth-conditional, then since we know what makes “S is in pain” 
true, and what makes “S has a mind” true, we are in an excellent position to recognise that 
the truth of the former guarantees the truth of the latter. And since the conditional “If S is in 
pain, S has a mind” records a relation between truth-conditions, it thereby records a relation 
which must hold between those entities which satisfy those truth-conditions. In this way 
conditionals do indeed serve to record relations between those properties instantiated in the 
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world, and can indeed be informative, should the relevant properties actually be instantiated. 
As a result, the truth-conditional theory accounts for our assertoric and inferential practices 
in a way which allows them to be (respectively) explanatory and informative, which is to say 
this theory of meaning is compatible with a substantive metaphysics. 
The same cannot be said about the conceptual role theory. If assertion-conditions are 
constitutive of meaning, then the fact that pain is ascribable on the basis of behaviour is not 
made on the basis of inference to the best explanation. Rather, the assertion is warranted 
directly on the basis of an arbitrary semantic norm. We cannot expect an arbitrary norm to 
increase (arbitrarily) our ability to explain the world, in which case talk of pain cannot be 
used to explain the existence of pain behaviour. 
Likewise, if knowledge of conceptual role is an independent constituent of meaning, then 
statements of the type of apriori conditionals philosophers are concerned with do not record 
relations between the relevant truth-makers, but merely record the arbitrary, meaning-giving 
rules governing the use of the terms involved. Consequently, conditionals recording 
warranted inferences in no way reflect the underlying nature of reality. 
Under the conceptual role theory - a view plausibly ascribed to Wittgenstein - neither type of 
element of a ‘metaphysical’ theory can sustain the role required for it to be genuinely 
metaphysical. Rather, all that we can hope to do is to is to identify the set of rules (the 
‘grammar’) governing the various assertoric and inferential practices which govern a 
discourse. In that case it is the fact that different subject matters are governed by different 
use-rules - they constitute different language games - that leads us to think that there are 
distinct types of entity in the world with differing ontological status. It is the mistake of the 
metaphysician to try to account for what are really mere differences in ‘grammar’ in the 
more substantive terms of a metaphysical system, the error being that of seeing the 
differences in question as having significance beyond the semantic. Once this error is 
recognised, metaphysics collapses. 
1 
The reason for examining these two theories is that they provide a framework within which it 
should be possible to place the communal use theory. However, this placement is not 




To start with, we could consider the communal use theory as the result of moving in a 
direction taking us away from a truth-conditional theory and towards a conceptual role 
theory, and then taking an extra step beyond. This is because the three theories - truth- 
conditions, conceptual role, communal use - are readily put on a scale of decreasing 
explanatory power. As we have seen, the truth-conditional theory explains both the 
principles governing assertion and inference in terms of one key concept, namely truth. The 
conceptual role theory is reached by removing that unifj4ng explanatory layer, leaving only 
the ‘surface’ rules governing use to fulfil all explanatory roles. In turn, the communal use 
theory states that we cannot even appeal to these types of rule to explain our linguistic 
practices. Rather than consisting in the grasp of a set of rules governing the use of our words, 
grasp of meaning consists in the ability to engage in various assertoric/inferential practices, 
where such abilities are taken as basic, and not amenable to explanation at all. Initially, then, 
linguistic practices are claimed to be governed by a single type of underlying rule, then they 
are held to be governed directly by independent use rules, and finally by no rules at all. In 
this way the progression from truth-conditions to conceptual role to communal use is the 
result of removing one layer rules - and hence one layer of explanatory depth - at each stage. 
When approached from this direction, it appears that at the (limited) level of explanatory 
power provided by a conceptual role semantics we have already relinquished the possibility 
of metaphysics, and so making the further move to communal use merely serves to make 
things (from the point of view of the metaphysician) worse. In particular, under the 
communal use theory our relevant assertoric and inferential practices are not warranted by 
anything - the practices are just what we do - and so certainly cannot accommodate the type 
of warrant required for an explanatory metaphysics. So, in making the step from conceptual 
role to communal use, the lot of the metaphysician is in no way improved, and from this 
perspective it looks as though communal use is as destructive of a substantive metaphysics 
as the conceptual role theory is. 
2 
However, before endorsing this conclusion, there is an alternative approach to this issue 
which should be considered. The above line of reasoning could be summed up as the thought 
that because it is a truth-conditional semantics which supports a traditional metaphysical 
2 
Of course when using language we have to consider that our linguistic utterances are warranted. The point is 
that from the meta-linguistic viewpoint - from outside the language in question - there are no rules available to 
take on the necessary normative role. 
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outlook, and because both conceptual role and communal use theories are incompatible with 
a truth-conditional semantics, that neither is suitable for the formulation of metaphysical 
theories. Yet, as we have seen, the conceptual role account is not destructive of metaphysics 
in virtue of the fact that it relinquishes truth-conditions, but rather because of the nature of 
the norms used instead. That is, it is because under this theory use is governed by arbitrary 
rules of assertion and inference that neither of those practices be used to betray the nature of 
reality. The relevant point is that the communal use theory also relinquishes rules governing 
assertion and inference, and in doing so distances itself from the type of anti-metaphysical 
view that the conceptual role theory enjoined. 
The overall result is that the communal use falls between the two positions discussed: it is 
neither metaphysically potent like the truth-conditional theory, nor metaphysically impotent 
like the conceptual role theory. Deciding what we can say in this situation - for there is no 
obvious third position to adopt - is perhaps the most pressing issue facing anyone advocating 
the communal use theory, but it is one which presents no obvious means of resolution. 
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